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ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURE OF SACRAMENTAL GRACE

THE purpose of this article should be quite evident from the very title itself. It is an endeavor to get the definitive doctrine of Aquinas regarding the nature of the grace coming to us through the sacraments of the Church. Any such attempt, however, necessitates an examination of the various writings to see whether his teaching is constant or otherwise, since this is by no means a foregone conclusion.

We shall try to point out as clearly as possible the Thomistic conception of the nature of sacramental grace; this necessarily entails a correct understanding of the function of that quasi-mysterious element of the sacramental process, the *res et sacramentum*, which to date does not seem to have been solved in so clear a manner as to make any of the several solutions proposed apodictic. We shall see that the simplicity and the

unity to which St. Thomas has reduced the sacramental process is one more proof of his having penetrated into the secrets of God and His supernatural plan in a most profound manner. Everything closely and intimately connected with the interior workings of the Divinity must necessarily reflect these perfections so proper to the Godhead. The sacraments are ordained to bring about sanctity, which, in the last analysis, is simplicity, the simplicity of a child in regard to its Father. We would naturally, therefore, expect the cause of this sanctity (even an instrumental cause), the sacramental process, to contain this note in an eminent degree.

Not that there will not be difficulties; this is already evident if we but consider that there are several theories which claim to be the exponent of the mind of the Angelic Doctor. We might reduce these difficulties to the following:

1. The change of St. Thomas' teaching on the nature of sacramental causality.
2. An obscurity as to just what he meant by the term *quosdam effectus* in the text occurring in the *Summa*.
3. A failure to consider as of very great importance the fifth article of the same question.
4. A lack of accurate consideration regarding those teachings which have some definite bearing on the problem at hand: the notion of *habitus*, of grace, of original justice and of original sin.

If we keep these points in mind, we should be able to arrive at some idea of the mind of St. Thomas in regard to the nature of sacramental grace.

It is best to follow a chronological treatment of the problem, so that if there is any development or change of doctrine, it will be the more apparent. That brings us first to a consideration of the *Sentences* and of the *De Veritate*. But before beginning our inquiry into the more important texts from these works, in which sacramental grace comes up for *ex professo* discussion, it is essential that we have some idea of the sacramental process as conceived by St. Thomas at the time of the composition of his commentary on the *Sentences*.

The division of this process was generally accepted as being made up of an action with a twofold effect, that is to say in sacramental terminology *res et sacramentum*, and the *res tantum*.

The *sacramentum*, or the *sacramentum tantum*, was the external rite, the sensible part of the sacramental process. The *res et sacramentum* can be considered as a sacramental character, or an *ornatus animae*. It is this which St. Thomas considers as the immediate effect of the sacramental action. The sacramental rite did not cause directly and immediately sanctifying grace, even if we consider it as an instrument of God. The reason for this is that at this time, the Angelic Doctor, following the teaching of his day, considered grace as being something created in the soul by God, something on the order of the human soul, and therefore, something which no creature could produce, even instrumentally. Nevertheless the *dicta sanctorum* made it essential to consider the sacraments as causing grace in some way, as being not mere *causae per accidens*, in no way inducing the effect.

Following an opinion being taught in his day, as is evident from the way in which he exposes it " And therefore some say," [1] he says that two things are produced in the soul by the external sacramental action: the *res et sacramentum* and grace. The first effect was brought about effectively by the sacraments.[2] With regard to the second effect, they were merely dispositional causes, *causae disponentes*, bringing about a disposition which of itself necessitated the infusion of grace.[3]

This creates a difficulty. Just what is this *talis dispositio* of which he speaks? [4] Is it something physical over and above the *res et sacramentum*? [5] If that were the case, there would be a threefold effect following from the sacramental action: the *res et sacramentum*, the disposition exacting the last effect,

[1] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *N. B.* Such as Peter de la Palu and Capreolus maintain.

and the ultimate effect itself, or grace. St. Thomas, however, speaks of only two effects,[6] and clarifies the role of the second, this *talis* dispositio, in the context:

> . . . but in addition, insofar as they (the material instruments) are instruments of the divine mercy which justifies, they bring about instrumentally (*modo perfectivo*) a certain effect in the soul, which corresponds to the first effect of the sacraments, such as the character, or something of the sort.
>
> They do not, however, bring about (*modo perfectivo*) the last effect which is grace, not even as an instrument, except in a dispositional manner, INSOFAR AS THAT WHICH THEY DO EFFECT INSTRUMENTALLY (*modo perfectivo*) IS A DISPOSITION WHICH OF ITS NATURE NECESSITATES THE RECEPTION OF GRACE.[7]

He identifies the first effect, or the immediate effect of the sacramental rite, which he has called above the *res et sacramentum*, with the disposition which necessitates the infusion of grace. It is God who immediately produces the form or sanctifying grace in the soul, and it is the sacramental rite which instrumentally produces the *res et sacramentum*, or the immediate effect; it is this latter which acts as the disposition for the infusion of grace, as the disposition which *normally accompanies it.*[8] So much for the effects of the causality of the sacraments in the commentary on the *Sentences.*

One other thing that could cause us difficulty is the term *gratia sacramentalis* as used in the earlier works. From its use it seems to have different meanings in various contexts. For at one time it seems to be something, an effect, that flows out of sanctifying grace and, therefore, presupposing the presence of the latter; at another, it appears to be something, a disposition, which precedes sanctifying grace. The solution is closely connected with the above problem, and is an application of

[6] *Loc. cit.* (cf. note (1)).

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *N. B.* The word *disposition* here is not used in the sense of an incomplete *habitus* which disposes something "*bene vel male.*" It is used to denote a kind of state of "matter" which precedes, *in ordine naturae, non temporis*, the infusion of a form.

the principle *causae sunt ad invicem causae, sed in diverso genere.* This disposition is something which precedes the infusion of the form in the genus of material causality, and something which follows upon the infusion of the form in the genus of formal causality. But there is a difficulty, at least an apparent one: is not the agent who produces a form the one who is responsible for the disposition necessitating the presence of that form? It is God alone who infuses the form in the case of the sacraments; the latter do not effect it, even in an instrumental manner. But if they do not effect the form, how can they effect a disposition which presupposes that form, at least in the genus of formal causality?

The answer is quite simple, and is in perfect consonance with the nature of instrumental causality which is, as St. Thomas says so clearly, *movens motum.*[9] God Himself directly infuses the form or the sanctifying grace, but He uses an instrument to bring about that disposition which the form requires. But in accordance with the nature of instrumental causality, the instrument does not move to produce its effect except insofar as it is moved by the principal cause. Ultimately, then, it is God Who causes both the form and the disposition required for the form. For the operation of the instrument as instrument is none other than the operation of God Himself; the same principle can be applied here as for the Sacred Humanity of Our Lord, " it is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead." [10]

Now to apply this to the problem at hand, the meaning of the term *gratia sacramentalis*; it is used by St. Thomas to indicate something which can be considered in one of two ways, either as a disposition preceding the infusion of grace, or, as an effect flowing from it. It is, we must note, the same reality, considered under different aspects in accordance with the principle mentioned above. If the term is not used in this

[9] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.

[10] *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2; the same thought is expressed in the *Sentences*: cf. *III Sent.*, d. 18, a. 1, ad 4 and ad 5.

manner, then we shall see that it is impossible to understand the texts that we shall examine.

Occasionally, in the earlier works, St. Thomas uses the expression to denote the last effect of the sacramental rite, or grace. This, however, is always more than evident from the text.[11] With this as a guiding norm, we can now move into our problem.

A. The *Sentences*

The best method of discovering St. Thomas' conception of the nature of sacramental grace at the time of the composition of the *Sentences* would be to analyze all or at least the most important texts in which sacramental grace is discussed. This would, however, make an article on the subject unduly long. For our purposes, namely, to discover the elements in the earlier works from which the definitive doctrine of the Angelic Doctor proceeds, it will suffice to synthesize or sum up what we consider to be the teaching that occurs here.

The following are the conclusions which would be deduced from such an analysis:

1. The sacramental graces flow out from the grace which perfects the essence of the soul, in a way *similar* to that in which the virtues and gifts do.[12]
2. The sacramental graces, properly so-called, really differ from the *gratia gratum faciens*. For the latter perfects the essence of the soul, while the former is ordained toward the removal of defects left by sin, with respect to the natural good of the powers of the soul.[13]
3. The sacramental graces are not identical with the virtues and the gifts, and are therefore really distinct from them.[14]
4. The sacramental graces are specifically distinct from one another.[15]

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[11] Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

[12] Cf. (a) *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 6, ad 5.
(b) *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5.
(c) *Ibid.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcl. 2 and ad 2; qcla. 3.

[13] Cf. (a), (b), and (c) in note 12; cf. also *IV Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*

5. The relation of the sacramental graces with habitual grace is that of a disposition for it, or of an effect flowing from it, depending on the genus of causality under consideration.[16]
6. The sacramental graces do not expel any *forms* which might be in the powers of the soul as the virtues do.[17]

It is by no means certain to say, as some authors do [18] that the sacramental graces differ from the *gratia gratum faciens* in the same *manner* as do the virtues and the gifts, and that they are, therefore, *habitus* distinct from this grace. The *point at issue* in each of those texts where this might appear to be so, must be taken into consideration. Moreover, from certain other texts in the *Sentences* and from the teaching on original sin, we shall see that the sacramental graces are not to be considered as *habitus* in the strict sense of the word.

In the fourth book of the *Sentences*, in his consideration of the grace given by the sacrament of Baptism, St. Thomas gives us his idea of just what the special grace of the sacrament is ordered to:

In original sin, such was the process, that the person corrupted the nature, and the nature the person. Whence in considering this sin, we can look for something that pertains to the nature, and something that pertains to the person.

The Passion of Christ was sufficient to remove both. But because the sacraments are applied to persons, the sacrament of Baptism removes from us that corruption of the person which overflowed from the corruption of the nature. And therefore, it takes away the infection of guilt insofar as this affects the person, and also the punishment which would deprive the person of That Act which is

---

[16] Cf. texts listed under (a) and (b) above.

[17] Cf. text (c), and *IV Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 1, ad 2.

[18] Capreolus, *Defensiones Theologiae D. Thomae Aquinatae in Quarto Sententiarum*, VI, Dist. I-II-III, q. 3, a. 3, § 3, p. 77 Turin, 1906); cf. also B. Brazzarola, *La Natura della Grazia Sacramentale nella Dottrina di San Tommaso* (Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Gregorian University, Rome), Grottoferrata, 1941. (The author attempts to prove in the work that the sacramental graces are *habitus* in the strict sense of the word.) Cf. also Cajetan, *Commentarium in IIIam partem*, q. 62, a. 2, n. 2; he admits that this may have been the mind of St. Thomas in the following places: *II Sent.*, d. 26, a. 6, ad 5; *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5; *IV Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 3; *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.

the Beatific Vision. But it does not take away, at the time in which the sacrament is conferred (*actu*), the infection which touches our nature; this is clear from the fact that through generation a baptized person transmits original sin to the offspring. Nor does it remove the penalties which pertain to a nature deprived of the grace of innocence of the first state, such as the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and other punishments of the sort which follow from the fact that man is composed of contraries, both in regard to the body, and in regard to the soul in a certain sense, that is, with respect to the appetite of the sense and that of the intellect.

However, baptismal grace does effect this result, that the penalties which remain no longer dominate the person; that they become, on the contrary, more subject to him, and that he might use them to his own advantage making them serve as an opportunity for virtue and an occasion for humility.[19]

And again we read:

But against the other punishment, following upon the constitution of corrupted nature, such as is the concupiscence or the "*fomes peccati*," a remedy is applied in Baptism, so that they no longer dominate the subject.[20]

In treating of the sacrament of Confirmation he says:

The disease of sin is removed in one of two ways; as regards the guilt: if it is original, it is removed in Baptism; if it is actual, it is removed in Penance. In regard, however, to the punishment by which we are inclined to sin, this is removed in Confirmation and in the other sacraments.[21]

One other text that illuminates the nature of this special grace, is taken from the *Supplement*, in regard to the sacrament of Extreme Unction:

The principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sins with respect to the *reliquiae peccati*. . . . These are *not* to be considered as dispositions resulting from actions; they are rather kinds of inchoate, or initial *habitus* creating a kind of spiritual weakness existing in our reason. When this is removed, even though

[19] *IV Sent.*, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 3.
[20] *Ibid.*, a. 3, qcla. 1, and ad 2.
[21] *Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 1.

the *habitus* or dispositions remain, the reason cannot be so easily inclined to sin.[22]

Sacramental grace must be considered in the light of original sin. If man had not sinned, there would have been no Passion, and consequently no sacraments, since the latter receive all their efficacy from the Passion of Christ. The sacraments were to be remedies against sin and the defects which it leaves in the soul, that is to say, the inclinations towards sin, or the wounds of the natural powers of the soul. They were ordained gradually to restore man to that pristine state of harmony which was found in our first parents before sin.

Original sin had brought about the loss of that marvelous harmony which consisted in a stable threefold subjection, of the mind to God, of the inferior powers of the soul to the reason, and of the body to the soul. It dissolved this by introducing into our will an aversion from God, and into the inferior powers a conversion toward commutable good.

From the texts cited above the special effects of the sacraments are ordained to rectify that disorder found in the inferior powers of the soul, at least partially. Their purpose is therefore, to rectify concupiscence, or the material element of original sin. The nature of this is described by St. Thomas in the *De Malo*:

> Concupiscence, according as it pertains to original sin, is not actual concupiscence, but rather habitual. It belongs to a *habitus* to make us trained (*habile*) for something. But an agent is also said to be inclined (*habile*) towards an operation from the subtraction of that which impeded this operation. So too, concupiscence can be said to be habitual in one of two ways, first as a disposition or *habitus* inclining us to doing something opposed to the dictates of our reason. Such would be the case in one who had the *habitus* of concupiscence from a repetition of acts. Original sin, however, is not considered to be concupiscence in this manner.
>
> Another way in which concupiscence can be understood to be habitual, is as an inclination to act outside the dictates of reason. This results from the fact that the concupiscible power is not per-

[22] *Summa Theologiae, Suppl.*, q. 30, a. 1, c. and ad 2.

fectly subject to our reason, given the fact that original justice has been lost. It is in this sense that original sin, materially speaking, is habitual concupiscence.[23]

The sacramental graces do not replace any form, because original sin is not a *habitus* in this sense of the word. They are ordained, rather, to restore partially something of that habitual disposition or harmony which was found in our first parents. They are to bring back, in some way, the subjection of the inferior powers to the reason. In the last analysis, then, they seem to replace merely imperfectly the material element of a *habitus* that does not impress any form on the soul, but which consists in a disorder existing in our nature, which disorder was prevented from coming about by a certain power of grace in the state of innocence.[24]

The term " concupiscence " is used here to denote the wounds of the natural good of the powers of the soul, or the " *fomes peccati* " inclining us toward sin. The sacramental graces serve to diminish the dominating force of this inclination, which, considered apart from its formal element, or with its formal element removed, does not have the *ratio* of a *habitus*, whether operative or entitative, since it is *in via*, or on the way to being removed.

It is true that St. Thomas frequently says that sacramental grace has some similarity with the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but this comparison cannot be pushed too far. They both flow out of the entitative *habitus* perfecting the essence of the soul, and they are both ordained to produce special effects in the powers of the soul, the one a remedial effect, the others a perfecting effect.

But sacramental grace, from all the descriptions of it given in the texts cited above, cannot be a *habitus* on the order of those of the virtues and gifts. For the latter are *operative habitus*, while sacramental grace, if anything would be an *entitative* or a *quasi-entitative habitus*, perfecting the powers

[23] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4.
[24] *II Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 5, sol.

not for operation (which function belongs to the virtues and gifts) but *in ordine ad se*. In this remedial aspect, which seems to be the aspect St. Thomas treats of predominantly in the *Sentences*,[25] it is ordained to *naturalize* a power of the soul, as John of St. Thomas says.[26] It is ordained to restore the power, or powers, to its or to their pristine health.[27] Its function, then, is to remove the obstacle, at least to some extent, to the free and unimpeded performance of virtuous acts; or let us say, that the remedial function of sacramental grace is to perfect the powers of the soul "*in ordine ad motum rationis*," such that the reason should find no obstacle on the part of the powers of the soul to its dictates.

Moreover the idea of a quasi-entitative *habitus* has no foundation in St. Thomas. For he speaks of only one entitative *habitus* in the soul, and that is grace.

Our final conclusion is, then, that the term sacramental grace refers to the immediate effect of the sacramental rite, or the *res et sacramentum*, precisely as such, if we consider it in one of its two relations with sanctifying grace, that is, as a disposition for it. It is not a *habitus*, either entitative or operative, but it is a remedy *tending* to bring back the powers of the soul to the subjection they once had in the state of innocence. Their function is one of restoration. Just as some of the old parts of an ancient monument can still be seen as a kind of witness to its restoration, so too, in the great work of restoring humanity, the latter has not been restored in all its parts so as to reach that state of harmony which existed between the inferior powers and the reason in the state of innocence.[28]

We cannot conclude with Capreolus, following Peter of

[25] *IV Sent.*, Prologue of St. Thomas.

[26] *Cursus Theologicus*, IX, q. 62, disp. 24, a. 2, n. 22.

[27] "Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia virtutum opponitur peccato, secundum quod peccatum continet inordinationem actus; sed gratia sacramentalis opponitur ei secundum quod vulnerat naturale bonum potentiarum." *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5, ad 2.

[28] P. Gounin, "La Grâce Sacramentelle," *Revue Apologetique*, 55 (1932), 142-143.

Palu, or with Fr. Brazzarola, that the sacramental graces are *habitus* in the strict sense of the word, and operative *habitus*; nor can we even say that the texts of the *Sentences* " favor the identification of the sacramental graces with new *habitus*." [29]

B. The *De Veritate*

Next in our consideration comes the text which has been used by both those who consider sacramental grace to be a *habitus* distinct from that of habitual grace, and by those who consider it to be a modality of this grace. Since the work was undertaken a little later than the commentary on the *Sentences*, we will be able to see whether there was any change or development of the ideas expressed there.[30]

The text occurs in an article parallel to one which is found in the *Sentences*—" Whether there is in every individual only *one gratia gratum faciens*.[31]

We shall have to consider the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth objections preceding the corpus of the article, insofar as the pertinent response is given as a solution for all of these. We might trace the objections *per modum unius*, so that the one response given for them will be somewhat more easy to grasp.

The sacramental graces are recognized as being specifically distinct from one another; [32] in fact so specifically distinct, that the objector conceives of them as different species of sanctifying grace [33] and not as one form that the various sacraments increase.[34] Under this light then, a person could have several *gratiae gratum facientes*, each of the sacraments producing its own.

[29] H. Bouëssé, O.P., *Le Sauveur du Monde 4. L'Economie Sacramentaire* (Chambéry-Leysee-Paris, 1951), p. 423.

[30] Fr. Walz, O.P., in his chronology of the works of St. Thomas, gives the *De Veritate* as having been written between 1256-9; the *Sentences*, between 1253-5; " Chronotaxis Vitae et Operum S. Thomae de Aquino," *Angelicum*, 16 (1939), 470-473.

[31] Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 26, q. a. 6.

[32] *Ibid.*, obj. 12.

[33] *De Verit.*, q. 27, obj. 14.

[34] *Ibid.*, obj. 13.

Moreover, the sacraments are considered as being directed principally against the guilt we have contracted,[25] and for that reason are not charismatic gifts in the sense of which St. Paul speaks,[26] because these are not opposed to any guilt.

Having already refuted some of the difficulties within the objections themselves, in the response one point will receive the special attention of St. Thomas—acceptance with clarification, or rejection of the assertion: "There are several species of habitual grace."

His response is a follows:

> . . . just as the diverse virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit are ordered to different acts, so too the different effects of the sacraments are as different medicines against sin, and participations of the power of the Passion of Our Lord, which depend upon the 'gratia gratum faciens,' just as do the virtues and the gifts.
>
> The virtues and the gifts, however, have a special name, because of the fact that the acts towards which they are ordained are evident; for that reason, they are distinguished from grace according to name.[27] The defects of sin, against which the sacraments have been instituted, are hidden; as a result, the effects of the sacraments do not have a proper name, but they are called by the name of grace, i. e., sacramental grace. It is with respect to these that the sacraments are distinguished insofar as these are considered their proper effects. Nevertheless these effects pertain to habitual grace, which is joined to them. Along with their proper effects, then, the sacraments have a common effect, habitual grace, which they give to one who does not yet have it, or increase in one who already does.[28]

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[25] *Ibid.*, obj. 14.

[26] I Cor. 12: 4.

[27] In the Leonine edition of the *De Veritate*, which will appear shortly, the last phrase will read as "should read 'unde etiam secundum nomen a gratia distinguuntur'." This is also the reading which occurs in the text where Capreolus discusses the nature of sacramental grace, referring to this text of the *De Veritate*. This would not seem necessarily to indicate that the virtues and the gifts are of the same nature as the sacramental graces; it would merely indicate that the virtues and the gifts differ from habitual grace on two accounts—because of their special effects, and, nominally. The sacramental graces differ from it on one, the fact that they have special effects. The nature of sacramental grace is not the point at issue.

[28] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 12.

The sacramental graces are to be considered as diverse medicines against sin, and participations of the power of Our Lord's Passion; and they depend, as do the virtues and the gifts, on habitual grace. But we must interpret this in the light of the entire response. The aim of the Angelic Doctor is to show that the special effects of the sacraments cannot be called diverse habitual graces perfecting the essence of the soul. He is answering principally the difficulty of the article—" Whether there can be more than one habitual grace? " The answer is categorical—No.

As regards the nature of sacramental grace, this is not determined because this cannot be decided perfectly until the special defects against which the sacraments are ordained are known; and they are as he expressly states not known (*latentes sunt*) Whence it is that we cannot give them any name such as " virtue " or " gift." It is true that we know something of the effects of the various sacraments, but we do not know the nature of the defects against which they are given. We know that until we perceive the nature of an object, we cannot know adequately the nature of that which is specified by the object. And therefore, we must conclude that until we know the nature of the defects, we cannot know adequately the nature of the sacramental graces or effects. If the *causa causarum*, the final cause is unknown, then the formal cause cannot be completely understood. And that is the exact cause we have here. For St. Thomas avows that the final causes, the defects for which the graces are given are hidden, or are not known.

We do know that the sacramental graces in some way pertain to habitual grace, as do the virtues and the gifts, and that habitual grace is joined to them, giving the sacraments not only their proper effects, but also a common effect, namely sanctifying grace.

Here again we note the position of sacramental grace with regard to habitual grace. It depends on habitual grace, and as such, presupposes it; and it also contains it by a kind of continuation, insofar as " the sacraments along with their proper

effects, have also a common effect, habitual grace, which they either give initially, or increase."

From two other responses in the same article, we can see a re-affirmation of the role sacramental graces are called upon to play. In the answer to the eighth objection, he says that in the consideration of sin, we can turn our attention to one of two things, the aversion which is the same for all mortal sins, in that they all turn us away from God, the unchangeable good; or we can consider sin in regard to the conversion it involves. It the latter consideration, the virtues oppose themselves to sin, such that the various virtues exclude the sins which are opposed to them. For contrary forms expel contrary forms or dispositions.

In the fifteenth response, St. Thomas says that if we consider sin precisely from the view-point of the aversion it involves, we have *one* wound inflicted on the soul, and that wound is healed by habitual grace. But if we take sin from the conversion to commutable good that it involves, it inflicts several wounds, which are healed by the virtues and by the special effects of the sacraments.

The virtues are sufficient to expel the forms opposed to themselves, as we can see from the answer to the eighth objection. The sacramental graces or effects must heal in another way, which is not expressed here, but which is probably that which is expressed in the *Sentences*—by acting as a remedy against the wounds of the natural good of the powers of the soul, which wounds, as we can see from the *De Malo,* do not require the infusion of any form or *habitus.* But regardless of the assertion of this last phrase, the fact that he does not mention how the sacramental graces heal, accords perfectly with the avowal that he has in the response to the twelfth objection—the defects against which they are given are unknown. For the *De Malo* was written at least four years after the *De Veritate.*[39]

[39] N. B. The dates given by Mandonnet for the composition of the *De Veritate* are 1256-9; for the *De Malo,* 1263-8. Cf. " Chronologie Sommaire de la vie et des écrits de Saint Thomas," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques,* IX (1920), 148.

From our consideration then, we can arrive at three conclusions:

1. The sacramental graces are distinguished from habitual grace, not in such a way, however, as to create different species of habitual grace perfecting the soul.
2. The relation of the sacramental graces with habitual grace appears to be exactly the same here as it was in the *Sentences*—disposition for, or effect following from, depending on the genus of causality under consideration.
3. The sacramental graces do not seem to expel any forms in the powers of the soul as do the virtues.

Beyond this, neither the text, nor the context allow us to go.

* * * *

There is one other text in this same work in which St. Thomas speaks of sacramental grace, a text, which, strangely enough, is not very often cited in regard to the problem. He merely repeats something that we have already seen in the commentary on the *Sentences*,[40] as regards the effects of the causality of the sacraments.

> The sacraments do not arrive directly and immediately at sanctifying grace, but rather at their proper effects which are called sacramental graces upon which there *follows* the infusion of habitual grace or its increase.[41]

We saw above that that which the sacraments caused directly and immediately was the *res et sacramentum*, which is a character, or an "ornatus animae" or something of the sort, in the case of the sacraments which do not impress any character. The sacraments do not cause immediately and directly the habitual grace perfecting the essence of the soul; they cause this only in a dispositional way. Are we to infer from this that St. Thomas wishes to identify the sacramental character with sacramental grace? I believe that he does not mean to identify the sacramental character with sacramental

[40] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1.
[41] *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 7, c.

grace, but rather the *res et sacramentum* with sacramental grace. Or let us say that he identifies the character with sacramental grace, not insofar as it is a character (for under this precise aspect it is something which is directly ordained towards cult), but insofar as the character is the *res et sacramentum* of a sacrament.

We must picture the sacramental causality as expressed here in exactly the same manner as we did in the *Sentences.* The immediate effect can be considered under one of two aspects—either as the *res et sacramentum,* or a physical disposition exacting of its nature the infusion of sanctifying grace, as we see it considered here; or we can regard it as an effect flowing from the grace in the essence of the soul, as we saw from the first text of the *De Veritate.* There can be no questioning the fact that the Angelic Doctor identifies the sacramental graces with the immediate effects of the sacramental rite. Nor can there be any question that the role of sacramental grace is twofold, and can only be explained by having recourse to the principle "causae sunt ad invicem causae, sed in diverso genere."

The notion of sacramental grace insofar as it is expressed here is exactly the same as that which we found in the *Sentences.* The nature is not determined here, either in the text or in the context, and indeed, it is difficult to know the exact nature, because the defects against which it is ordained are hidden. From the response to the eighth objection, we see that they do not infuse into the powers of the soul any form such as the virtues do; they are not, therefore, operative *habitus,* on the same order as are the virtues or the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

With this then, let us turn to the nature of sacramental grace as proposed in the *Summa.*

C. The *Summa Theologiae*

The problem which has been facing us throughout our study is the nature of sacramental grace, or sacramental grace considered in regard to its formal causality. We would expect

that a consideration of the other three causes would help us to reach a solution. While it is true that we have already considered them, we have not pointed them out as such, preferring to wait until we should study the problem in the *Summa*, since it is here that we have the definitive and concise teaching of the Angelic Doctor on the subject.

That brings us, therefore, to a study of sacramental grace in relation to (1) its efficient causes, God and the sacraments; (2) its material cause, or the subject to whom it is given, man wounded by original and actual sin; (3) its final cause, or the ends for which it is given. However, since the final and material causes are so closely related, we can consider them together.

I

Sacramental Grace in Relation to its Efficient Causes

When we consider the position of the articles on sacramental grace in the *Summa*, we can be quite certain of one thing, that he is considering here, *from the very position of the articles*, sanctifying grace, or habitual grace, not insofar as it perfects the essence of the soul, nor insofar as from it there flow virtues and gifts to perfect its powers; he is considering grace here precisely as it is given to us in and through the sacraments with a view to giving us help in regard to certain difficulties with which we are faced in our spiritual life, which is now a Christian life, or a life depending upon and imitating the life of Christ, the Incarnate Son of God.

The Term *Gratia Sacramentalis*

The understanding of the solution regarding the nature of sacramental grace, will be much easier and more convincing, if we understand the meaning of the term *gratia sacramentalis*. In the *Summa* St. Thomas does not use it merely to denote the special effect of each of the sacraments, *qua effectus specialis*, such as he did in the earlier works. If we were to consider the term in this sense, we would destroy the trend and the unity

of the question in which is occurs. For all the other articles consider grace as an effect of the sacraments, or we might say, they treat of grace as conferred sacramentally, implying therefore an opposition to the consideration of grace merely in the abstract, the grace of the virtues and of the gifts.

This interpretation is confirmed in the *sed contra* where St. Thomas tells us that if grace, coming to us through the sacraments, did not have something in addition to the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, then the sacraments would be *frustra*, useless, for one already having this grace of the virtues and of the gifts. The grace therefore, given by the sacraments is not exactly the same, essentially and accidentally, as that of the virtues and of the gifts.

Secondly, it is confirmed in the body of the article where he opposes grace *secundum se considerata* to the grace conferred by the sacraments. The question to be answered in the article is whether the grace given through the sacraments adds something to the grace which perfects the essence of the soul and the virtues and the gifts which perfect the powers of the soul. He answers in the affirmative, and in explaining the answer he says that it *adds* a certain divine help. He does not, therefore, identify sacramental grace with the help that it gives, but says rather that grace as given through the sacraments has something in addition to the habitual grace, or as he says, to the grace of the virtues and of the gifts. That "something" enables the one receiving a sacrament to live the Christian life, or that aspect of it symbolized by the particular sacrament received.

Part of the reason [42] for this change in the use of the term *gratia sacramentalis* is given to us in the first article of the same question, that is to say, because of the fact that he changed his teaching on the causality of the sacraments. The two questions are very closely related. The fact that the sacra-

[42] N. B. I say "part of the reason" because he had already broken from the idea that grace was directly created by God in the soul, at the time of the writing of the *De Veritate*. Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 9; a. 4, ad 15.

ments cause grace *perfective*, according to the teaching we find here in article one, is an indication that most probably sacramental grace is no longer considered as a disposition, not even *in genere causae materialis*, as it definitely is in the commentary on the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate*, where he proposes the theory of dispositional instrumental causality.[43] We might also note that Capreolus who considers sacramental grace as a *habitus*, also considers that St. Thomas taught the theory of dispositional causality in the *Summa* as well as in the other two works.[44] So it seems that there is more than a coincidence in linking up the causality of the sacraments with the nature of sacramental grace, and especially with the term *gratia sacramentalis*.

Lastly, the manner in which St. Thomas speaks of sacramental grace here, is quite different from that of the preceding works, just as is the manner in which he speaks of sacramental causality. This comes from his conception of the entire sacramental system. For the sacraments are considered as giving as their principal and immediate effect sanctification,[45] a sanctification which is accidentally diverse in accordance with the sacramental symbolism of the various sacraments. The limitation, or better, the determination of the sanctification given by the sacraments, has been established by God according to the exigencies of the spiritual life which has some conformity with our corporal life.[46]

In short, the entire conception of sacramental theology as found in the *Summa* is more unified and more simple than we

[43] *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 5: "Et ita patet quod gratia quam sacramentum directe continet, differt a gratia quae est in virtutibus et donis; quamvis etiam illam gratiam *per quamdam continuationem* contineant." Cf. also *ibid.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2, ad 2. It is even more clear in the *De Verit.*, q. 27, a. 7, c. (*in fine*): "Et hoc modo gratia quae est in sacramentis; et tanto minus, quanto sacramenta non perveniunt directe et immediate ad ipsam gratiam, de qua nunc loquimur; sed ad proprios effectus qui dicuntur gratiae sacramentales, ad quod sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis, vel augmentum."

[44] Capreolus, *loc. cit.*, q. 1, p. 4.

[45] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 2, c.

[46] *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 1, c.

find it in the other works, because here he is laying out a sum-total of theology, according to a definite plan, which receives its unity from that of its object, God, Who is Himself perfectly simple. The whole notion, then, of sacramental grace is more positive, more closely bound up with the sanctifying aspect of grace, infiltrating into the acts which are of their very nature supernatural.

* * * *

As we consider the article [47] we see that St. Thomas places it immediately after one of the articles on sacramental causality. The sacraments cause grace, a grace which is not merely a special effect, but sanctifying grace by which we are joined to God as adopted children " enjoying the Word, and being participators of Him from a certain kind of an affinity of likeness," to use the very deep and mysterious words of St. Thomas himself.[48]

The sacraments confer this grace, not by setting up or causing, even physically, merely a certain disposition in the soul, exacting from God the infusion of grace; rather they themselves confer sanctification on the soul by being elevated and moved by God to produce an effect which is beyond their natural powers. In other words, the sacraments cause their principal effect *perfective.*

We would naturally expect that the next question he will ask will concern the principal effect of the sacraments also, which is, as he says in the Prologue, grace, around which centers the entire consideration of the present question. He proposes the question " Whether the grace which is caused by the sacraments is the same as the grace of the virtues and of the gifts."

He answers in the negative, and says that it adds something

[47] *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 2.

[48] " Et licet Verbum Dei sua virtute penetret omnia, utpote omnia conservans et portans, creaturis tamen intellectualibus, quae proprie Verbo perfrui possunt et eius participes esse, ex quadam similitudinis affinitate et eminentius et ineffabilius potest uniri." *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 41.

which he calls rather indefinitely a *quoddam divinum auxilium*, a certain divine help to enable the sacrament and the one receiving it to attain the end for which it was instituted. In the body of the article he does not proceed much farther in determining the nature of the help; he allows that to remain somewhat obscure, or let us say that he allows the mystery which is contained in the life of grace as sacramentalized to remain.[49]

He does tell us the reason for our sacramental grace-life, namely, to produce special effects necessary in a life which is now according to divine providence essentially Christian, or Christ-like, insofar as we are now *imagines Filii sui*.[50] These special effects are " something beyond the acts to which the powers of the soul are ordained . . ." and we might add, considered naturally or supernaturally; that is to say that the powers of the soul can in no way produce these effects even perfected by the grace of the virtues and of the gifts. The sacramental grace is not this effect, as can be shown from the fact that throughout the entire *Summa* St. Thomas, when speaking of the special effect of the various sacraments, never calls it the sacramental grace of the sacrament. This special effect is the final cause of the sacrament, while the sacramental grace *adds* beyond the grace of the virtues and of the gifts a certain help or strength by which the final cause of the sacrament is attained. The sacraments would be useless, if the grace they give was in no way different from the grace of the virtues and the gifts, and the causality of the sacraments, as expressed by the phrase *efficiunt quod figurant*,[51] would simply be untrue.

But that grace is different, and that difference is brought

[49] " Es gehört nämlich zum Wesen des sakramentalen Mysteriums, dass das Mysterium auch in Sakramente, Mysterium bleibt. Das wäre nicht der Fall, wenn es in demselben schlechtweg offenbar würde; es soll ja eben etwas im Sakramente, im Innern desselben Verborgenes sein und bleiben." M. J. Scheeben, *Die Mysterien des Christentums* (Herder, 1951), p. 460.

[50] Rom. 8: 29.

[51] *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1.

out more clearly in the answers to the objections proposed. The grace of the sacraments is ordained to effect a spiritual life in us which is essentially Christian, requiring certain special effects, in addition to the normal ordering of our actions which is taken care of by the activity of the spiritual organism, or the grace of the virtues and of the gifts.

We might ask ourselves just what these effects could be that the grace of the virtues and of the gifts cannot produce. For this is of itself sufficient to perfect the soul and its powers, to incline them to the doing of good, and to exclude all sin which is the cause of the defects of the soul.

In the third response St. Thomas wards off this attack. The grace of the virtues and of the gifts introduces into the soul *habitus* or forms which are directly opposed to sin and to the vices, or the *habitus* inclining us to evil. By these new forms sin and the vices are excluded, as regards our present state and that of the future; for we are prevented from sinning by these perfections, establishing goodness, and inclining us toward the doing of good. This, however, does not say anything for the sins, which are past as far as their commission is concerned, but whose guilt (*reatus*), implying an obligation of satisfaction, remains; for this a special remedy is given through the sacraments. The mere infusion of grace into the soul does not necessarily imply a remission of the temporal punishment due to sin. Grace, however, infused into the soul, by the instrumental causality of the sacraments, implies to some extent satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to sin, in addition to excluding the eternal punishment, by bringing into the soul the presence of sanctifying grace.[52]

We might also take this phrase in a more limited sense, that the sacraments give a special remedy diminishing the material element of original sin, the *fomes peccati* or concupiscence, inclining us toward sin. Regardless of how we take the phrase, however, he is not talking about any *habitus* that is added by sacramental grace, as is evident both from his conception of

[52] N. B. We shall see more of this role of sacramental grace later on.

satisfaction, which we shall see later on, and from that of the material element of a kind of natural *habitus* affecting our very nature as well as our supernature as did also the *habitus* of original justice.[53] It would then be, as we have shown above, neither an operative *habitus* nor an entitative or quasi-entitative *habitus*.

In the third response St. Thomas refutes an objection that would multiply the number of habitual graces sanctifying the soul. The objector states that every addition or subtraction in forms changes the species of the form. If therefore sacramental grace adds something to the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, we would have a species of habitual grace that would differ specifically from this grace. If such be the case, then nothing certain can be shown from the fact that the sacraments are said to cause grace; for we do not know what kind of grace they would cause.

The objection proceeds from the notion of *habitus*, how it grows and increases. Sacramental grace according to the objector, insofar as it adds something to the *habitus* of grace, necessarily changes it specifically. The objector is not convinced of this himself; he is merely trying to show that the thesis proposed would lead to this. For this theory of addition implies that sacramental grace would be a special *habitus*, not in the same category as the *gratia gratum faciens*.

St. Thomas refutes the objection, *not by denying* that sacramental grace is a species of grace, but by explaining *how* it is a species of grace. If we keep in mind the meaning of the phrase *gratia sacramentalis* as the grace which is conferred in the sacramental action or the *res sacramenti* according to all it implies, we will not have to distort the answer in any way, especially in respect to the comparison he uses. We can accept it simply as it is given.

The reasoning of the major of the objector is not to be denied. It is, as a matter of fact, St. Thomas' very own.[54] But

[53] *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 82, a. 1, c., and responses.
[54] *Ibid.*, q. 52, a. 2, c.

the application of the major to the present problem is the thing against which St. Thomas reacts. We are not treating of the addition of one form to another; we are treating of the *extension* of *one* form to certain special effects which in accordance with divine providence are not ordinarily accorded except in and through the sacraments. In speaking of the growth of *habitus*, St. Thomas tells us:

> A cause increasing or augmenting a *habitus* always effects *something* new in the subject, but it does not always effect a new form. It may give more perfect existence to a form already existing in a subject, *or* it may make the subject *extend* itself further.[55]

And we might add, to the special effects necessary in the Christian life, or the spiritual life set up for us by Christ the Incarnate Son of God. And so St. Thomas could say, to use a comparison, that sacramental grace is opposed to the *gratia gratum faciens* as a species is to its genus. It *contains* in its very essence the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, just as humanity in its very essence contains animality. Just as animality as found in a horse and as found in a man is not an equivocal concept, neither is grace as found in the phrases *gratia sacramentalis* and *gratia virtutum et donorum*. Sacramental grace adds something to the concept of the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, somewhat as man adds *something* to the notion of animal.

Here we see the import of the response; he is trying to show that sacramental grace and the grace of the virtues and of the gifts are not equivocal graces, or equivocal *habitus* of sanctification. Rather, sacramental grace includes the grace of the virtues and of the gifts and, in addition, adds something to it. The sacramental graces insofar as they contain the grace of the virtues and of the gifts do not differ from one another; but they do differ specifically from one another with respect to the *quoddam divinum auxilium* that they give to attain the end of the sacrament in question.

[55] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

This interpretation finds its confirmation in a response which we find in the question on the sacrament of Confirmation. The question to be answered is whether the sacrament of Confirmation confers habitual grace. The objector is pictured as denying that it does:

> . . . habitual grace does not differ in regard to species, since it is ordained to produce one effect. Two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Since therefore, habitual grace is conferred upon a person in the reception of Baptism, it seems that it is not conferred by the sacrament of Confirmation, which is administered only to one who has been baptized.[56]

In his response St. Thomas points out two flaws in the argument: [56] that the grace of Confirmation (*gratia sacramentalis Confirmationis*) is not exactly the same as *gratia gratum faciens*, or habitual grace; [57] one and the same form can be increased in the same subject, *per modum intensionis*. He has already pointed that out in treating of the notion of *habitus* and the virtue of Charity.[58]

In the response we see that the *res tantum* of the sacrament of Confirmation, if considered according to all that it implies, that is, adding something over and above the element that it as well as all the sacraments gives, namely, habitual grace, this *res tantum* of the sacrament of Confirmation is not the same specifically as the *res tantum* of the sacrament of Baptism considered in all that it implies. The grace of Confirmation differs from that of Baptism, not insofar as we consider the element they have in common, but in regard to the special effect that each of them gives, thus making the *res tantum* of the particular sacrament in question different from the *res tantum* of another sacrament. The special element or effect that each of the sacraments adds is a kind of specific difference, if you will, but St. Thomas does not intend to say that this specific difference constitutes a species in *exactly* the same way that rationality does when added to animality.

[56] *Ibid.*, III, q. 72, a. 7, obj. 3.
[57] *Ibid.*, ad 3.
[58] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 52, a. 2; II-II, q. 24, a. 5.

In a short article on the effect of the sacraments, Fr. Unterleidner gives what appears to be a sufficient clarification of the point at issue:

> Sacramental grace is to common grace as species is to genus. It contains therefore, common grace, just as the notion of man for example, contains the form animal, the generic form which he shares with the beast. But it contains something more, just as the concept of man embraces the generic form of animal and something more. But he does not press the comparison any further, and therefore restrains the proportions of the two relations, in order to avoid making habitual grace a genus (of grace) divisible into species in the strict sense.[59]

St. Thomas uses the comparison then, but not to its fullest possible extent. For this would give us specifically different *habitus* of sanctifying grace, which is exactly the point the objector is trying to make, and St. Thomas trying to refute.

To regard the article in this light saves the trend of the question, and gives to sacramental physical or direct causality all that it should have; the sacramental rite causes the *res et sacramentum* and the principal effect of the sacrament, the sacramental grace, which includes habitual grace together with the *quoddam divinum auxilium*, sanctifying the soul or let us say, the person, in a special manner, for the role he or she plays in the sacramental life. Thus sacramental causality and sacramental symbolism, which exact that the sacraments *efficiunt seu causant quod figurant seu significant*, are preserved.[60]

In an earlier question St. Thomas tells us that the sacraments are signs of something sacred insofar as they sanctify men.[61] That which they confer through the *res sacramenti* is sanctification. This latter is not merely habitual grace such as we would find it abstractly considered; it is habitual grace with a certain divine help or strength added to it. This latter

[59] "L'Effet Immédiat des Sacrements," *Revue Augustinienne*, XII (1908), 193-194; cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, IX, q. 62, disp. 24, a. 2, nos. 5, 17 (Paris: Vives, 1885).

[60] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1 ad 1.

[61] *Ibid.*, q. 60, a. 2, c.

element, too, has a sanctifying force or role, not separate from or independent of habitual grace's role of sanctification, but intimately and necessarily connected with it, *extending* the sanctification which the latter effects. It is this habitual grace, precisely insofar as it sanctifies in a special manner, that St. Thomas calls sacramental grace; the special manner of sanctification is in accordance with the signification of the symbolism of the sacramental rite.

This, then, seems to be the thought of St. Thomas on perfective causality and on the nature of sacramental grace, such as that is given to us in this particular article, and both receive from this reinforced simplification more unity and strength. This interpretation exacts a change in the use of the phrase *gratia sacramentalis*, just as the use of the phrase *causa instrumentalis* in regard to the *sacramentum* of the sacramental process no longer in the *Summa* means mere dispositional cause, but perfective cause, as a result of the conviction of St. Thomas expressed in the tract on grace [62] and in the *De Veritate*,[63] that grace is not created, insofar as it is not a subsistent entity.[64]

Without hesitation, then, we can say that the reason for the change in speaking of sacramental grace came not so much from a clarification of the final causality of the various sacraments, as from a more simplified view of the efficient causality of the sacramental action. As a consequence of this simplification and unification of the teaching of St. Thomas, we no longer need have recourse to the distinction which we noted above in the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate* in explaining the relation between sacramental grace and sanctifying grace. The term *gratia sacramentalis* should no longer be applied to that special effect which acts as a disposition for the *res sacramenti*, *in genere causae materialis*, or as the special effect flowing from the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, *in genere causae formalis*.

[62] *Ibid.*, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.
[63] *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 9; a. 4, ad 15.
[64] Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 4, c.

Above all we should not consider sacramental grace and sanctifying grace as "physically the same grace which is at the same time, and according to different modes, sacramental and sanctifying." [65] For if we are going to consider sacramental grace as a modality of sanctifying grace, or as the *res tantum* of the sacrament, then we should not say that sacramental grace is a "preparation for sanctifying grace under one aspect, and an emanation from it under another aspect." [66] This would be to use the term sacramental grace in two different senses, that is to say, both for the special effect, which can be considered under one of two aspects, and for the modality of sanctifying grace which is nothing else than the principal effect of the sacramental action, or the *res tantum*. Or we might say that we should not use the same term to indicate a disposition for a form, and the form, and consider them as being only modally different. To say the least, this is quite confusing. That which is modally different is the *one* form considered with or without the special effect received through the sacramental action.

* * * *

In conclusion, then, from what we have seen sacramental grace is in the strict sense of the word a *habitus*; it is *not*, however, the *habitus* which some theologians have tried to make it; for it is not a *habitus* on the order of those of the virtues and of the gifts. Nor is it anything that flows from the *habitus* of sanctifying grace such as do the virtues and the gifts. Nor is it for St. Thomas a special vigor which is added. All of these notions come from taking sacramental grace in the strict sense of the word, or as the special effect. Sacramental grace is nothing but the *habitus* of sanctifying grace modified in accordance with the particular exigencies of the various phases of the spiritual or Christian life.

It is from the failure to distinguish between sacramental

[65] E. Hugon, O.P., "Correspondance sur 'L'effet immédiat des sacrements'," *Revue Augustinienne, loc. cit.*, p. 344.

[66] *Ibid.*

grace in the strict sense, or the special effect or vigor and sacramental grace in the broad sense, or sanctifying grace as modified in accordance with the ends of the sacraments—it is from this failure that most of the difficulties in this question have arisen. If we call it the modification of sanctifying grace, then we should not call it the special effect, or the special vigor; in the one case it is a *habitus*, and in the other it is not. Sacramental grace for St. Thomas is a *habitus*, on the same order as habitual grace; or *more correctly*, it is habitual grace, or the grace of the virtues and of the gifts, now modified with a certain divine help making it attain the special ends of the sacrament.

Those theologians who identify sacramental grace with the special vigor, or with the special effect, are not wrong, but they should not quote this article from St. Thomas to support their stand. For the term *gratia sacramentalis* is not used in this sense in the *Summa*.[67]

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(to be continued)

[67] Fr. Hugon, in his response to Fr. Unterleidner, acknowledges this, that sacramental grace and sanctifying grace are one and the same physical entity, and that if we consider physical causality as being *only* perfective, and drop the idea of dispositional physical causality, then we should also simplify our conception of sacramental grace to that which we have given above. This can and should be done, and is, no doubt, the mind of Aquinas. He was "merely trying to conciliate the texts of the *Sentences* with those of the *Summa*." Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 345.

CAN QUALITIES BE MEASURED?

DEVELOPMENT in modern experimental science began at the moment when qualities were measured; and the basic factor of progress in such science has been advancement in measuring qualities.

It is impossible in our day to think of experimental science except in terms of measuring heat, light, weight, voltage, valence, radiation, emotion, sensation, intelligence, behavior, and other like entities. While science has preserved much of its ancient naturalistic and qualitative character, it has advanced, nevertheless, by increasing measurement and quantitative treatment of the beings which in other times were qualitatively analyzed and described. Such measurement has produced undeniable results; and theories which have their foundation in measurements have been successful in predicting future phenomena. This indicates that the process of measuring qualities is valid.

For the philosopher of science, therefore, questions are bound to be raised which are the theoretical foundation of measuring qualities: Are such qualities truly measurable? If they are so, why? Are there any limitations to the measurability of qualities? Finally, how does one measure them?

These are fundamental questions. For, if it is true that qualities cannot truly be measured, then the scientist is engaged in an illusory enterprise. And further, if there are limitations which accompany measurability in qualities, then these restrictions will necessarily condition the truth, the meaning and the accuracy of the measurements; and make it necessary to modify, restrict, and interpret the use of data obtained under such limitations.

Adequate solutions to these problems of measurability in qualities may be reached by an application of several principles

of the philosophy of nature of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Concerned with such application this study first considers the act of measurement and those properties which it requires in the object to be measured. It establishes that these properties are present in qualities—but with limitations; and concludes that under these restrictions, qualities are measurable. Finally it treats the problem of direct and indirect measurement of qualities.

I. On Measurability in General

1. *The Nature of Measure and Measurability*

Measure, says Aristotle, is that by which quantity is known.[1] This is the fundamental and truest meaning of the word measure. It includes a " means of knowing " and " quantity." Measure is the determination and estimation of quantity. ". . . Measure is found first of all in numbers, secondly in magnitudes." [2] It is properly spoken of in quantities, says St. Thomas, for measure is that by which the quantity of a thing is made known.[3]

The use of the term measure is extended by analogy from its basic meaning, however, to include any norm which may be applied in any genus: " Measure is found first of all in numbers, secondly in magnitudes, and in a certain other way in all other genera, as it appears in IX *Metaph.*" [4] Measure may reach beyond the quantitative aspect—thus any object is judged to be a more or less true species of a class, according as it approaches or recedes from the ideal of the class. It is said thus to be measured by the ideal. This is true of whiteness, intelligence, courage, and societies. Men " measure up " to the standard and are judged as true members of a class, or they do not. Measure is found even in the genus of substances

[1] *Meta.* X, 1, 1052 b 20.
[2] *De Virtut. Card.*, a. 3.
[3] *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.
[4] *De Virtut. Card.*, a. 3.

where the measure of all other beings in the genus is that substance which has being most perfectly and most simply—who is God.[5]

Fundamentally, however, measure is said of quantities: that by which the quantity of a thing is made known.

The act of measuring is defined in its most general meaning as the act of the intellect applying certain principles to the examination of objects proposed at hand—" to judge or measure is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions." [6] Joining the fundamental quantitative notion of measure to this act of the act of measure, the definition of measure becomes: the act of the intellect applying certain and determined quantitative elements to proposed quantified objects for the purpose of determining their quantity.

From this fundamental and commonly agreed definition of measurement it is possible to gain insights into the first problem of this essay: the notion of measurability, or the properties required or postulated by the object in order that it be measured.

The first property, the root of all others is that it be a quantity. This is a capital point and hence the definition of quantity, its properties, its species, its causes and effects, its analogous extension to qualitative realms and particularly to the psychical, will be given a more detailed treatment in this study.

2. *The Notion and Properties of Quantity*

Measurability is quantity. Whatever is quantitative is by definition measurable: wherever there is an aspect of quantity there is an aspect of measurability. But if the quantity is only metaphorical, so also will be the measure, really no measure at all. If the quantity is said under restrictions, so also will there be restrictions on the measure. If the quantity is analogous, measurability and measure are analogous also.

But what is quantity? Which things are quantified? Are qualities, love, intellectual things? Are these measurable?

[5] *I Sent., ibid.*

[6] *Summa Theol.* I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4.

Quantity is a form possessed or radicated in bodies by which they have all the various and multiple effects and properties by which we identify them as quanta or quantified objects. Because quantity is one of the most simple and fundamental notions, one of the ten most general classes of being, one can define it only by reference to these effects and properties known to us, rather than through a genus or class in which it can be placed.[7]

Quantity first of all is a property of physical bodies, those composed of matter and form, natural bodies. Quantity, properly speaking, is physical and material. It is the first accidental determination of these bodies, and it is characteristic of bodies because it arises from the fact that all bodies are material. Without matter there is no quantity.[8]

Defining it through the effects and properties it possesses in matter, i. e., through the peculiar determinations and characteristics it gives to matter and bodies, we may say that it is an accident adhering in a physical body which makes it divisible.

That divisibility is the exact and first property or effect which quantity gives to a body is disputed by many Thomistic philosophers. All agree, however, on several properties which are the effects of quantity and of nothing else. The precise problem is to determine which of these is the first property and which is the order in which they proceed from one another. Among these many formal effects of quantity are the following: divisibility, extension of parts in body, actual extension in place, impenetrability, and measurability.[9] Another is the property of possessing integral and homogeneous parts. The precise problem of which of these is first will not interest this paper. Each of the effects comes to a body from quantity, and suffices to establish a clear idea of its nature. We can therefore define quantity in terms of each of them. Quantity is that form which gives a body integral parts, or which gives it an

[7] A. Pirotta, O. P., *Summa Philosophiae* (Turin: Marietti, 1936), II, 121

[8] *Summa Theol.* III, q. 77, a. 2.

[9] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

order of parts in the whole body; or quantity is that form which makes a body divisible.

On one property we may be more specific. Measurability is not the first of the formal effects of quantity. It is rather one of the latter. For it is only after a body is constituted with parts, in space and impenetrable, that we are able to relate it to something extrinsic to the body, which is to measure it.

Because the notion of quantity is so fundamental, Aristotle does not define it in his treatment, but chooses rather to begin his tract by naming the various species of quantity: discrete and continuous quantity. Continuous quantity is that quantity in which the parts are joined by a common term; and discrete is that in which the parts are not so joined. Continuous quantity is called magnitude, and it is measured. Discrete quantity is multitude and its property is to be numbered. The first instance of discrete quantity is number, a multitude to which has been added the relation of measure, a multitude measured by unity. Instances of continuous quantity are lines, surfaces, solids, time, and place.[10]

Once the quantity of a body is established absolutely: i. e., to be so great or of such a number, it receives quantitative determinations relative to other quantities or to some norm. Thus its extension is divided into *length*, if it is the greater linear dimension, a determination which comes to it from a relation to the other dimensions, or *breadth* if it is the shorter dimension, or *depth* if it is a perpendicular dimension. Relative to another quantity it may be *more* or *less*. Relative also to the normal, natural, or perfect quantity for the body, the quantity it now possesses may be termed *great* or *small*. It is *great* when it approaches the perfect, *small* when it does not. What is great for a man is small for an elephant. In the same way it may be *prolonged* or *brief*, *wide* or *narrow*, *deep* or *high*. In discrete quantity it may be *many* or *few*.[11]

[10] *Categ.* 6, 4 b 20-5 a 14.

[11] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

These names or determinations of quantity are relative. They are called the modes of quantity. They are not species or instances of quantity, nor are they effects or properties brought to a body by quantity. They are determinations in the quantified object which depend upon its being quantified and arise from a real relation of the quantified object to another quantum or to a quantified norm extrinsic to it. Notable among them are *great* and *small*, determinations of quantity which come to it relative to what is normal, natural, or perfect for the body. Seven feet is great for a man, small for a giraffe. Five feet is small in a man, but great in a monkey.

Aristotle takes up the quantum and the measurable in *X Metaphysics* [12] in a text in which he makes a list of measurables which parallels that of the species of quanta listed in *Categories* 6 [13]—with a notable addition, however.

The first measurable is discrete quantity or multitude: " All quantity *qua* quantity is known by the one, and that by which quantities are primarily known is the one itself." [14] This " one itself " is unity, the principle of number, which is the measure of multitude. He extends the notion of quantum, however: " In other classes, too, ' measure ' means that by which each is first known, and the measure of each is a unity—in length, in breadth, in depth, in weight, in speed." [15] Thus he extends the class of measurable objects to the three dimensions of continuous quantity. These, too, are measurable by a unity. This listing is similar to that of quanta in *Categories* 6.

To these he adds weight and speed; and then qualifies this statement by making a significant distinction on these two last quanta. " The words ' weight ' and ' speed ' are common to both contraries, for each of them has two meanings—' weight ' means both that which has any amount of gravity and that which has an excess of gravity, and ' speed ' both that which

[12] *Meta.* X, 1, 1052 b 20-b 27.
[13] *Categ.* 6, 4 b 20-5 a 14.
[14] *Meta.* X, 1, 1052 b 22.
[15] *Ibid.*, 1052 b 24.

has any amount of movement and that which has an excess of movement; for even the slow has a certain speed and the comparatively light a certain weight." [16]

Aristotle adds this clarification to indicate that speed and weight as 'that which has any amount of gravity' and 'that which has any amount of movement' are qualities, not quantities; and hence are not measurable; while, on the other hand, weight as 'that which has an excess of gravity' and speed as 'that which has an excess of movement' are in a certain way quanta and measurable.

The distinction is one between quantity and quality; and indicates at least the fact that quality, although it is not quantity, is in a certain way nevertheless measurable. This is clear because he classes two qualities among the measurables. In summing up his treatment of measurables he makes a similar reference to qualities, but in this instance more explicitly: "Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality." [17] Clearly, however, qualities are not measurable except in virtue of some relation to quantity for the quantum and the measurable are by definition convertible.

In general, then, the measurable is the quantum. To be measurable an object must be quantified; and the properties of the measurable object will be those properties and effects of quantity: divisibility, having homogeneous parts, impenetrability, extension in the quantum, and so forth.

3. *A Thomist Critique of a Modern Theory of Measurability*

Modern statements of the requirements of measurability accord with the teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas. According to Spaier, for example,[18] measurement postulates: 1) the homogeneity of the object; 2) its divisibility as indicated by

[16] *Ibid.*, 1053 b 27.
[17] *Ibid.*, 1053 b 5.
[18] A. Spaier, *La Penseé et la Quantité* (Paris, 1927), p. 322.

the units of the graduated instrument; 3) the permanence or fixity of the measurable species; 4) the invariance of dimensions; 5) the continuity of the object; 6) its spatial objectivity.

Of these six, three are reducible to the effects of quantity as taught by Thomists. Others relate rather to the optimum conditions for measurement. Reducible to quantity are: homogeneity, divisibility, and continuity of the object. Belonging to the optimum conditions for measurement are: the permanence or fixity of the measurable species, the invariance of dimensions, and the spatial objectivity of the object.

Homogeneity, understood as specific or substantial homogeneity, is required by measurement; and according to the Thomists is an effect of quantity.[19] Homogeneity understood as including accidental homogeneity is not required. Ten "animals" can be counted and a many-colored surface can be measured. Quantity causes this specific homogeneity. It is the first accident inhering in a subject, and thus it measures substance immediately,[20] other accidental determinations following it in the substance, as color, qualities, relations etc. The parts of a quantum are *simpliciter* homogeneous, that is of the same species.[21] A head and a foot, both "man" and "this man," are specifically homogenous, although heterogeneous in their accidental organization, function, place, etc.

Divisibility is proper to quantity. It is one of the formal effects of quantity, and part of its definition. It is the fundamental reason why we are able to number units in a continuum, as Spaier remarks.[22] It is by means of divisibility that we are able to obtain an absolute value for a quantity.

Continuity is a property of one species of quantity; and hence in measuring bodies it is required. But the other species of quantity, discrete, i. e., multitude, is measurable as well. This is by definition non-continuous. The molecules in a

[19] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124.
[20] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 28, a. 2, corp.; III, q. 77, a. 2.
[21] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
[22] Spaier, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

volume of gas are not continuous, nor are the emissions from a radioactive substance, yet they can be measured.

In order to establish a functional relationship between two quantities, continuity must be established, it is true. Often, however, this is an assumed continuity, assumed for the purposes of the function, when in fact it is known that one variable is discontinuous. "In dealing with a discrete medium of particles, we may, provided each element of volume contains a large number of corpuscles, regard the medium as continuous for purposes of mathematical analysis." [23]

Of the conditions which belong to the optimum conditions of measurement there are the permanence and fixity of the measurable species and the invariance of dimensions. This permanence or fixity may be considered as specific or substantial, namely that the object remains the same sort of thing; and this is homogeneity in time; and is required by measurement. Or it can mean a permanence in accidental characteristics. This is part of the ideal measuring condition and is never in fact achieved. Invariance of dimensions is a species of this accidental permanence, and is in fact only approximated.

St. Thomas sees in this impermanence of dimensions and other accidental characteristics an application of a philosophical principle, namely that in changeable things, as physical and corporeal realities, there can be nothing completely and immutably permanent.[24] He applies the principle in a second way when he writes: "Nor ought it to be that every measure be completely infallible and certain, but according as it is possible in its genus." [25] The best that one can hope for in measurement is that the dimensions will be invariable as the conditions allow. Perfect invariance is impossible.

The laboratory confirmation of this principle is found in the fact that no measure is perfect. All measures in physical science

[23] V. E. Smith, *Philosophical Frontiers of Physics* (Washington: Catholic University, 1947), p. 35.

[24] *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 97, a. 1, ad 2.

[25] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 3, arg. 3 et ad 3.

are only approximate.[26] This imperfection in measurement is caused in part by the instrument, which can never be perfect and limits the accuracy of the measure by its own degree of perfection, in part by the observer, who is changeable, and in part by the act of observing which modifies the object being observed. In the measure of mutable beings by mutable beings, using mutable instruments, the best will be an approximation, St. Thomas would say.

The last of the qualities of the measurable listed by Spaier is that the object possess spatial objectivity. This spatial quality is inseparable from continuous objects since all continuous quantities are found in bodies, which are spatial. Measurement of discrete quanta in physical measurement is ultimately the measurement of bodies as well. In this sense spatial objectivity is a function of quantity.

This desideratum of spatial objectivity is often understood, on the other hand, to mean that all measurements must reduce themselves to spatial measurements, that is, upon a spatial scale, a measuring of the spatial displacement of an indicator or index from a point. In this sense spatial objectivity is part of the optimum measuring condition. "All instruments," says Smith, "involve the registering of results by geometrical means."[27] That is the ideal.

The fundamental reason for this reduction of all measurements to spatial terms, as the spatial coincidence of a point upon a scale, is that these spatial elements are the fundamental species of quantity. Titchener notes a psychological reason as well. Linear magnitudes are the prototypes of all measurements and all others are reduced to that. The reason is that spatial magnitudes and dimensions are easy for us to handle and we are practised in these and not in weights and brightnesses.[28] This spatial objectivity is only ideal and not necessary because we could measure weights by comparison

[26] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-37.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[28] E. B. Titchener, *Experimental Psychology*, II i (Stud. Quant.) 1903, xx.

with a series of standard weights instead of using a standard spring and pointer or the linear displacement of a pointer in a scale balance. Spatial objectivity is not required for measurement, although it provides the best and psychologically most convenient and most accurate way to measure.

In sum, then, for Thomists, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, measurability is a function of quantity. Where there is an element of quantity, there also will there be measurability. Quantity is the cause of many formal effects in a body; and brings to it also certain relative determinations, as to be great or small. Finally, Aristotle extended the notion of measure to qualities indicating that certain qualities as weight and speed were measurable under the aspect of being an "excess." Modern theories of measurability concur with this teaching of the scholastics.

II. The Unit of Measure

Among the total requirements for measurements, other conditions must be met besides those demanded in the measureable object. Required is the principle of the measurement, the norm, or unit. And needed also is the act of measure, or the application of the norm or unit to the quantified object to determine its quantity.

The norm or unit, the "measure" must be homogeneous with the measured object, be an indivisible in the genus of the measured object; and must be more simple than the quantum; although it need not be the cause.

Homogeneity of measure and measured is necessary in order that the measure be not useless, for the purpose of measurement is to know a class of things by means of one: all lines by one unit length, the hotness of all hot bodies by the unit of heat, and so forth. The measure must be in the genus of the measured in order to give us knowledge of it.[29]

The measure must be the indivisible in the genus of the

[29] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 96, a. 1, ad 1.

measured. It is this either by natural choice or by our own decision. It need not be the absolute indivisible, but that which seems indivisible to sense. Thus Aristotle says: ". . . the first thing from which, as far as our perception goes, nothing can be subtracted, all men make the measure, whether of liquids or of solids or of size; and they think they know the quantity when they know it by means of this measure." [30] And St. Thomas remarks that the measure may be absolute or according to our choice: " the measure is the minimum in the genus of quantity, either absolutely (*simpliciter*) as in number which is measured by unity, or according to our choice of it as in continuous quantity, . . . and thus we use the palm of our hand to measure cloth or the furlong as the measure of a road." [31]

This measure may be the indivisible we choose to measure an absolute quantity, the foot or inch; or it may be the indivisible we use in a relative measure: thus the normal or perfect quantity for a man is the measure by which we measure this man to determine if he is " large," or " small." In all cases it is an indivisible, or is considered so.

The measure or unit may be intrinsic to the quantity or extrinsic to it. " A body is measured," says St. Thomas, " by an intrinsic measure as a line or a surface or a depth; or by an extrinsic measure . . . as a piece of cloth is measured by one's forearm." [32]

III. The Act of Measuring

The third part of measurement is the act of measuring, the formal constituent of measurement. This is the act of the intellect applying the measure or norm to the quantified object in order to determine its quantity.

The act of measuring is essentially an act of the intellect, a judgment. It is made up of two formalities, the act of judging

[30] *Meta.* X, 1, 1053 a 5.
[31] *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.
[32] *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 5.

and the act of computation of the quantity. Because the act of measurement is an act of the intellect it requires those factors necessary to every intellectual judgment. The two terms of the judgment must be known, and they must be known or seen together in some way.

The essential act of measure is the judgment which falls on the two entities to be compared: the measurable object and the norm or unit which is applied to it. The first quantitative judgment is "equal" or "unequal," or "more" or "less." This is a measurement. It is a comparison with a determination of quantity: the object is greater than or less than the norm. This act of judging equal or unequal is the basic act of measurement in the physical sciences, especially in the measurement of quality intensities, as will appear in later pages. And in fact, in many measurements it is impossible to determine quantity more absolutely than that. The second formality is the determination of the absolute quantity of the quantum: fifty cubic feet. This is the perfection of measurement, is found in the measurement of only certain quantities, and is not always realizable.

A contemporary definition of measure, that of Nagle,[33] notes this intrinsic limitation in some measurements: "Measurement is the process of correlating numbers with things that are not numbered." It consists first in the assignment of suitable units to material quantified phenomena, and secondly in the computation, by proper mathematical operation on these units, of related magnitudes.[34] This definition does not include the notion of determining absolute quantities, but speaks rather of correlating numbers with things not numbered. This allows for the correlation of ascending intensities of a quality, brightness or hardness, for example, without the necessity of making a computation or estimation of the absolute amount of the hardness. Brightnesses are observed and arranged in an

[33] E. Nagle, *On the Logic of Measurement* (New York, 1930), p. 37, cited by Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[34] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

ascending series: B_1, B_2, B_3. Hardnesses are arranged serially as one substance is able to scratch another. The judgment in this measurement is " more or less." To this series of ascending brightnesses or hardnesses we correlate an ascending series of numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . etc., or even 10, 20, 30 . . . etc. The number chosen for each intensity is not a measure of its absolute brightness or hardness, but indicates only that this intensity is greater than that correlated with a lower number. This is a true measure, and in fact represents the process which takes place in many measurements in physical and psychological science.[35]

Measurement is divided into direct and indirect. Direct measurement is that in which the measure or unit is homogeneous with the object and is applied to it in such a way that the judgment can be made immediately. Indirect measurement is verified when the unit or immediate norm is not homogeneous with the object, e. g., in reading weight from a linear scale, or in the case when the unit although homogeneous cannot be applied to the quantum except through some intermediary. Külpe distinguishes measurement into *direct*, which formulates a process in terms of conventional units of the same kind, and *indirect*, which gives a quantitative expression to a quantum or measured object by noting its functional relation to some directly measurable process.[36] The hotness of mercury is measured by the linear extension of the column of mercury, because this expansion is always in constant functional relation with the temperature. The linear displacement of the top of the column gives us a value for hotness in terms of distance.

At first sight indirect measurement seems to contradict the Aristotelian dictum that the unit and the quantum must be homogeneous, because e. g., in measuring heat by linear extension, they seem to be heterogeneous. John of St. Thomas noted this difficulty and wrote: " When we say that the unit must

[35] M. R. Cohen, and E. Nagle, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934), pp. 293-296.

[36] O. Külpe, *Outlines of Psychology* (1909), p. 45.

be homogeneous with the object measured, this can be understood either as proportionately or by likeness. Those things which share in one genus and are contained under it are said to be homogeneous according to likeness . . . That which receives a certain form and is determined by it is said to be of that other's genus by proportion because it is proportioned by that which it receives and is reduced to its genus as by a principle *quo*. This reduction is not formal, but by participation." [37] This is the functional reduction of one quantum to another about which Külpe wrote.[38]

Thus mercury has one form: heat. This heat intensity is the object to be measured. An increase in the intensity of the heat causes the volume of the mercury to increase, or in a tube, the length of the column of mercury. The heat of the mercury is informed or determined by the linear expansion which it receives, because the heat is prior to the length. This expansion is a principle *quo* of knowing the heat, and reduces the heat to the genus of length or extension; not formally because there is no change of nature, but by participation or proportion. The unit applied, the linear gradation on the thermometer scale, is homogeneous with the linear extension of the mercury, and by proportion, with the heat in the mercury. The functional relationship which is sought between the directly observable quantum and the remote object in the case of indirect measurement is found in three classes of relations. The direct measure may be something prior in nature to the remote quantum, as its cause, and thus one measures light intensity by the amount of voltage at the lamp filament; or it may be something concomitant with it as a biological process in a psychological function; or it may be something that follows, its effects, as radiation follows heat intensity. Through functions based on these three relations a value for a remote quantum in terms of a directly observable one may be obtained.

[37] Joannes a S. Thoma, *Cursus Philosophicus* (ed. Reiser; Turin: Marietti, 1930), II, 382, a 20-22.

[38] Külpe, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

This suffices for measure and measurability. The task that remains is to continue investigation into the nature of the measurable quantity, making explicit the direction Aristotle gave the notion of the measurable when he added speed and weight to the list of measurables in *X Metaphysics*.[39] It will then be the time to judge if sensation does or does not fit the requirements demanded for the measurable.

IV. The Measurability of Qualities

1. *The* ratio quantitatis *in Intense Qualities*

The quantum is the measurable. And hence there has never been any doubt that lines, surfaces, and volumes, as well as a multitude, were measurable. These were quantities in the strictest and most proper sense of that word.

The concept of quantity, however, from the time of Aristotle, has expanded itself beyond the realm of its strict and proper application: as accident of a physical body. It has been applied to qualities as well, so that among the measurables we count not only the primitive species of quantity but qualities of all species, not however without some distinction.

As we have seen, Aristotle himself makes this extension. In the list of measurables he makes in *X Metaphysics*, to the list of strict quanta, lines and surfaces, he adds two: speed and weight. To clarify this addition he states: "The words 'weight' and 'speed' are common to both contraries, for each of them has two meanings—'weight' means both that which has any amount of gravity, and that which has an excess of gravity, and 'speed' means both that which has any amount of movement, and that which has an excess of movement; for even the slow has a certain speed, and the comparatively light a certain weight."[40]

The difficulty in including speed and weight as quanta is that in one sense they are qualities and not quantities. And yet they are measurable as experience shows. St. Thomas,

[39] *Meta.* X, 1, 1052 b 22-b 30. [40] *Ibid.*, b 27-30.

commenting on this distinction of Aristotle, shows the reason for the difficulty and the solution which Aristotle gives:

> There is no doubt that dimensions are quantities and that properly and first (*primo*) it belongs to them to be measured. But there could be a doubt about speed and velocity because they seem to be more qualities than quantities.
>
> And therefore he states how they pertain to quantity and how they can be measured, saying that speed and weight are common to both contraries, for in one of the contraries you can find the other; thus the heavy is in a certain way light, and vice versa; and the fast is in a certain way slow. There is a twofold consideration of each of these. Heavy is said in one way absolutely, namely, of that which has an inclination to the center, without considering how much it has of such inclination; and in this sense it does not belong to the genus of quantity, nor can it be measured. In another sense heavy is said in comparison with another heavy thing: that it exceeds another in this aforesaid inclination, as when we say that earth is heavy with respect to water, and lead in respect of wood; and therefore by reason of this excess there is as an aspect (*ratio*) of quantity and measure. In a similar way, speed is said in a twofold way. . . . In one way it has an aspect of quantity and measure; and in the other not.[41]

Here then the quantity of qualities is stated under a distinction. Qualities considered absolutely or *simpliciter* have no element of quantity; but considered in comparison with another quality, relatively, they have an element (*ratio*) of quantity and of measure.

St. Thomas accepts this extension of quantity to qualities in other places, particularly in the *Summa*. He states in one text the general conclusion: " Quantity imports the element (*ratio*) of measure, which is found first of all in numbers, secondly in magnitudes, and in a certain way in all other genera." [42] He makes this more specific:

> Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of bulk or dimensive quantity, which is found only in corporal things. . . There is also quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*) which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity

[41] *X Metaphys.*, lect. 2, nn. 1941-1942.

[42] *De Virtut. Card.*, a. 3.

we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less hot, for as much as it is more or less perfect in heat.[43]

According to scholastic philosophers, then, quantity, though primarily said of spatial and divisible bodies, is said in a certain way of qualities as well. But this attribution of quantity to quality comes to qualities not as they are understood absolutely, but as they are understood relatively. This quantity is called the quantity of virtue, the quantity of power, or the quantity of perfection.

But what is the justification for this transfer of quantitative notions to qualities? Does one speak truly of quantities in such beings as virtues, hotness, sin, or sensation? This is the next problem.

St. Thomas begins his defense of virtual quantity by placing the general conditions for the transfer of quantitative names:

> Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intellectual and spiritual things on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporal things, which come under the imagination.[44]

In the Disputed Question: *On the Virtues in Common*, he applies this principle to the problem of increase:

> For it is to be noted that since names are signs of ideas, as it is said in *I Periher.*, as we know the less known from the more known so we name the less known from the more known. And hence it is that because local motion is the best known of all motions, the name of distance is derived from contrariety of place to all contraries between which there can be motion: as the Philosopher says in *X Metap.* And likewise because the motion of substance according to quantity is more evident to sense than motion according to alteration, the names proper to motion according to quantity are derived to alteration. Just as a body which moves to a perfect quantity is said to increase, and the perfect quantity is called great with respect to the imperfect, so that which moves from imperfect quality to perfect is said to increase according to

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[43] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. also: I-II, q. 52, a. 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 1; a. 5, ad 2; *I Contra Gentes*, c. 43; *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 3.

[44] *Ibid.* I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

quality, and the perfect quality is called great with respect to the imperfect.[45]

This is the teaching in the *Summa*:

> Now in corporal quantities a thing is said to be great according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it: wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in a man which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore 'in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better' as Augustine says (*De Trin.* v. 8).[46]

The teaching of St. Thomas is incorporated in the context of a problem of change or increase of quality because it is his intention to manifest the possibility of the increase of virtue. The principles of his argument, valid for the more general problem of the quantity of quality, may be set forth here. On the one hand, there is the more known—the experience of quantity. We know that one substance is greater than another —that it has a greater quantity and we are able to compare the two stating that S_1 is more or less great or small than S_2, a judgment we obtain immediately upon knowing the two substances. This is a judgment on their quantity. In addition, we are able to compare the quantity of S_1 with a norm, e. g., what is normal, natural, or perfect for the species of the substance; and on the basis of this comparison, state that S_1 is great or small, as seven feet is great for a man, where the norm is six feet, and small for a giraffe, where the norm is fifteen. These names, more or less, greater and smaller, are names which are used in quantitative comparisons.

In qualities, the lesser known, we have a similar experience, no less fundamental and immediate than in quantities. Thus we observe two qualities, whitenesses, or intelligences, or brightnesses; and within the same species we are able to make an immediate judgment that W_1 is whiter than W_2, or I_1 is a greater intelligence than I_2 and so forth. This fact Aristotle

[45] *De Virtut. in Comm.*, a. 11.
[46] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

made a property of quality: " Whiteness is predicated of one thing in greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in greater or lesser degree than it did before, if a thing is white it may become whiter.[47] In a similar way, we are able to compare any whiteness, W_3 with the normal whiteness for this body, or compare any intelligence I_3 with the normal intelligence for this species, and judge that the case present is a high or great whiteness, or that it is a great intelligence. I_3 shows, we might judge, great intelligence for a chimpanzee, but small intelligence for a man.

But, because, as St. Thomas notes, our experience with quantity is more known due to " the natural connection of the intellect with corporal things, which come under the imagination "[48] we transfer the terminology of quantities, " great " and " small," " more " and " less," to qualities, whose properties are less evident to sense, and so speak of " great " intelligence or " more " white.

But the properties of qualities to which we give the quantitative names are intrinsic to qualities, are real, and are evident. " It is proper to quality to receive more and less."[49] The experience of perfect and imperfect relative to a norm is one which is fundamental and immediate. To this experience we apply the names " more," " less," " great," and " small." It is to this property of receiving more and less that is the foundation for the quantity of perfection or quantity of virtue, the names given by St. Thomas to qualities as they possess the relative properties common to quantity and quality.

Although qualities do not possess the absolute properties of quantity, since absolutely they are of a different genus: " heavy is said in one sense absolutely . . . and in this sense it does not belong to the genus of quantity, nor can it be

[47] *Categ.* 8, 10 b 25-b 28.

[48] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 52, a. 1.

[49] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, I, 223. Cf. also other scholastic authors in the tract on the praedicament of *quality*, e. g., J. Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* (8th ed., Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I, 153, n. 189.

measured.[50] But qualities do possess the relative properties of quantity—some of the modes of quantity—to be more or less than another, or to be great with reference to a norm: " in another sense heavy is said in comparison with another heavy thing: that it exceeds another . . . and therefore by reason of this excess, there is an element (*ratio*) of quantity." [51]

These same distinctions may be applied to measure: that by which the quantity of a thing is made known.

2. *Intense Qualities are Measurable*

Measure of quantity is twofold. It may be 1) *relative*, as when we compare the quantum to be measured with another quantum of the same species, and judge that it is greater or less than the measure; or if the measure be a standard, that is, what is natural or perfect, we may judge that the measured quantum is " great " or " small." This is the first and basic measure, and common to all measures of quantity. Or it may be 2) *absolute*, when we compare the quantum to be measured with a unit, the most simple element of the genus, in order to determine its absolute quantity, e. g., two inches in length. This is the perfection of quantitative measure.

In qualities there is parallel measure. There is *relative* by which we compare one quality to be measured with another quality of the same species and judge that it is more or less than the other, more white, or less; or we compare the given quality with a norm or standard, the perfect or natural, and judge that it is " great " or " small " for the subject in which it is an accident. Thus the same measured intelligence is great for a girl, but small for a boy of a certain age.

But there is no *absolute* measure for qualities. It is impossible to compare a quality with a most simple unit of the genus in order to determine the value of the quality, as five degrees of whiteness, eight grades of charity, and so forth. This measurement presupposes a property of quantity which is not possessed by qualities: that of being formed by addition.

[50] *X Metaphys.*, lect. 2, n. 1942. [51] *Ibid.*

The cardinal properties of a quantum, e. g., that the quantum whose number is 6 be three times that whose number is 2, and six times that whose number is 1 (this is the meaning of the absolute measure, for the unit is by definition of value 1)— depend on the ability of the quantum to be formed by addition of unit, 1 to 1 to 1, etc. This must be the case at least conceptually, or in potency, even if it were not true that the quantum were formed by addition in the first place.

When it is stated that a given lines is six inches long, that a given multitude contains three hundred pieces, or that an area contains fifty square inches, one means that the unit, whether it be the inch, the square inch or the unity, can be applied successively to the given quantum until the whole quantum is exhausted; and the absolute quantity is determined by the number of times that the unit was applied. This procedure clearly implies that the quantum was formed, or can be thought as being formed, by the addition of unit to unit. The concept of addition is bound up in the very notion of an absolute measure; thus absolute measures require quanta that are formed by addition.[52]

But addition as a mode of increase is proper and unique to dimensive quantity.[53] Lines, areas and number can be increased in no other way. In quantities of this sort, all inequalities are caused by subtraction or addition; [54]; and the quanta can be made equal only by addition or subtraction. Hence dimensive quantities, bodies, volumes, areas, lines, quanta in the strict sense of quantity, alone are measurable absolutely.

The mode of increase of qualities, on the other hand, is not by addition, but by a deeper radication of the form in the substance of which it is an accident. And therefore qualities are not measurable absolutely, but only relatively. This may be manifested in the following way.

[52] Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae*, II, 169; P. Hoenen, *Cosmologia* (2nd ed.; Rome: Gregorianum. 1936), p. 204, n. 141; Joseph Tonquédec, *Questions de Cosmologie et de Physique* (Paris: Vrin, 1950), p. 106, n. 4; F. J. Thonnard, *Précis de Philosophie* (Rome: Desclée, 1950), p. 374, n. 329.

[53] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 1; *I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.

[54] Maquart, *op. cit.*, II, 178.

The increase of qualities is not by addition because this adding can happen only when the super-added quality is distinct either in kind from that to which it is to be added, or numerically, since addition requires distinction of some sort; and these are the two possible ways in which there can be distinction. But the quality to be added cannot be distinct in kind because it is by definition the same quality: whiteness or intelligence. Nor can it be distinct in number because numerical distinction in accidents comes from the subject in which they are radicated. But in this case the new quality is to be radicated in the same part of the same subject as the present quality to which it is to be added. And therefore it cannot be numerically distinct. Thus it is not distinct in any way; and cannot be conceived as being added.[55]

The increase of qualities is had by a deeper radication of the form in the subject because the quality is a form which is actualizing the subject in a certain manner (*quale*). But every form more perfectly exerts its formal causality by more completely exhausting the potency of its subject. The notion of more perfectly qualifying a subject is that very notion which is implied in the notion of more or less intense qualities. Qualities become more intense, increase therefore, precisely by a deeper radication in their subjects.[56]

These considerations are *per se* and proper to qualities. As qualities they increase by more completely actualizing the potency of the subject to possess them. Certain special forms and qualities however may increase in a manner which is accidental to them as qualities. Thus motion which is one, that is of constant direction, has a sort of more or less insofar as it approaches the end of the motion, the term. And science which is one by the intelligibility of its object, and is *per se* increased as that object is known more perfectly, nevertheless has an increase inasmuch as more conclusions may be seen in

[55] Pirotta, *op. cit.*, p. 325. Maquart, *op. cit.*, p. 164. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 5; *I Sent.* d. 17, q. 2, a. 2.

[56] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 67, a. 3, ad 2; II-II, q. 24, a. 5; *I Sent.* d. 13, a. 3, ad 8 et ad 9; d. 17, q. 2, a. 2 et ad 3.

the principles of the science and brought under the science. The science in a way is said to increase as it extends to more objects. Motion has two ways of increasing, then, one *per se* by which the body is said to travel faster, an increase in speed, and another by which the moving body increases by approaching the term of the motion. A science has a similar twofold mode of increase, one by which the things and objects of the science are better known, more deeply penetrated and understood with a deeper intelligence, this is the proper and *per se* increase of science, and the second by which more objects are known. This is an increase but is secondary and accidental to the science.[57] Other qualities, e. g., sensation, have a similar accidental increase.

Per se and properly, qualities increase not by addition but by a more perfect and fuller determination of the subject, by more deeply exhausting its potency. And since only additive quantities can be measured absolutely, it is necessary to conclude that qualities have no absolute measure. But as we have seen, they can be measured relatively because they intrinsically and properly increase in perfection, share a " more or less "; and have a real property, in virtue of a comparison of any quality with the perfect or natural, of being called " great " or " small."

The measure of qualities, therefore, consists in arranging them in the order of their intensity as we are able to judge this by our experience, either by crude common experience, or by an experience refined and corrected by instruments, which nevertheless relies on the " equal or unequal "; " more or less," judgments which we must make in comparing them. We can arrange a group of brightnesses in this manner, for example, or hardnesses. Hardnesses may be placed in an ascending series by the ability of a substance of any hardness to scratch another. Thus wood scratches chalk, glass scratches wood, steel scratches glass, and diamond scratches steel. Their hardnesses can be arranged as that of chalk, wood, glass, steel, and diamond.

[57] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 52, a. 1. *De Virtut. Card.* a. 3.

To these ascending intensities we assign numbers: H_1 for the lowest, and to it assign the value 1 or 10; H_2 for the next and assign the number 2 and 20; and so forth. With instruments we may perfect our ability to determine the series, but we do not change the principle. These numbers are a true measure of the qualities, but they do not indicate any absolute quantity. The hardness of value 12 is not 12 times that of a unit whose value is 1, nor is it three times the hardness whose value is 4, etc.

The measurement of qualities, then, is done by arranging the qualities according as one is more or less intense than another, providing in this way a series. This measure is not absolute but relative; and is a true measure. Because qualities are increased not by addition but by a deeper formalization or radication in a subject they cannot be measured absolutely. But because we really experience more and less intensity among qualities of the same species, they allow a relative measure.

This is the teaching of the Thomist school; it is also that of many modern philosophers of science. Thus, for example, Cohen and Nagle write: [58]

> Both in daily life and in the sciences it is often essential to replace propositions simply affirming or denying qualitative differences by propositions indicating in a more precise way the degree of such differences. It is essential to do this in the interest of accuracy of statement as well as in the interest of discovering comprehensive principles in terms of which the subject matter can be conceived as systematically related. . . . Theoretical and practical considerations lead us, therefore, to replace qualitative distinctions by quantitative ones.[59]

The authors point out that the measure of qualities possesses pitfalls which must at all cost be avoided: " The employment of number to indicate qualitative differences requires a careful examination if it is not to lead us into error and absurdity." [60]

The substance of the careful examination which the authors

[58] Cohen and Nagle, *An Introduction to Logic*, 289-296.
[59] *Ibid.*, 289-290. [60] *Ibid.*, 290.

conduct is an affirmation of the scholastic doctrine on the measurability of qualities and of the limitations to such measurement, and a defense of the distinction between the absolute and relative properties of dimensive quantities:

> Hardness and softness, like temperature, shape, density, intelligence, courtesy, are nonadditive qualities. Such qualities are frequently called intensive. They can be "measured" only in the sense that the different degrees of the qualities may be arranged in a series. Concerning them questions of how much or how many times are meaningless.[61]

V. The Measuring of Intense Qualities

The measure of qualities according to their ordinal measure involves the problem of discovering and determining this order and of classifying the qualities so measured. There is a direct and an indirect form of this measure.[62] There is first of all the direct measure: when intensities are arranged by direct sensory observation. One case is that of hardnesses, another of measuring temperatures by one hundred substances each of a different temperature. The substances are observed directly by the sense of touch, arranged in the series of their increasing temperatures, and finally a number is assigned to each.[63]

The inconvenience of this direct measurement led men early in the history of science to devise indirect measurements, that is, a measure of a quality by means of a direct measurement of one of its causes or effects. These indirect measurements were necessary or useful for two reasons. The first is the inaccessibility of the quality: the fact that it cannot be observed directly, e. g., the temperature of a celestial body or the electric charge on a molecule, or sensation in an animal. The second reason was a need for scientific precision and rigor in the measure. In indirect measures devised for this reason, the intensity of the quality is measured in terms of the quanti-

[61] *Ibid.*, 296.

[62] Thonnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-381. Hoenen, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-195; 488-497. Maquart, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-173.

[63] Hoenen, *op. cit.*, 185.

tative increase of some strictly measurable quantity. This is usually an extension, as heat is measured by the length of the column of mercury. Thus the varying degrees of increase of the quality are correlated with a cause or effect of the quality which varies with it, and is a strictly measurable quantum. Through the cardinal properties of this quantum, a measure of the quality is to be had.

This strict measure of the cause or effect confers on the measure of the quality an element of precision. It does not remove the essential ordinal character of the measure nor bestow cardinal properties on the quality. It does make possible a more careful control of the measure, it adds rigor and accuracy and it provides a more uniform way of measuring the quality.[64] The measurability of the quality itself never exceeds the limits of ordinal measure.[65]

This indirect measure is made through some cause or effect or through some concomitant phenomenon of the quality which is being measured. St. Thomas remarks:

> Virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and with regard to action; in regard to being for as much as things of a more perfect virtue are of longer duration; in regard to action for as much as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act.[66] . . . A thing is said to be a great power which is able to lift a great weight or in any way to do a great thing.[67]

St. Thomas here mentions the effect as a measure of the qualitative intensity. The cause might have been chosen as well: the distance of a unit lamp from a screen may be used as a measure of the intensity of the brightness on the screen. Or it might be a concomitant function as blood pressure is a measure of the intensity of fear in a psychological experiment.

This indirect measure of qualities by means of their effects is common to all qualities, even the most spiritual. Thus for

[64] *Ibid.*, 188-189. Thonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 380.
[65] Hoenen, *ibid.*, 186.
[66] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1.
[67] *De Virtut. in Comm.* a. 11.

example the discrete number of problems solved in a unit time is a measure of intelligence.[68] Required, of course, is the relation of the cause to some directly measurable effect.

The ease of this measure and the precision and accuracy of it increase as the quality is more related and bound up to a material subject.[69] The most sublime qualities, at one extreme, which are in no way related to quantified matter, are in no way measurable, while other qualities, at the other extreme, deeply immersed in matter, as heat, are easily and accurately measurable. The reason is clear: the measure is made in virtue of the bond which exists between the quality and its subject, and between the intensity of the quality and the amount of the effect. In subjects which are material and physical the effects are in the physical and quantitative order; and one such effect can be chosen as a measure of the quality itself.

Physical qualities, therefore, are the most measurable of all; and their measurements may be used as the foundation of scientific work. Three conditions which make it possible to erect a science on a structure of intense qualities are: 1) a property of all intensities, namely, that if intensity A equals B and B equals C, then A equals C; and also that if A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A will be greater than C. Numbers and intensities have this in common. 2) that the cause or effect chosen be a strictly measurable quantum with cardinal properties, as an extension. This is the ultimate reason for the dictum of Smith that ultimately all scientific measurements involve the registering of results in geometrical terms,[70] i. e., in terms of a directly and cardinally measurable primary quantity.[71] 3) that the quality be continuous, that is to say, that the increase of the intensity be a motion without discrete intervals. This condition is required in order to express the relation of the quality to a continuous cause or effect, or to

[68] Thonnard, *op. cit.*, 376. [69] *Ibid.*

[70] Smith, *Philosophical Frontiers*, p. 22.

[71] Hoenen, *op. cit.*, p. 191. Thonnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-376.

other qualities, in a formula valid for all intensities of the quality.

There are many examples of measures fulfilling these conditions. Thus heat, mechanical energy, light, electricity, all are expressed and measured by units which are quantities, although the qualities themselves are not, and can be measured only ordinally.[72]

The measure of intensive qualities conducted in this way has great scientific value; it is upon such a structure of qualitative measures that the physical and chemical sciences have advanced. In a similar way, this indirect measure of qualities can be used in formulating hypotheses which intend to explain the observable effects of phenomena in terms of theoretical causes.[73]

By means of this indirect measure of intense continuous qualities in terms of their strictly measurable quantitative effects, a special quasi-cardinal property may be attributed to quality intensities: the inequality or equality of their proportions.

If we take three points on a quantitative extension AC, we are able to state that the differences A — B equals or is greater than the difference B — C. Or we may make proportions and compare these and state that A : B equals or is greater or less than B : C. In treating of continuous intense qualities we may initiate a similar comparison. Here we find a difference, however. The comparison between differences is impossible because intensities do not admit differences, being made up of non-additive parts. In the comparison of proportions, however, the whole undivided quality intensity is compared with another undivided quality intensity. And this comparison of intensity proportions is valid. Of three intensities of different values we may state that A : B equals B : C, or that A : B is greater or less than B : C.[74]

[72] Thonnard, *ibid.*, pp. 377 sq. [73] Hoenen, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

[74] *Ibid.*, 190-194. For a criticism of Hoenen, which, however, does not weaken his position but rather clarifies it, see: J. Tonquédec, *Questions de Cosmologie et de Physique*, pp. 120-122.

Conclusion

We may conclude of the ordinal measure of quality intensities: Qualitative intensities cannot be measured cardinally—"how much" and "how many times"—because their mode of increase is not by addition but by a more complete radication of their form in their subjects. They can be measured ordinally however, that is arranged in a numbered series according to their increase in intensities. This measure may be made directly by an observation of the various intensities by which the intensities are ordered and numbered by a direct sensory judgment on each intensity.

Precision and rigor, however, are added to the measurement if it is made indirectly, that is, through an effect or cause of the quality intensity which is itself strictly measurable, and which admits all the properties of cardinal measurement. By means of the direct measure of this effect, the quality intensities can be ordered, and then introduced into scientific treatment and calculation.

The measure of intensities carried out in this way, although it never exceeds an ordinal measurement, is however sufficiently rigorous and accurate to be the foundation for a scientific treatment of the quality, both in experimental and in theoretical science.

Furthermore, by means of this indirect measure also, a certain cardinal property is attached to continuous qualities, by which intensities which cannot be compared by addition or subtraction or multiplication or division, since they are in themselves undivided, may be compared as proportions; and relationship of equality and inequality, may be predicated of these proportions.

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THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO HISTORY IN EARLY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

THE good tidings of the new and final Revelation, which proclaimed the arrival of the Savior and through Him the deliverance and redemption of mankind, mark for the early Christian the fulfillment of time and history. As the beginning of the final world-epoch, the coming of Christ, at the same time, also reveals the true meaning of the past, including that of creation and the fall of man. This insight, so far, had been partially hidden from man, leaving him without any real historical understanding. In addition, the New Testament also indicates clearly the means by which the faithful may attain to salvation and the life everlasting, thereby pointing to the true future through which the present as well as the past achieve their fullest significance. In this sense the coming of Christ integrates into one single and continuous meaning the whole of historical existence in its aspects of past, present and future. The result of such a realization was that the early Christian discovered the import of history in the actual manifestations of the manifold and continuous relations of God to man and man to God. This discovery was confirmed by the conviction that the all-pervading Divine Love was the decisive force throughout total history. It was fortified by the spiritual solidarity of mankind as the beloved children of God. It found additional support in the awareness of universal sinfulness, human weakness, and man's craving for salvation. It had its ultimate basis in the unshakable faith of a common deliverance and redemption. Thus this " God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son," became a conception of history of the first magnitude.

The ultimate and true meaning of universal history, therefore, was to be recognized in that divinely ordained continuity

which, as a religious (and ethical) conception of time and history, begins with creation and the original fall of man and his freedom to sin. Its highest overtones are reached in the redeeming message of the New Revelation and the atoning sacrifice of Christ. It concludes with the Last Judgment and the complete and irrevocable separation of good and evil, and the final victory of the good over evil. This conception of history makes Christ the vital center of universal history. For it is Christ Who forever decides the struggle between light and darkness, good and evil—the basic metaphysical problem of the religious and moral interpretation of history advanced by the early Christians.

Hence history, viewed from the depth of the irreversible Divine Resolve, is actually the unique stage of the single and continuous " world drama." In conforming to this conception of history the early Christians were able to achieve an identity of religion and history. At the same time they established that unity and continuity of time-events which constitutes the foundation of a metaphysics of history. Moreover, in an anticipatory mood, the early Christians considered the divine plan of revelation and salvation in its relation to time and time-sequence, the ultimate criterion of all history and historical actuality.

These conceptions of the significance of time and history were greatly strengthened by the apocalyptic or eschatological expectations professed by the early Christians. These expectations or hopes were founded on Christ's own words that He would soon return in order to judge the world in righteousness. As a matter of fact, many people felt that the time of man's work had run out and, consequently, they not only saw the end of time as being imminent, but actually yearned for this final and conclusive event. The belief in the proximity of the final Kingdom of God as well as the realization that Christ's kingdom was not of this world, should also help to explain why some of the early Christians displayed an attitude of general indifference toward affairs and issues of a predominantly secular

nature. It should also serve to understand why some did not actively participate to any appreciable degree in the existing social, cultural, legal or political events of the day, except in those instances where the dictates of charity demanded conclusive action. In the face of the proximity of the Last Things there could really be only one relevant command—an apodictic METANOEITE—a most urgent " repent and return to God."

Within the historico-religious view of the early Christians we can observe that for them the imminent event of the Last Judgment, as the final and irrevocable step in God's resolve, constitutes the complete and irreversible consummation of the divine plan of salvation and redemption. The Last Judgment, therefore, is the total realization of the one all-embracing anticipation of man's ultimate reunion with God. This conviction dominated the whole historical outlook of the early Christians. To the true believer history, in its fullest meaning, is nothing other than the expectation of man's final and complete delivery from all earthiness and evil and, hence, from all history in the common sense of the term. In the midst of historical motion and change the consoling restfulness of the Eternal City of God is envisioned. But such a conception already initiates a transcending of all history within history itself. The iniquities of history and historical existence are sublimated by the realization of the everlasting significance of mere temporality. Thus finite historical existence itself becomes infinitely exalted and glorified inasmuch as Christian faith proclaims that the infinite and eternal enters the historically finite and there reveals itself in its eternal glory to those who in the simplicity of their hearts are able and willing to read the signs. The infinite distance between the wholly perfect God and the wholly imperfect man, it was felt, does not preclude an intimate relationship between God and man, or the communication of the fulness of the Divine Life. It is this personal communion which gives rise to an ever new life and ever new beginnings, and thus constitutes the foundation of a conception of history as it was understood by the early Christians.

The presence of the eternal in history and mere temporality finds its innermost expression in the fact that the Eternal God reveals Himself within the framework of history. And in so doing the Eternal God imposes not only infinite tasks upon finite historical man, but also sets in motion forces and events of everlasting significance which are understood by man within the framework of historical finiteness. This realization of the presence and efficaciousness of the eternal in finite history should be considered as that event which initiates a concept of universal history. At the same time this realization also gives true dignity to every form of individuality and individual existence.

The complete absorption of man in God—the total surrender of all separate individuality to the One God, however, is not tantamount to an extinction of human individuality and the historical significance of individual man in all his personal actions and volitions. The Christian idea of man does not deprive him of his essential being or his unique personality. Notwithstanding this complete subordination in the Divine Will, man's absorption in the fellowship of God rather preserves and, indeed, enhances man's personal and historical significance and worth. By spiritually delivering himself from the casual nexus of a blind cosmic fate which seems to control ancient man, the Christian man is no longer confined within the narrow and frequently oppressing limits prescribed by nature and the natural processes. The total moral and spiritual regeneration of man proposed by the New Testament means the possibility of ever new beginnings and ever new moral creations. Hence the history of man, in the light of these novel conceptions, is no longer " natural history," as it was for instance with the ancients, but " supernatural " history.

The most profound Greek thinkers, to be sure, have attempted to interpret temporal and historical life as the reproduction of eternity. But this kind of reproduction failed to visualize the entrance of the eternal into time and finite historical existence. The predominant and traditional Graeco-Hellen-

istic ideal of man and his historical existence within what was considered a closed universe of causal nexus, could maintain itself only with reference to an essentially timeless and static present which actually extinguished historical existence. Such a philosophy, which knows of no significant past or future, presupposes a moral and intellectual strength which always feeds on itself, and which could not endure as soon as the redeeming power of reason began to be questioned seriously. The classical expression of the particular attitude is the famous passage found in Marcus Aurelius (2.17): "What, then, is that which is able to guide man? One thing, and one thing only, philosophy."

This wholly negative attitude of the ancients toward the historical position and significance of man actually proved a definite and serious moral drawback in that it did not provide the means for a fundamental inner revival of man. Its failure to offer any new and wider spiritual and moral horizons—its inability to point to a truly significant future transcending the momentariness of intellectual or aesthetic pleasure—all these definite limitations became a real burden at the time when the defects of historical existence and temporal life, even the most virtuous, could no longer be denied. The rather dismal failure of antiquity to comprehend the real significance of historical temporality—its inability to grasp the meaning which the concept of the future has upon the historical present, is closely related to the prevailing Greek conviction that historical change and movement could not bring about an appreciable improvement. In the final analysis, this failure was but the result of those cosmological teachings of antiquity which insisted upon a meaningless repetition of cyclic and essentially identical world periods.

It is only too obvious that such philosophical notions could not very well promote the idea of moral improvement or historical progress. As long as the optimistic and heroic vitality of the overwhelmingly aesthetic Greek intellectualism was able to maintain itself, these notions seemed to be quite acceptable.

But with the gradually waning faith in philosophical speculation, and with the progressively increasing realization that philosophy by itself was incapable of successfully coping with more profound moral wisdom and insight, traditional philosophy soon came to be looked upon as something intolerably sterile. The ancient views on the meaning of life and history bore throughout an unhistorical aspect which found its salient expression in the idea of an endless procession of identical cosmic cycles which continuously and, hence, meaninglessly always revert to their starting point. Obviously, within such rather aimless cycles of generation and corruption all significance, historical or personal, is completely lost in a kind of mechanism which itself not only defies all meaning, but which always threatens to extinguish all true human dignity and worth.

Already during the fourth and third centuries before Christ the Hellenic world began to show definite signs of intellectual decline. At the same time the unavoidable contacts between the various philosophical viewpoints and the serious conflicts which arose therefrom, has made it more and more obvious that philosophy by itself could not elevate man to a state of inner contentment or happiness. No longer was philosophy credited with the ability to offer convincing insights into the nature of things or the essential moral needs of man. This complete loss of faith in the redeeming power of philosophy found its most marked expression among the Sceptics who finally came to the conclusion that virtue consists in the renunciation of all knowledge rather than in any attempt to acquire knowledge. Hence it was felt that man, by his own intellectual efforts and resources, could gain neither real knowledge, nor true virtue, nor lasting happiness.

In the midst of these disappointing realizations an intense desire for abiding spiritual and moral comfort waxed stronger and stronger. Thus the paramount philosophical interest which characterizes the close of ancient philosophy, became increasingly transferred from the earthly to the heavenly sphere. Man

began to feel the urgency for a better world as well as for his own salvation beyond mere sensate happiness. This new religious fervor found perhaps its most adequate philosophical expression in Plato's metaphysics. As a matter of fact, Plato, at least during the last phases of Hellenic thought, became the foremost intellectual guide for all those who were seeking the inner road back to their heavenly home. But Plato's efforts to point out the eternity of a higher and purer world, had their serious limitations. For the philosophical "high-road" to salvation, according to Plato and the Platonists, could be managed only through the proper use of a highly sophisticated reason, while with the orthodox Christians it meant the total regeneration of man through joyous faith and good works. Hence it is not altogether surprising that the Christians should regard the religious intellectualism of the pagan philosophers as feeble and inept efforts of mere natural reason abstractly to express what the faithful, through supernatural revelation, already fully believed.

The fact that the Christians saw the Divine Efficacy manifesting Itself in one single and irreversible purposive trend throughout the whole of historical duration, constitutes the basis of a conception of history which welds both religion and history into one single and unique significance. And this reduction of all historical existence to a religious conviction endowed history itself with an entirely new meaning. To the Hellenic thinker history could not really have any profounder significance. For within such a mode of thinking human action and human resolve at once were lost in an endless and inwardly unrelated succession of "nows" which problematically separate an eternally extinguished "past" from a practically illusory "future." The idea, so essential to Christian thinking, that the present, at least in a moral sense, partakes in a morally relevant and even decisive future stretching, as it were, into infinitude, remained a conception totally alien to the ancient mind, often as distasteful as the notion of infinitude itself.

The ultimate triumph of Christian religion over Graeco-

Hellenistic cosmological speculation was greatly stimulated by the emergence of a new conception of history. Christian religion most profoundly influenced the question concerning the end of human existence and human progress, and hence the problem of history itself. In general, classical antiquity believed in only two possibilities: the ultimate good consists either in the life of quiet intellectual contemplation, or in some extravagant deed, or perhaps in the combination of both. Yet it might consist in the welfare of the whole, thus becoming a collective good in which the individual became somewhat submerged and even extinguished. But even the classical ideal of heroic or intellectual greatness, being, as it were, primarily worship of heroism or intellectualism, lacks that element which brings to the fore the historical person rather than the impersonal and hence really unhistorical achievement.

The early Christian interpretation of history and historical existence within a divinely ordained measure of time, on the other hand, is basically religious and moral and, hence, historical in a profounder or, shall we say, metaphysical sense. Early Christianity, as a religion of salvation and redemption, views the whole of historical actuality from the position that every historical event, every act as well as every free human resolve, despite its finiteness has in itself definite consequences of everlasting nature. This type of historical interpretation in all its religious and moral implications is actually based on the realization that the infinite future constitutes the sole time notion that could be called fully adequate to the historical problem as such, that is, to a history which was to be understood in terms of moral action and religious truth. The infinite future, the eternal and irrevocable consequences of every human act, always remain the ultimate criterion, justification and consummation of all history—if history is to be understood as the sum total of human actions and human volitions. Hence it is this infinite future which also endows the past and the present, that is, all of history with its true meaning. The Christian conviction of life everlasting, the sole and true issue

of all temporal human existence and human history, could only look to this infinite future. For this infinite future contains the absolute and irreversible consequences and, therefore, the decisive criterion of all historical events. Interpreted in this manner the present is, in a religious or moral sense, merely a " hint " or anticipation of the future—a mere opportunity to conquer the everlasting future and, by so doing, to make true history. Only through this infinite future can the present acquire any real historical significance. Hence, judged from the point of view of religion and its relation to history and historical actuality, the present is merely an anticipatory and, at least morally speaking, a relative term. The joyous surrender to the future and to the definite promises it holds becomes the decisive trend within the conception of history held by the early Christians.

The first important attempt to designate the infinite future as the only really relevant time notion is to be found in the exhortations of St. Paul (Philip. 3:12-14): " Not that I have already obtained this, or already have been made perfect, but I press on hoping that I may lay hold of that for which Jesus Christ has laid hold of me. . . . Forgetting the things which are behind, and reaching forward into the things which are before, I press on toward the mark, to the prize of God's heavenly call in Jesus Christ."

Christianity, by the very fact that it is a religion of salvation and redemption, directs man's historical conception beyond ordinary history in that it points to a future world or a " future history." But this reaching beyond ordinary history into a future world does not imply a complete estrangement from the present or the past. On the contrary, the spiritual teachings of Christianity in their moral and cultural aspects are definitely constructive in respect to this world. For what the future alone can bring to full fruition and actualization, is already contained in present and past history.

The early Christian conception of history also differs from the classical idea which proclaimed that heroic life consists in

a dramatic conflict between virtue and fate. This idea was completely discarded when Christianity abandoned the Greek antithesis of man and nature. No longer, according to Christianity, is man's fate and, hence, history determined by a blindly working mechanism or cosmic fate so frequently referred to by the great tragic poets of antiquity. Neither is man the toy of capricious designs of mystical powers external and often inimical to him. The forces which guide men, according to Christianity, like those which govern his environment, are subject to the laws of God and thus by no means hostile to man. In this fashion history itself becomes the continuous record of man's conscious and moral life—a life, that is, which is created both free and potentially happy, either temporally or eternally, depending on man's capacity for conscious action and deliberate choice: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." (John 8:32) But this truth is to be found neither entirely within, nor yet entirely without the frontiers of creation and history.

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THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

A. What do We Mean by Society?

1. *The Concept of Society*

THE concept of society involves two elements: a plurality and some kind of union. These two concepts, at first, may seem contrary. In fact, they are not, because union is nothing other than a plurality put together. Plurality is contrary to unity but not to union. It is the division of unity. Unity is more than union.[1] We have a unity when plurality disappears giving rise to something new, as when the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen gives rise to water. On the contrary, we have a union when plurality (i. e., the parts) persists and tends to form an aggregation. In the first place, we have an essential unity; in the second, only an accidental unity, which we call union. In a union we have an essential plurality and an accidental unity.

Society is made of men. When men gather or assemble together to form a society, they are not fused into one: they do not disappear nor do they give rise to something new (as oxygen and hydrogen disappear in giving rise to water). Society therefore is a union of men, an essential plurality: *Adunatio hominum*. Men form in society insofar as they are persons, that is, subjects of rights and obligations, because through free will they are masters of and therefore responsible for their own actions. The human person may be considered in his twofold aspect: his being and his actions (*esse et agere*), which are really distinct, since being is continuous while actions are intermittent. Society is not concerned with the being of persons. It presupposes their unity in nature insofar as they all belong

[1] "Unitas potior est quam unio" (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 4; cf. also I, q. 11, aa. 2, 3).

to the same human nature; but society is only concerned with the actions, the activities of persons and it is constituted by their dynamic union.

There are two kinds of human or deliberate actions: immanent which remain in the agent, and transient which pass from an agent to an object. Transient actions may affect ourselves or others (*ad alterum*). Every deliberate action in particular is morally either good or bad, and it falls under a virtue or a vice. Actions regarding other people and coming under the general heading of justice are called social actions.[2]

All these social actions may be exemplified as a motion from its point of departure to its point of arrival; and, as such, they receive their generic unity from the point of departure and their specific unity from their point of arrival. From their point of departure social actions are as many as the persons from whom they proceed. The only possible union they can have, therefore, must be from their direction and convergence towards the same point of arrival. This point of convergence, if it is to combine together dynamically these social actions which in themselves are many, must be in itself a unity.

Now all deliberate actions, social or otherwise, insofar as they are deliberate, proceed or are produced by the will; and the object of the will is good. The converging point, therefore, of all social actions must be the good of all the persons producing them, that is, the common good of all the members of society. Society, therefore, is constituted by the dynamic union of all the social actions of the members towards the common good of all. In this sense, St. Thomas defined society: *Adunatio hominum ad unum aliquod communiter agendum*.[3] He also

[2] "Necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum" (*ibid.*, I-II, q. 18, a. 9). "Omnis actus in aliquod bonum tendens, nisi inordinate in illud tendat, habet pro fine bonum alicuius virtutis: eo quod virtutes sufficienter perficiunt nos circa omnia quae possunt esse bona hominis" (*II Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, qcl. 5, ad 3). "Homines ordinantur ad invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem iustitiae, quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae" (I-II, q. 100, a. 2).

[3] *Contra Impugnantes Dei cultum*, c. 3.

refers to the definition by Cicero: *Populus est coetus multitudinis, juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.*[4]

2. *The Essence of Society*

Outside Christian philosophy there are two main theories about the nature of society. One maintains that society is a pure fiction, a resonant or loud-sounding nothing (Bastiat, DeMichel, etc.). The other theory maintains that society is a subsistent living organism: be it a big animal (Biological school: Alfred Espinas; and Sociological school: Durkheim), or a super-man (Historic school: De Savigny, Stahl, etc.).

These two theories refute one another, as neither one can answer the serious objections of the other. In other words, both are right in what they reject, and both are wrong in what they profess to maintain. No power of imagination will ever show us this huge animal or superman; nor can any force of logic ever convince us that society and the state are nothing but a mere mental fiction. The truth must be something between and above these two opposite theories. Society must be something subsistent independently of its members. This is the Christian theory and this is how it is explained.

Society, we said, is the dynamic union of the social actions of the members towards the common good of all. Let us for a moment imagine a race of five men running towards a given goal where there is a flag. We can distinguish the five men, their individual running, the flag and the convergence of their running towards the flag. The essence or nature of society is this dynamic convergence of the social actions of the members towards their common good.

That convergence is a relation. A relation is the order or respect of one thing to another, for instance paternity is a relation, i. e., that by which a man is called a father in respect to his son; that by which he is called husband in order to his wife is also a relation. A relation may be real or purely mental. It is real, objective, i. e., existing independently of its being

[4] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 2.

known or not by the mind, when it is something which actually affects the subject to which it is attributed. It is purely mental when it is attributed to the subject merely by the fact that it is thought of, for instance, when I say: you are in my thoughts, or you are seen by me; your relation to me is purely mental. If I stop thinking of you, that relation you have to me ceases. On the contrary, paternity is not attributed to a man simply by my thought, but by the actual fact of generation, whether that fact be known or not by other people.

Now that convergence of the social actions of the members towards their common good is real and objective, independently of whether I think of it or not. It is just as in an automobile factory where, by division of labor, the work of all concerned converges in the making of cars. Real here does not mean something material or corporeal, which one can touch and hold in his hands; only materialists would be guilty of such confusion; and yet a relation is not something absolute and subsistent. Paternity and filiation, by which one calls another his father or his son, is a very real thing, yet is only a relation. We can therefore conclude that the essence or nature of society, i. e., the convergence of the social actions of the members towards their common good, is a real relation.[5]

B. What Gave Rise to Society?

This question may be answered in two ways: a) by giving the efficient cause of society; b) by giving the final cause or the purpose of society.

1. *The Efficient Cause of Society*

Here again Christian philosophy is between and above two opposite theories. On the one hand, Hobbes (1588-1679) and Rousseau (1712-1778) maintained that society is due only to

[5] "Sciendum est quod hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo habet solum unitatem ordinis, secundum quem non est simpliciter unum" (*I Ethic.*, lect. 1, n. 5). "In quibusdam enim ipse *ordo* habetur pro forma, sicut in civitate" (*V Metaphys.*, lect. 5, n. 817).

a free contract; and, on the other, Spinoza (1632-1677), Hegel (1770-1831), Comte (1798-1857) and Darwin (1809-1882) agree that society is a necessary product of natural evolution. Christian philosophy maintains that society is both from nature and from free will.

It is from nature in the sense that man by his very nature is inclined to form in society with his fellow-men, which is shown both by his needs [6] and by human speech.[7] And since natural right is but the rational formulation of a natural inclination,[8] it follows that man has a natural right to society and that society thus formed is in accordance with human nature and with natural rights.

It is from free will in the sense that the form of government, i. e., a kingdom or a republic, a democracy or an unlimited monarchy, is decided upon by the free choice or consent of the members. To take an example: man is naturally inclined to marriage, and in this sense marriage is from nature. But the particular choice between, say Joe and Jean, is only due to free choice. Therefore every particular marriage is in a sense from nature, i. e., from man's social nature; and in another sense from the free choice of both parties.

Society therefore comes directly from man, ultimately from

[6] "Naturale est homini ut sit animal sociale et politicum . . . magis etiam quam omnia alia animalia, quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat. Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adiuvetur, et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem occupentur" (*De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1). "The consciousness of his own weakness urges man to join his work with that of others . . . It is this natural impulse which binds men together in civil society" (Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*).

[7] "Est igitur necessarium homini quod in multitudine vivat . . . Hoc autem evidentissime declaratur per hoc quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam unus homo aliis suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere" (*De Reg. Princ., loc. cit.*). "Homini in civili societate vivere natura iubet . . . quod praecipue demonstrat et maxima societatis consiliatrix loquendi facultas" (Leo XIII, *Diuturnum illud*).

[8] "Secundum ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae." "Ad legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam" (*Suma Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, aa. 2, 3).

God, Who made man a social being;[9] and the proximate efficient cause of it is man's social nature, i. e., nature and free will. St. Thomas has stated this theory in any of the following formulae: *a natura inclinante et ratione perficiente; ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur; societas est a natura, sed cum consensu.*[10]

2. *The Final Cause or Purpose of Society*

According to the Christian doctrine, man, endowed with a social nature, is placed here on earth in order that, spending his life in society, and under the authority ordained by God, he may cultivate and evolve to the full all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator; and that, by fulfilling faithfully the functions of his trade or other calling, he may attain both to temporal and eternal happiness.[11] In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural means which man can and must use to reach his destined end; since society exists for man, not man for society.[12]

The end of society is the good or happiness of man; and since " the good of anything depends on the condition of the nature of that thing," [13] the end of society depends on, i. e., is measured by the nature of man. So whether we consider the origin or the purpose of society, we arrive at the same conclusion: society is by and for man insofar as he is a social being. And what we say of man as such equally applies to each and every man,[14] because all men are of the same nature. Man's natural socialness is the raison d'être of society.

[9] This also applies, incidentally to civil authority, which comes from God in the same sense that God, through man's natural socialness, wants society, and society could not exist without authority. Therefore, authority as such, like society as such, is from man's social nature; this or that form of authority, however, is man's free choice.

[10] Cf. *VIII Polit.*, lect. 6; and *Summa Theol., Suppl.*, q. 41, a. 1.

[11] Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno.*

[12] Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris.*

[13] " Bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem suae naturae." (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 59, a. 5, ad 3).

[14] " Manifeste apparet felicitatem unius hominis et civitatis esse eamdem et unius rationis " (*VIII Polit.*, c. 1). " Idem oportet esse iudicium de fine totius multitudinis et unius " (*De Reg. Princ.*, I, c. 14). " Quod autem de singulis hominibus, idem de societate civili intelligendum est " (Leo XIII, *Sapientiae Christianae*).

Society and man's natural socialness are more intimately connected than even the words convey. Man is by nature social, because he is by nature rational, so much so that Aristotle and St. Thomas define man both as a rational being and as a social being.[15] Also the nature or essence of society, as we have seen, consists in a relation, and relation can only be perceived by reason, i. e., by a rational being. Hence the intimate connection based on reason between society and man's natural socialness.[16]

C. What Do We Mean by International Society?

Literally speaking, " international society " means a society of different nations, and actually every political state is a society made of different nations. Hence the necessity of distinguishing between a nation and a state. The word " nation " comes from *nasci*; but by " nation " is meant a group of families having in common their origin, customs and language. For the constitution of a nation some scientists add to these three the following three things: religion, history and civilization.

The state, on the contrary, is a juridical combination comprising people of different nations living under the same code of laws. Hence, while a nation arises from a natural development, a state usually owes its formation to historically contingent circumstances, for instance, the need of self-defense against an aggressor or invasion on the part of other groups of families, etc. Actually, mankind is not divided according to nations, but according to political states; in fact, there is no state which is made of a single nation and every nation is divided up among several states; so that now " nationality " is synonymous with state allegiance. America is in itself a society of practically all nations in the world.

[15] Cf. note 6.

[16] In fact they are correlative, i. e., neither can exist or be understood without the other (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2).

It was this anomaly which gave rise during the last century to the theory formulated in the "Principle of Nationality," proclaiming that every nation should unite to constitute one political independent state, and that states should correspond to nations. Aside from the practical impossibility of this idea, the theoretical value of the principle of nationality is very slight. Man has a natural right to form a society, not because he is a member of a nation, i. e., not because he is Irish, English, Scotch or Welsh; not because he is a descendant of a given race, speaks a given language and has a given set of customs; but simply because he is a man, and as such, social by nature.

Those who have in common the constitutive elements of a nation may find it easier to unite and live together peacefully, if they so wish; but they are not bound by any natural obligation to do so. Rights and obligations are necessarily correlative, and where there is a natural right, there must be a corresponding natural obligation. The members of a given nation as such have therefore no natural right or obligation to unite politically under the same state. By international society, therefore, we mean a society among politically independent states. It would be better to call it interstatal society, if such a word existed.

D. The Need of an International Society

We have said that by an international or interstatal society we mean a society among states, and by society we do not mean a unity but only a union, an essential plurality, or as St. Augustine says: *concors multitudo*, a converging multitude, whose members are not absorbed or fused into one, but whose social activity is directed towards the common good of all. In our case, an international society would imply that the international juridical activities of the individual states be dynamically directed towards the common good of all the state-members.

We maintain that it is in accordance with natural rights that men should unite in separate states, independent from one

another in all that concerns the form of government of their choosing and the manner of organizing their own life within the legitimate frontiers of each state. But we also maintain that the various states are necessarily and mutually bound together by moral and juridical ties in one big family.[17] The states, therefore, are bound to promote the confederation of all mankind within one big family, regulated by special laws with the view of fostering the union and the prosperity of all peoples.

E. How Far is the State a Natural Society?

Is it not true to say that, according to the traditional Catholic teaching, the state is a natural society as much as the family? Let us examine this question closely. First of all, as regards the traditional Catholic teaching, may I recall that the state, as we know it now, is quite recent, and therefore the word " traditional " cannot apply to it in its orthodox meaning as used in the Church.

Secondly, the family society is natural in the sense that without it man could not even exist; while the state society is natural in the sense that without it man could exist, but not so well or so comfortably. Therefore, while the family is necessary and therefore natural for our very existence, the state is necessary only for the welfare of man (*ad esse, ad bene esse*.[18] In fact, the reason generally put forward to prove that the state is a natural society is that man is social by nature and indefinitely capable of improvement. Since the family is not sufficient to provide man with all the development of which he is capable, man therefore needs a society, and a much larger one, than the family for his complete development.[19]

[17] Pius XII, *Summi Pontificatus*.

[18] " Ad hoc scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed ut *bene* vivat " (*I Polit.*, lects. 1, 2). That is why they both, Aristotle and St. Thomas, maintain that man is more inclined by nature towards the family than towards civil society (*VIII Ethic.*, lect. 12, n. 1720).

[19] ". . . scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt

This larger society at the time of Aristotle was the city (hence the word " citizenship ") ; at the time of St. Thomas it was the city or kingdom (*civitas vel regnum*) ; [20] in later times it was realized in the various states in Europe and the small state in Italy; and recently also the Empire. Thus the concept of a natural society larger than the family has progressively widened with the extension of independent cities or kingdoms.

From this it follows that in this larger-than-the-family society there are two aspects which we might call the widening and the restricting aspects. The first indicates the starting point, i. e., larger than the family; the other, the point of arrival, i. e., the actual frontiers of that society. From the above given reason one can only conclude that the larger-than-the-family society is natural in its widening aspect, but not in its restricting aspect. In fact, the actual delimitation of frontiers between one state and another, and the creation or suppression of states are merely positive rights based on post-war agreements or rather dictated by the victor and changing from war to war; and therefore they are not of natural but of positive rights. As it is natural that families should unite to form a bigger society, be it a city, county, a nation or a kingdom: [21] so also it is natural that states should unite to form an international society and eventually a world society.

As the state does not absorb or destroy the natural rights of families, but respects and defends them; neither should the international or world society absorb or destroy the natural rights of states, but rather respect and defend them. These three: family life, state life and international life, are all natural, each one in its proper sphere. Their aims are not opposing but complementary to one another, and as the complete aim of the families cannot be attained outside the state,

ad vitam, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest " (cf. *I Ethic.*, lect. 1, n. 4).

[20] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 11.

[21] " Dicendum quod sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis ordinatur ad commune bonum: ita etiam et bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum civitatis " (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3).

neither can the complete aim of the states be attained outside an international and even a world society: because now all states are dependent on one another and no state can prosper in isolation from all the others.

F. International Society is a Natural Society

Nature inclines both to state and to international society, but more to the latter. This is shown by 1) the unity of mankind, 2) the international tendency of human progress, 3) the right to international commerce, 4) the existence of international law.

1. *The Unity of Mankind*

a) Unity of nature and purpose. On the one hand, we all have the same human nature with the same faculties, tendencies and aspirations; and by the same nature we tend to form a society. We are all inclined to the same happiness in this life, to the integral and harmonious development of all human capabilities under the guidance of reason. On the other hand, knowledge is essentially international and cannot be diminished by the fact that it is shared by many or even by all men. All nations have to a certain degree cooperated in scientific discoveries, and all enjoy the benefits. Inventors and geniuses are rightly looked upon as international; *they* belong to mankind as well as their inventions or masterpieces, whether monuments of science, art, music or films, etc.

b) Unity of origin. We all originate from the same family. This is no longer denied by any serious scientist; in fact, all the discoveries go to confirm the biblical narrative of the origin of mankind from one and the same family. Comparative study of human races has only shown accidental differences; while interfecundation proves their common origin. Again, the origin of all languages from common roots confirms the origin of mankind. We can, therefore, conclude with St. Thomas that insofar as we all derive in an uninterrupted line from the same father,

we all form, as it were, one man.[22] Moreover, over and above our common origin from the same family, we have all been equally created by God. Our individual souls, because they are indivisible and spiritual, could not be generated, but they have been all individually created by God. From this universal divine paternity there follows necessarily a universal brotherhood of men; for where there is one common father, all the children are brothers.

c) Unity of habitation. All men dwell on the same planet which God has given to all without any particular allocation or distribution. In the Acts of the Apostles (17:26) we read: " It was He (God) Who has made, of one single stock, all the nations that were to dwell over the whole face of the earth." God has not only created men, but by His providence He also guides and disposes all the history of mankind. He has fixed the limits of time inside which the history of the various nations is to evolve. Hence before we are citizens of such and such a nation, we are by natural right the citizens of the world.

2. *The International Tendency of Human Progress*

Man, we have noted, is by nature capable of improvement without limit, which is shown by his desire of knowledge and happiness. The more he knows, the more his desire for knowledge increases.[23] And as for the desire of happiness, it is natural and necessary in every human being, since no one can deliberately desire what he knows to be harmful to himself, nor could anyone ever give up wanting to be happy.[24] Hence it is that human progress tends to extend more and more widely. At

[22] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 1.

[23] " Anima intellectiva, quia est universalium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita . . . per rationem et manus homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum et ad infinitos effectus " (*ibid.*, I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 4). " Quanto plus aliquis intelligit, tanto magis in eo desiderium intelligendi augetur, quod est hominibus naturale " (*III Contra Gentes*, c. 48, n. 2).

[24] " Voluntas naturaliter vult et ex necessitate beatitudinem, nec aliquis potest velle miseriam " (*De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3; *de Verit.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 18). " Necesse est, quod omnis homo beatitudinem velit " (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 8).

first social relations, as we have seen, were limited within the boundaries of the family; and as families grew into nations and eventually into states, social relations widened accordingly. There is a natural inclination in all civilized peoples to extend their contacts with all the peoples of the world, and this inclination extends with progress. It is shown in all the spheres of activity by international congresses of all sciences, arts and professions by correspondence, by commerce, by migrations, etc. In fact, every social activity tends, as it progresses, to become international.

On the other hand, the experience of centuries has shown that those peoples who on account of geographical conditions have remained isolated, remain backward and are dying out. Moreover, those peoples who for political reasons deliberately shut themselves up, who refuse to come into contact with others, deprive themselves of many advantages, and create suspicion and misunderstanding which usually lead to wars.

3. *The Right to International Commerce*

All the goods found on our planet are destined by the Creator for the whole human race. So we read in *Quadragesimo Anno*.[25] Since we are all equal by nature, we all have the same natural rights inherent to our nature. No one is to starve; no one, individual or groups of individuals, can claim any exclusive monopoly on the use of these goods which God has destined for everybody. No one has the right to exclude others from the use of such goods.[26] God has distributed nature's good unevenly over this planet. There are regions which are naturally rich and others which are naturally poor. There are regions which are over-crowded and others sparsely populated. The boundaries between one state and another, we have seen,

[25] ". . . that the goods which the Creator destined for the entire family of mankind . . ." (no. 45).

[26] " Quantum ad usum ipsarum rerum non debet homo habere res exteriores ut proprias, sed ut communes; ut scilicet de facili aliquis ea communicet in necessitates aliorum . . . unde dives peccat si alios ab usu illius rei indiscrete prohibeat " (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ad 2).

are based on human and often arbitrary convention, with no foundation in natural rights.

The institution of private property, which according to Catholic teaching [27] is only of secondary right, must always respect this divine ordination (as St. Thomas calls it),[28] that the use of all nature's goods should remain open to all men. No legislation of human making can ever abrogate this plan of God, who is the supreme owner of all things. Human laws to be valid must conform to God's plan manifested by natural rights. God who has distributed these goods unequally has also created men social by nature, that they may share among themselves these goods and thus cooperate freely in God's government of the world.

Those countries which abound in certain natural goods are bound by natural rights to share those goods with other countries by means of international commerce. If we believe that our economic system requires that we should burn and destroy our surplus products rather than share them with those nations who need them, there is something wrong with our economic system, and like the Pharisees of the Gospel, we are perhaps making void God's plan to suit the so-called economic rules of our own making.[29]

4. *The Existence of International Law*

Every state is governed by its own code of laws. No society could subsist without a code of laws, and similarly laws can

[27] Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* presents the doctrine of St. Thomas on private property as the doctrine of the Church, when he writes: "The Church without hesitation answers" and here he repeats the doctrine of St. Thomas word by word from the above quoted article. Now according to St. Thomas private property is not of primary natural right, but only of secondary natural right: "Secundum ius naturale non est distinctio possessionum (private property), sed magis secundum humanum condictum. Unde proprietas possessionum iuri naturali superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanae" (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ad 1).

[28] "Secundum naturalem ordinem ex divina providentia institutum, res inferiores sunt ordinatae ad hoc quod ex his subveniatur hominum necessitati" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 66, a. 7).

[29] Mark 7:8.

only be given to society as such, never to individuals as such; in other words, only society is a capable subject of laws.[30]

Now if man is social by his very nature, societies are certainly not less social than man himself. Therefore, once various states are constituted, there necessarily arise juridical relations between them, and consequently the need of international laws regulating such juridical international relations between states.

St. Thomas explains how civil or state laws are derived from natural law and he also proves the necessity of such laws, if men are to live together in society. Those reasons equally prove the necessity of international law if states do exist together on this planet and are to have some kind of juridical relations between them.[31] Now, laws can only be made for a society, since only a society is a capable subject of laws; consequently only an international society is a capable subject of international laws. In other words, if there is to be international law, there must be an international society.

In international politics it seems that for over thirty years we have been playing at international acrobatics. We want a binding international law without an international authority. In fact, we want an international law binding everybody else except ourselves. We want individual states to bind one another and yet remain independent and free as before. We want each individual state to bind itself freely and to feel that it is free and bound at the same time. When are our politicians going to realize that the Kantian principle of self-determination is a contradiction in terms? If outside the state there can be no right, how could there be international rights or international laws?

The following statements were considered to be self-evident seven hundred years ago: No one can legislate for or bind any save his own subjects; in fact no one can bind himself: *Nullus*

[30] From the words quoted above in note (21), St. Thomas concludes: "Unde ille qui gubernat familiam, potest quidem facere aliqua praecepta; non tamen quae proprie habeant rationem legis," because only a society can make laws and can receive laws: *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, aa. 2, 3.

[31] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 3.

proprie cogitur a seipso, nullus proprie loquendo suis actibus legem imponit." [32] A law which does not bind is not a law. *Lex quae non obligat, non est lex.*[33] No law can bind without a corresponding authority; in fact there can be no law without a corresponding legislative authority. There can be no authority without a corresponding society; and hence there can be no international law without an international authority, nor an international authority without an international society. Private persons, unless they form a society, cannot legislate. Similarly individual states cannot legislate for one another unless they form an international society.

G. Only an International Society can Lay Claim to the Title of Absolutely Perfect Society.

By absolutely perfect society we do not mean perfection *de facto*, but only *de jure*; not as an end attained, but as a tendency to that end. Society is not something absolute, like a human organism, but something relative; in fact, it is in itself a relation, and therefore a perfect society cannot be defined absolutely in itself, but only relatively, i. e., by comparison with something else, as a husband can only be defined in comparison with his wife. Hence, in our opinion, all definitions of perfect society taken from society considered absolutely in itself cannot possibly be right; for instance, such a definition as this: " perfect society is that which is independent in its existence and self-sufficient in its action " is beside the point.

We have seen that whether we consider the efficient cause or the final cause of society we come to the same conclusion, namely, that society is caused and measured by man's natural socialness, which is the raison d'être of society. Therefore, it is by comparison with man's natural socialness that perfect society is to be defined; since the perfection of a thing, which is measured by another, consists in being adapted and adjusted to its measure, like a dress to a form, like a glove to a hand.

[32] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 96, a. 5, ad 3; q. 93, a. 5.
[33] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 2; q. 96, a. 5.

That society, therefore, is perfect which is perfectly adjusted to man's natural socialness. But man's natural socialness is international. Therefore only an international society can be absolutely perfect. A society, to lay claim to the title of completely perfect society, must be actually international, and potentially (i. e., in its actual tendency) it must be human or world society, i. e., open to all nations. Hence whenever the multiplicity and variety of states is in conflict with man's natural socialness, this should prevail, and the former should give place to man's international socialness.

I would like to conclude with the desire expressed by Pope Benedict XV at the end of the first World War:

> It is much to be desired, Venerable Brethren, that all states, putting aside mutual suspicion, should unite in one league, or rather a sort of family of peoples, calculated both to maintain their own independence and safeguard the order of human society. . . . The Church will certainly not refuse her zealous aid to states united under the Christian law in any of their undertakings inspired by justice and charity, inasmuch as she herself is the most perfect type of universal society. She possesses in her organization and institutions a wonderful instrument for bringing this brotherhood among men, not only for their eternal salvation, but also for their material well-being in this world.[34]

And that warning by Pius XI two years later: "No merely human institution of today can be as successful in devising a set of international laws which will be in harmony with world conditions as the Middle Ages were in the possession of that true Society of Nations, Christianity." [35]

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[34] Encyclical, *Pacem*, May 23, 1920.
[35] Encyclical, *Ubi Arcano*, Dec. 1922.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Morals and Medicine. By Joseph Fletcher. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. Pp. 243 with index. $4.50.

The first reaction of a Catholic on encountering a book by a Protestant theologian on specific moral problems such as the patient's right to know the truth, contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization and euthanasia is pleased surprise. Perhaps the traditional Protestant vagueness on definite moral issues, deplored on the dust-jacket and in the preface by Dr. Karl Menninger, is to give way to a more conclusive moral theology which, while probably differing on some points, will at least provide a basis for civic cooperation. Such happy expectation of a new ally is heightened by the high praise there accorded to Catholic moralists for their diligence.

With such a gracious introduction, it is possible to thumb blissfully, if not too carefully, through the first two chapters. The first, on human rights, displays an interesting historical insight into the relations of religion and medicine, with an impressive background of reading in modern medical problems as well as Catholic moral theology. The author is quite concerned with the interference of old religious beliefs in medicine. He carefully distinguishes reflective or rational morality from theocratic or revealed morality and chooses the second as his frame of reference, while at the same time professing his belief in the revelation of the Old and New Testaments, and expressing the hope that his conclusions fall within the range and provision of Christian theology. His opposition is reserved, it seems, for a third type of morality which he calls customary, that is, the confusion of *mores* with morals. The problem encountered in the second chapter is that of the moral right of the patient to know the truth about his condition. This preliminary skirmish, like the introductory chapter, is, at first glance, uneventful. However, both chapters strike the tone which is maintained throughout the work. The reader is reminded by the smooth urbanity, worldly wit and amicable benignity with physicians that the discussions of these medico-moral problems were originally the Lowell lectures. There is a slightly discordant note in rather constant and petty peevishness with Catholic moralists, but then this might be expected in a field the author confessed had already been filled by those whom he could not approve in every respect.

The real shock comes in the succeeding chapters. The pleased surprise this time is for the medical men rather than the moralists. It was perhaps best expressed by the science editor of the *New York Times* who wrote

in his review: "As a devout clergyman, Dr. Fletcher might be expected to champion theological conceptions of morality. He opposes them." The nature of that opposition the disappointed moralist may glean by turning back to the subtitles in the table of contents. Contraception is there described as our right to control parenthood. But that is only the third chapter. The fourth, fifth and sixth are successive illuminating explosions. Artificial insemination is the right to overcome childlessness. Sterilization is our right to foreclose parenthood; euthanasia, our right to die.

What proof is offered for these interesting conclusions, so novel in a moralist? Each chapter discusses the history of the practice, its current medical and legal status, but the discussion of morality is in each case a negative argument directed against Catholic moralists and anyone who agrees with them, be he Protestant clergyman or physician. Are the conclusions of these four chapters, the bulk of the book, then merely assumptions? Oddly but perhaps significantly, the principles which are supposed to guide the conclusions, while dispersed rhetorically as slogans throughout, are not found in anything like definite form until the seventh and last chapter which is on the ethics of personality. Dr. Fletcher there justifies his procedure by stating (p. 214): "Deliberately we have relied upon a cumulative support for our central thesis, choosing to bring out what it means in a clinical style by examining concrete problems rather than by presenting a contrived and systematic construction of ethical doctrine." This process from conclusion to principle undoubtedly would enjoy a certain attractiveness for men accustomed to the inductive methods of scientific research. Yet, while apparently avoiding aprioristic reasoning, it is actually far more aprioristic in the pejorative sense than the genuinely scientific method of Aristotle, for it makes the principle fit the conclusion. The actual result is a process from prejudice to principle, a work of rationalization rather than reasoning.

Unfortunately a point-by-point refutation would take a shape larger than the provation. A great deal of ground is covered, and many passages from Catholic moral manuals are quoted. Yet as the book progresses, it becomes increasingly evident that the praise accorded Catholic moralists is a great deal like that which Mark Antony accorded Brutus and the rest in his famous speech. "So are they all, all honourable men." In this connection, it is interesting to note that Paul Blanshard is cited for his "somewhat tendentious (book), for all its careful documentation." Dr. Fletcher is mildly deprecating about the whole thing, remarking: "Mr. Blanshard has chosen to shock his readers rather than to explain the tortuous and detailed arguments with which Catholic moralists handle these matters. The result is an inexact and incomplete account of the Catholic views." (p. 19) The quality of Dr. Fletcher's scholarship is often of the same kind as Blanshard's for all its careful documentation, and the best thing that can be said of his contribution is that it is less inexact and incomplete. Some-

times the inexactness is picayune, as when he writes *libror censorum* for *censor librorum* or Liturgy for Litany of the Saints. But sometimes it is more important, as in his accusation that popes and moral theologians condoned sterilization to obtain *soprani falsetti* choirs. Surely the author's mind, so subtle in other respects, could have discerned in one of the sources adduced, the *Moral and Pastoral Theology* of Father Henry Davis, S. J., a distinction between such sterilization and the use for church music of those already made eunuchs. And still other times the author's explanation is incomplete, as when he challenges the inviolability of the sacramental seal for the sake of *agape*. In that case, the author implies that the reasons for the seal of confession are "institutional expedience (such as creating confidence in the inviolability of the confessional 'no matter what')." (p. 57) Such reasons are neither exclusive nor compelling, and it is unjust to Catholic moralists to omit the main reason they give, while conducting a debate on the matter.

Since a detailed rebuttal is clearly impossible, any critic must search out and judge the underlying bases for Dr. Fletcher's conclusions. It is exceedingly difficult to get at the moral principles of the book because of its technique, and indeed even when they are uncovered, they are quite nebulous. One may wonder to what extent the good physicians understood, or even cared to understand, the moral justification of such inviting conclusions as the legitimacy of contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization and euthanasia. These doctors are practical men, busy in their research and practice, and if this earnest clergyman, who seems to enjoy the blessing of his co-religionists in his position as professor of pastoral theology and Christian ethics in an Episcopalian theological school, says that these things are good, why, so much the better. The conclusions indeed seem to benefit the human health and happiness the physicians are sworn to serve, and here is obviously a scholarly man, well acquainted with medicine and legal practice, who must also be an expert in moral matters. If other theologians oppose such conclusions, they are surely less enlightened; they must have, as Dr. Fletcher says they have, theocratic ideas tinged with customary or primitive morality. Of course, such an attitude on the part of the physicians really involves an act of faith in Dr. Fletcher, which would mean a betrayal of the reflective, rational morality on which he takes his stand. Thus those tempted to the conclusions owe it to Dr. Fletcher as well as to themselves to examine carefully his principles, his general ethical position, and to satisfy themselves of the soundness of those principles and their logical connection with the conclusions. In doing this, there is one further difficulty; Dr. Fletcher frequently anticipates objections by qualifying his principles to meet the objection. In that case, the critic must insist that he follow the qualified principle rigorously to the conclusion.

The main principle of *Morals and Medicine* is what is called Personalism.

" The bias of my ethical viewpoint, apart from its frame of reference in the Christian faith," the author writes in his Preface, " is probably best pinpointed as personality." Personalism is described immediately as " the correlation of personality and value; the doctrine, that is, that personality is a unique quality in every human being, and that it is both the highest good and the chief medium of the good." How the human person is the highest good will be reserved for later discussion. The question now is how it is found in every human being, since Dr. Fletcher denies human rights to the unborn child (p. 152) and later denies personality itself to an unconscious person since he cannot communicate with others. (p. 201) Then the ancient ontological definition of the person as the individual substance of a rational nature would certainly not be accepted in the author's context. Just what a rational nature is the author finds in a somewhat dubious condition, which may have to be revised in the light of increasing knowledge. " On any view, all the way from Aristotle to a Ralph Linton," the author writes in his final chapter of principles and qualifications (p. 221), " there is no reason to regard this personality of men as fixed, static and predetermined." He says in the same place that men *become* persons; he emphatically denies that they *are* persons. What then constitutes human personality? Not the soul, since the very word is in a dubious, murky condition and " too obscure, not to say obscurantist, to deserve any further use in either common-sense or Christian ethics." (p. 218) The direct creation of the soul is denied as " antiquarian " and as committing the " genetic fallacy of judging the worth or value of a thing by its origin, rather than by its achievement." (p. 222) The immortality of the soul is similarly denied as a pagan notion, although the New Testament faith in eternal life demands the qualification that there is a resurrection of the *spirit* (distinct then from soul) for the just. The other alternative is extinction (hell, of course, does not merit mention). If the soul then is rejected, and the nature of man apt for revision, what remains of the being of a human person in Dr. Fletcher's personalism? Certainly not the body, for it has no part in personality. The body is an *it,* a *thing;* at best, the body is the material of the artist, man.

The important thing about the human person for Dr. Fletcher is self-consciousness, which marks the frontier between *thou* and *it.* And the real significance of self-consciousness is the freedom of choice it gives. Paul Tillich's notion of personality is quoted: " Personality is that being which has the power of self-determination, or which is free; for to be free means to have power over one's self, not to be bound to one's given nature." (p. 66) " To be a person," Dr. Fletcher himself says, " to have moral being is to have the capacity for intelligent causal action." (p. 218) There is more than a little truth here, although it is difficult to see how one can be certain of the conclusion when so much confusion exists about the notion of personality and the concept of man is in such precarious condition that it is subject

to further change without notice. Probably the author regards intuition as sufficient to establish the fact, but the omission of the ontological background causes some serious confusion. However, the idea that is being sponsored in this personalism is for the present simply this. The evolution, progress and growth of personality consists in independence. Although Kant is quoted twice, and Hegel and Engels given credit for the proper ideas of freedom and necessity (despite the terror of investigation which is supposed to reign in academic circles, the citation is from the *Handbook of Marxism*), the author qualifies by saying that the person of man is not to be put in God's place and that man, for all his ingenuity and growth is still a creature of the natural order. The question to ask is how this qualification to meet anticipated objections is followed in the conclusions drawn.

However, it is quite naturally the moral situation which is the heart of Dr. Fletcher's problem. The matters of personality and freedom are but preliminaries. In his introduction to the concrete problem of contraception, he isolates four factors in every human act, four things to be considered in every moral judgment. These are first, the motive; second, the intention, which is also called the object or end sought; third, the means or method; finally, the result or consequences. These factors would seem to provide a working basis for the discussion of morals except for the fact that the explanation given asserts that not only the first factor, motive, but even the second, intention is subjective, internal and psychological as opposed to objective, external and behavioral. In practice, the second factor is sometimes reduced to the first, sometimes to the third so that there is no clear statement about the objectivity of a particular moral end, independent of the motive of the agent. This confusion about a moral object is at once so elemental and yet so serious that any college sophomore writing an examination paper on general ethics would receive a resounding "F" for it. One of the fundamentals of any sound morality is the objectivity of a moral object or end, independent of the physical nature of the act and likewise independent of the motivation of the person performing the act. Murder is intrinsically evil, even though the physical action is the same as legitimate self-defense, execution of a criminal, or military action in a just war, because murder is unjust killing. Dr. Fletcher himself makes use of this distinction to justify euthanasia which he does not see as unjust killing. Nor does the motive of the agent justify a moral object already intrinsically evil; certainly the Robin Hood motivation of the Communist powers does not justify their lying and stealing. So likewise does adultery remain intrinsically evil, despite the ever-so-noble motivation of the adulterers, which Dr. Fletcher suggests may be the fulfillment of the parental impulse. But in both these cases—euthanasia and artificial insemination by a donor—Dr. Fletcher can and does argue that the moral object is not intrinsically evil. In two other cases, he admits, at least for the sake of argument or for the conscience of

the questioner, that an action may be wrong and still be justified by its motivation. This means that in practice, Dr. Fletcher, who has some unkind things to say about the application of the principle of the double effect, really goes much further, so that indeed the end may justify the means. In the first case, on artificial insemination, he writes: "And even if we grant that masturbation is self-abuse when practised for its own sake, does it not lose that character when it becomes the method or means to a procreative process which is otherwise impossible?" (p. 118) To those who may feel some scruple about sterilization, Dr. Fletcher has a word of hope and comfort offered "only half in jest." "Repentance in Christian doctrine," he says, "is supposed to be a high virtue as well as the gateway to a larger life. Why not then, if unhappy circumstances require it, obey the moral claims of sterilization, and then repent, that is, be sorry, as any sensible person would be anyway?" (p. 170) Here is a coarse version of the *pecca fortiter* which Luther himself would disown; here now is a Protestant indulgence which really is a license and permission for sin.

The relativity of the author's moral system becomes increasingly apparent. The reason for the relativity is the lack of an absolute. Whatever may be said about the freedom ethic, if it is to remain an ethic, it must have an end. The confusion of immediate ends and means is all too obvious; the question of an ultimate end is never considered, except the single reference to the resurrection of the spirit without any advice on the means to take thereto. Of course, a book on particular moral problems is not intended to be a complete course in ethics, but surely some assumed or postulated end must color any judgment of human actions, if they are, as was said, causal. The description of person already quoted states that the person himself is the highest good. In that to be taken literally? It would seem not, from other references to God, but those references apply to God as creator, not as goal. Nevertheless, the purposiveness of the person and his freedom is entirely neglected. Thus the primary principle of ethics, that the morality of a particular action depends on its order to the ultimate end of man himself has not yet been refuted; in this new ethic it is simply passed over in disdainful silence.

How then shall the critic speak of the eternal law of God as the way God instructs us to reach our true goal? Dr. Fletcher has what amounts to an allergy towards any kind of law. The civil law is too tainted with customary morality, too much under the influence of theocratic moralists. It is always discussed, but as frequently deplored, and the physicians are invited to work for its liberalization, or failing that, to get around it. In one instance there is a very strong hint that the Hippocratic oath does not bind in the case of euthanasia, for after all these centuries Dr. Fletcher finds it mutually contradictory in its promises to relieve pain and at the same time to refuse drugs which produce death.

The divine law as promulgated in the Old and New Testaments the author acknowledges, mentioning that this is one qualification for the Lowell lectures he may besaid to possess. However, frequent references to theocratic morality and Bible-bound moralists make one wonder how Dr. Fletcher intends to have and to eat his cake. Admittedly it is a question of interpretation, as he himself indicates. When, for instance, he anticipates an objection to the anthropocentrism of his freedom ethic, he replies: " Given a theocentric context for the analysis of these matters, ' what doth God require of thee? ' how is that to be determined? " (p. 189) In the determination of God's requirement or the interpretation of Scripture it is sufficient, in this matter of euthanasia as in others, that " many Christians do not find any theological logic (natural reason) or revelation to condemn euthanasia." Dr. Fletcher duly records the long history of pagan and Christian opposition to suicide, but the opposition is nearly always dismissed as theocratic tinged with customary morality. Here as in his other conclusions, Professor Fletcher is impressed neither with Church Councils, even of the earliest age, nor with Church Fathers like Augustine and Jerome who are treated with contempt, nor with modern writing, whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

In his own use of Scripture, the author is eclectic. If a text suits, it will be used innumerable times for many purposes. " Blessed are the merciful " is stretched not only to cover a multitude of sins, but even to the denial that there are sins to cover. But if a text does not suit, it must be corrected or explained. An example of the first is Christ's condemnation of evil thoughts taken from the same sermon as the beatitude of mercy. Since psychiatrists maintain guilt-complexes about evil thoughts are harmful, Professor Fletcher undertakes to *correct* (his word) Christ, using for the occasion another sentence, which in context was uttered against false prophets: " By their fruits, you shall know them." This wrenching of Scripture for previously contrived purposes is far more evident when the text forms a telling argument against one of the practices deemed necessary for freedom. The account of Onan's sin in Genesis is described as a deceptive evasion of levirate marriage, which it was. But, by a bit of rapid exegetical legerdemain, it becomes " quite clear that Onan was punished for the deception, not for the method he used." (p. 118) The interpretation that the self-defilement which was used as a means was itself sinful is rejected as " uncritical." Then " all Jewish and non-Catholic exegetes are agreed about this." (p. 118) Evidently the standard Protestant exegetical work, the *International Critical Commentary,* is no longer to be considered either critical or non-Catholic, for Professor John Skinner in his exegesis on Genesis there writes: " Onan, on the other hand, is slain because of the revolting manner in which he persistently evaded the sacred duty of raising up seed to his brother. It is not correct to say . . . that

his *only* offence was his selfish disregard of his deceased brother's interests." (pp. 451-452) Fletcher himself is forced by Deuteronomy 25 :7 to admit that the penalty for the evasion of the levirate responsibility was not death but public ridicule; yet no connection is seen between the direct slaying by the Almighty and the crime which merited such an awful punishment. "The account in Genesis merely states that 'the thing which he did displeased the Lord.'" (p. 88) "Merely" is a very light word to use about God's displeasure and the consequent punishment.

Yet perhaps the most disturbing position assumed by Professor Fletcher in regard to Christian revelation is his attitude towards suffering as part of the divine plan. This may seem to be a small matter compared to some of the things already mentioned; after all, if there is to be such ruthless living in respect to the generative function, surely a ruthless attitude towards the dying is not unexpected. Still, the very centrality of Christian living is its revolutionary way of suffering, which is neither hedonist nor stoic. Dr. Fletcher himself admits with Brunner that "it is not without significance that the picture of a dying man is the sacred sign of Christendom." "But when it is applied to suffering in general it becomes, of course," he goes on, "a rather uncritical exemplarism which ignores the unique theological claims of the doctrine of the Atonement and the saving power of the Cross as a singular event." (p. 197) Is then Christ Himself guilty of "uncritical exemplarism" when He declares that "if any man will come after Me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow Me?" Is St. Paul, of all people, unaware of the uniqueness and singularity of the Cross and Atonement when he writes: "I rejoice now in the sufferings I bear for your sake; and what is lacking of the sufferings of Christ I fill up in my flesh for His body which is the Church?"

Whatever the stand of the reverend gentleman on the revealed morality of God, there can be no doubt that his choicest shafts and most poisonous barbs are reserved for the natural law target. Catholics sometimes assume that Protestants, whatever their differences with them on the place of the Scriptures in revelation and on their interpretation on certain points, are at least one with all who profess Christianity, as indeed all men of good will, in their acceptance of the natural law. Reinhold Niebuhr would correct this assumption: "There is something ironic in the fact that the concept of the Natural Law is regarded by Catholics as a meeting-ground for Catholics and non-Catholics, and for Christians and non-Christians, whereas, as a matter of fact, it is really a source of tension between the Catholics and non-Catholics." ("A Protestant Looks at Catholics" in *Catholicism in America*). Niebuhr's objection is that ". . . rigid Natural Law concepts represent the intrusion of Stoic or Aristotelian rationalism into the dynamic ethic of Biblical religion." Fletcher's attack proceeds from an entirely different quarter; as interpreted by its proponents the natural

law interferes with medical care and ultimately with that supreme good, the freedom of the human personality.

However, his direct attack legitimately centers about the vague and loose use of the word "natural." It may be said at once that any ambiguity in the use of the word is not confined to Dr. Fletcher's opponents. In one of those after-thoughts of the last chapter he speaks of a "moral order" which was called by ancient and medieval moralists the Natural Law; by religionists the Will of God; by the American Founding Fathers, certain inalienable rights. No further information is given in this postcript except that this morality, which is an aspect of what is as well as what ought to be, is an article of faith. Faith probably is not to be taken literally in what promised to be a morality of reason.

At any rate, it will not be unfair to select one place of the many places in the book where the natural law is attacked, for the infection seems to bring itself to a head in the argument for sterilization. *Casti Connubii* is given as the provocation: "Christian doctrine establishes, and the light of human reason makes it most clear, that private individuals have no power over the members of their bodies than that which pertains to their natural ends. . . ." Dr. Fletcher writes on his side: "Here again we are back to that counter-Reformation version of the Natural Law as something *physiologically* determined, which we have previously described as a denial of true morality, and as a submission to *fatality* and to physical (material) determinism." (p. 159)

Saint Thomas had some things to say about the Natural Law almost three centuries before the Reformation, and he is not generally credited with ambiguity. The Natural Law is not a physiological law; the Holy Father was not condemning the use of spectacles or store-teeth because these things do pertain to the natural ends of the parts of the body affected. Nor does the natural law refer to human nature (otherwise Dr. Fletcher who points to man's ability to walk upright as the sign of his reasoning ability could not be allowed an occasional somersault). The word "natural" refers to *right* human reason; it refers to the "ought" judgments. Dr. Fletcher himself says that the "moral order" is an aspect of what is as well as what ought to be. Certainly then the "ought" should be based on reality, and part of reality is the physical organism which the person uses. But the real question is the determination of the "ought"; or to use Fletcher's terminology, "the moral order." What is man ordered to? Every human action has an order to an end. Particular ends are not enough. What is the final motivation, the ultimate end? This book never tells, unless one may assume that the statement that the person is the highest good is to be taken in an absolutely literal sense. In that event, what is the purpose of man? Again the darkness and confusion close in, for there is no answer to be found here. And because there is no answer to this most

fundamental question, there is no satisfactory answer to secondary questions about proximate ends, and there are egregious blunders in the evaluation of moral acts.

The natural law is not blind submission to fate. It is an intelligent examination of the law of God written on the fleshly tablets of the human heart. It goes far beyond the examination of physical phenomena where Dr. Fletcher, for all his inveighing against physical determinism, stops. It helps the human person use physical things below it as means to a higher freedom than is ever mentioned in *Morals and Medicine*.

Sex is an important question here, for three of the five problems discussed in this book center around its meaning. Sex is assumed to be good, which it certainly is, but what meaning can the word good have if it is not also an end? The purpose and function of sex is reproduction. The author does mention that, but seems more often concerned with the mere assuagement of a natural desire. But what role does sex play in the entire human personality? Is it only an animal function, only the expression of love or does it too have a part in the direction of the human personality to its true ultimate end?

The meaning of life itself enters the last moral problem entitled the right to die. The natural desire for sex played such an important part in the previous three chapters that one might expect the natural desire to live to play an important part in this chapter. The author admits " the valid generalization that the wish to live is among the strongest instinctual drives in the higher animals, including men." But this instinctual drive, so unlike the one to sexual satisfaction, is to be ignored. Even Freud's testimony that in the subconscious everyone is convinced of immortality is overriden by the slogan, " pathetic immaturity."

What then is this wonderful maturity? It is freedom, freedom from nature, but with due provisos and exceptions. But how does it apply? For what purpose is this freedom to be utilized? For the development of personality. Dr. Fletcher is heartened by the ability of science to remove moral compulsions; thus, contraceptive devices have removed the triple restraints of conception, infection and detection from extra-marital sexuality. But this is, to use a distinction he proposes, only physical freedom (*can*), not moral freedom (*may*). Still, Dr. Fletcher praises the enhancement and heightening of moral stature by such physical freedom, though he is forced to confess by the recorded promiscuity of the Army during the last war and the Kinsey report that the heightened personal responsibility and the increased physical liberty also enhance the chances for moral failure. Now if it is evident that mere physical freedom is not an unmixed blessing, why is it so extolled? The question might be by-passed if the author had said more about the use of moral freedom in the achievement of a true ultimate end. As it is, the only end proposed is the untrammeled

pursuit of science without regard to other human values and without regard to the supreme human value which is the achievement of the end to which God has destined the human personality.

It is unlikely that Dr. Fletcher, and those who agree with him, would be willing to consider their problems in what they would call a theocratic context. Nor is there any better hope that the purposiveness of Aristotelian ethics will find a place in their reflective, rational morality. The adroitness displayed in dodging what is prejudicial to pre-conceived theses is too reminiscent of the sophists whom not even Socrates, Plato and Aristotle could silence forever.

Nevertheless, the Catholic moralist should not be discouraged. Despite the number of books which are currently appearing against the natural law, this concerted and concentrated attack hardly represents the entire Protestant or non-Catholic community. The number of quarrels Dr. Fletcher has with other Protestants in the course of his remarks is some evidence that the battle has not yet been decided. Indeed, in his own Episcopalian communion there are many who do not share his views. Moreover, there are powerful, discerning writers like C. S. Lewis who are poles apart from Dr. Fletcher in their views on what constitutes Christian behavior. It is interesting to note that Fletcher quotes only one insignificant passage from Lewis' *Problem of Pain,* a book whose whole tenor would be against Fletcher's ideas on euthanasia. Neither it nor any of the works like *Christian Behaviour* which would touch on the other problems of *Morals and Medicine* are as much as mentioned in the bibliography.

For those men of good will who are likely to listen, then, the Catholic moralist has a special work to do. He must show how reasonable are the conclusions which he says are binding not simply on Catholics but on all men. For Protestants who accept the revelation of the Scriptures, he must perform the task which Pope Pius XII said was one of the noblest tasks of the theologian, to show how his conclusions may be found in revelation. (*Human Generis*) Here he faces a serious difficulty, for the main current of Protestant thought is not at all in sympathy with the great Thomistic principle that grace perfects nature. The education of ministers by-passes philosophy to begin at once with a theology. In the more advanced theological seminaries there is an attempt to " systematize," that is, order revelation through reason. But the philosophy chosen will be personalism, humanism, existentialism or any philosophy but the Aristotelian *philosophia perennis* which they regard with ancient hostility and fear. Although some early Protestants did attempt something with scholasticism, modern Protestant thinkers regard this attempt as unfortunate, and are nearly always suspicious of it. Nevertheless, it is certainly feasible to present to those who accept and love the Scriptures the conclusions of the natural law in their divine, promulgated form. Not only the decalogue and the sermon

on the mount are to the point; indeed, even the Pauline epistles, so highly favored by Protestants, have things to say about the natural law. For instance, the divine words of St. Paul to the Romans, in which he upbraids those pagans for their abandonment of God and their consequent degradation and dishonor in unnatural intercourse with women and unnatural homosexuality, should indicate to the believing Protestant that there is more to the natural law than a mere pagan ethic. St. Paul likewise in his first epistle to the Corinthians is not at all unlike the Catholic moralist who sees in the natural law a meeting place for Christians and non-Christians when in his condemnation of fornication, adultery, effeminacy and sodomy, he asserts: "And such some of ye were." If these things were sins only for those who accepted Christianity, how could these converts be stigmatized for what they had done in their pagan life when they were without knowledge of Christian teaching?

For those who do not accept Christian revelation, it is still possible to show how philosophy itself, however faintly and incompletely, leads to the moral conclusions of the natural law. Many may have embraced philosophies which are really barriers between reason and the discovery of moral truth. But, as Newman once said: "While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians. . . . In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it." The cooperation of non-Catholics in the Natural Law Institute of Notre Dame University, where the meaning, history and presence of the natural law in American ideals and even non-Christian religion is discussed, is a harbinger of hope.

There is a valuable lesson, then, for the Catholic moralist in Dr. Fletcher's book. Although some may justly claim they have been badly used, this book will serve as a good reminder about incautious and incomplete remarks. Even when Catholic moralists write for the Catholic community, other eyes, some unfriendly and some friendly, are reading over their shoulders. It will not be sufficient to stamp the magisterial foot, while reciting: "The Catholic Church teaches" or "the Natural Law holds." Especially in the case of the latter it will be necessary to show how these conclusions are derived, and to perform not only the function of an explicator but that of an apologete. Here there is a parallel with the one conclusion of *Morals and Medicine* we may accept. The patient has the right to know the truth about his condition insofar as he can understand it and in terms intelligible to him. The physician himself—and this is true of any professional man and indeed every man—has the right to know insofar as he can understand and in terms intelligible to him, the reason why moral guides say this action is right; this, wrong.

This principle may be applied to the morality of the book under review. The conclusions of the book make it a scandal, in the Scriptural sense of that word, for it presents the occasion of spiritual ruin. The means used in

arguing to the conclusions are unfair, incomplete and self-contradictory. There is an even stronger word for such judgment of higher things by lower, and it is the opposite of wisdom. Dr. Fletcher calls at least one Catholic argument simple and foolish. It is not simply a return of the compliment, but a strict, technical use of the words to say that Dr. Fletcher's arguments are not simple; they are stupid.

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Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy Scripture. By JAAK SEYNAEVE, W. F. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1953. Pp. 596.

Even a cursory reading of the works of John Henry Newman will reveal that man's deep interest in and wide acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures. "Like medieval sermons his are often for pages on end a mosaic of Bible texts." (p. 46) And this interest and acquaintance could only have been the result of a constant study of the inspired text. But yet, to attempt an analysis of Newman's teaching on Sacred Scripture is not an easy task. For he was not a professional biblical scholar, nor did he publish, in any sense of the word, an introduction to that science.

It is true that the Cardinal did write various treatises on particular aspects of Sacred Scripture. But these treatises were generally the result of some controversy that had been stirred up by the Liberals of his age. (And Newman was a controversialist, and lived in a controversial period.) It would be necessary, therefore, in order to present any kind of complete picture of his biblical teachings to analyze all of Newman's writings. The present book represents such an attempt. And to its author, Jaak Seynaeve, professor at the White Fathers' Theological College in Louvain, are due the thanks of all those interested in Newman as well as of those whose interest is in the development of biblical science. For the book is a definite contribution to the study of the religious thought of Newman and his age.

An introductory chapter presents the historical and doctrinal background of Newman's biblical teachings. And it is only by a thorough study of that background that we can understand the controversial trend of much of Newman's writings. For the "sudden growth of physical sciences and the introduction of more scientific, critico-literary methods in Bible study" (p. 44) had a strong influence on the deeply religious scholar. And especially is this to be noted in the problem of squaring the findings of science with certain statements of the Bible. That Newman faced this problem by a thorough investigation of the nature of inspiration need not be stressed. But the same could not be said of many of the so-called Christians of the time. Even some of his Anglican friends were surrendering

to the camps of the Rationalists. This fact was a constant source of sorrow to the future Cardinal, and could not but increase the intensity with which he fought on the side of Orthodoxy. And it is only by an understanding of the ardent zeal of the man that we can fully appreciate much of what he said and wrote.

Newman's biblical teachings are presented in two main sections. In the first is presented his doctrine on inspiration, and in the second his hermeneutical principles are analyzed. Several appendices of some 160 pages contain the previously unedited manuscripts of Cardinal Newman on Holy Scripture. Of particular import among these is an essay on the inspiration of Holy Scripture written between the years 1861 and 1863. Better, perhaps, than anything else these writings reveal the struggle that was going on in Newman's mind, a struggle to satisfy fully the demands of the new sciences without abandoning the position of the Church. His failure to publish them was due in part to his dissatisfaction with them, but more especially to the general apathy and even hostility with which, he felt, they would be met, even by the members of the Hierarchy. ". . . he was very much afraid of coming into conflict with the Hierarchy if he carried on his controversial work as before." (p. 67) Their present publication contributes nothing to our knowledge of the nature of inspiration, but they do contribute much to our understanding of the man who wrote them.

When the question of Newman and inspiration is raised the first thought of many is directed to the famous (or infamous) " obiter dicta," as though his whole position on the subject could be summed up in those two words. But that this is not the case is evident from the thorough study of the problem in the first part of this book. Here the historical background for Newman's various writings on the subject, especially the so-called " Inspiration Papers " of 1861-1863 and the Articles of 1884, is first presented. Then is analyzed his teaching on the subject, first as an Anglican, secondly as evidenced in the " Inspiration Papers," and finally as presented in the Articles of 1884.

It would exceed the general purpose of this review to present all the arguments of the author with regard to this question of inspiration. But his general conclusions can be stated and some comment made on them. First of all, as an Anglican Newman had little to say concerning the problem of plenary inspiration. He never doubted it. And the historical circumstances were not yet such as to raise any doubts.

But in the year 1855 there were published two books which prepared the way for the publication of many others along the same lines of historical criticism. The two were Stanley's *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* and Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians.* Stirred into action by these books and others of the same nature Newman began work on the " Inspiration Papers " of 1861-1863. It is here that he

shows a close acquaintance with the problem of inspiration. It is true that there are some statements in these papers which are suspect. But to judge Newman's mind on the matter from isolated statements would, as Seynaeve points out, be unfair. At the same time it must be remembered that for the future Cardinal the doctrine of inspiration traditional among theologains was inadequate in coping with the new difficulties. He must devise a theory that would be, in some respects, new. And it is Seynaeve's opinion that this theory does, at least, avoid the dichotomy between inspired and uninspired portions of Holy Scripture. "Scripture is *tota* inspired, as a whole, *sed non totaliter,* not in all its aspects; is inspired *tota* when considering its extent, but *non totaliter* when considering its depth; only the thread as it were of matters *fidei et morum* is inspired. But this moral-religious thread is everywhere present from beginning to end of Scripture, whether it is to be found in the literal sense reinforced by the Divine Breathing, as it normally is, or in the mystical sense, whenever the literal proves itself unsufficient." (p. 149) This, in the reviewer's opinion, is a fair summary of Newman's view on inspiration in the papers of 1861-1863. And this will surely shed light on some of the less happy statements of Newman with regard to matters not pertaining to faith and morals.

As for the Articles of 1884, where the well-known reference to the "obiter dicta" is made, the author sums up his opinion in these words, ". . . we think that according to his views, they (i. e., the "obiter dicta") do not fall under the influence of inspiration. But we must add at once that Newman never definitely made up his mind. He keeps wavering; doubt prevails." (p. 178) Such a statement is certainly a far cry from the position of those who would qualify Newman's theory as "simply erroneous," or of those who "read into Pope Leo XIII's Biblical Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* a direct though implicit condemnation of Cardinal Newman's doctrine." (p. 154) And after a study of his arguments the reviewer must agree that Seynaeve's position seems justified. Newman's solution was not a final one, nor did the Cardinal himself look upon it as such. And always in his eyes "the solution to this problem rests with the Church."

What was it that contributed to Newman's difficulties in his understanding of the problem and, at the same time, to our difficulty in understanding his teaching in the matter? There were two main factors. The first was Newman's lack of Scholastic training. As the author points out, ". . . he was not sufficiently familiar with Scholastic terminology and distinctions, in terms of which the problem was worked out in Catholic theological circles." (p. 191) This was especially true in his failure to "penetrate the full significance of the notion of instrumentality." (p. 176) And, as all agree, the concept of instrumental causality is most important

for a correct understanding of inspiration. In Seynaeve's opinion, ". . . according to Cardinal Newman's view, no word can, strictly speaking, be the result of a double causality. . . ." (p. 176) Does not this failing, then, help to explain how the Cardinal could be so vehement in his defense of the *plenary* inspiration of Scripture and yet so ambiguous in his explanation of it?

But there is yet another factor which, in the reviewer's opinion, should be emphasized. And that is the general nature of the Cardinal's writings of this period. They were not, as a rule, composed in the reflective calm of an undisturbed mind, but in the heat of battle. He wrote, not a text-book for students, but an answer to adversaries. And, as in most controversial writings, exaggerated statements are to be expected. It would be unfair to judge these without referring to others on the same subject. This point must be all the more insisted upon when we realize that " Newman had a great dislike for abstract reasoning, for ' cut and dried arguments.' "

The second section of Seynaeve's work deals with the hermeneutical principles of Newman. And here especially is to be noted the transition from the controversialist dealing vigorously with the enemy to the deeply religious man expounding Catholic doctrine to his audience. For that very reason the reading of this section is much easier. But the task of culling the information must have been all the harder. For Newman but rarely dealt *ex professo* with some hermeneutical principle, whereas he did treat of inspiration in specific papers.

This section is divided into four chapters. The first deals with Newman's two First Principles of Bible interpretation. And these are most important for understanding how the man looked upon the inspired text and how he used it in his writings. The first of these principles is that the Bible is a religious book inasmuch as it has God for its author and for its supernatural end. Consequently it treats always of religious matters, and in particular it treats of Christ. " Its pages breathe . . . of our Lord, and of His work and teaching, from the beginning to the end." " Scripture, if Christ were not in it, had nothing great or worth our study." (p. 209) But despite this divine quality it is a book adapted to human capacities and human nature. This divine adaptation is, for Newman, the Economical System.

The second of his principles is that the Bible must be interpreted by the Sacramental System which " is the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and instruments of real things unseen." The truly vast range of this System can be glimpsed in these words, " the bare letter of the Bible is a shadow of and at the same time leads to deep truths hidden as it were behind a veil; sacraments as ' mystical signs ' confer supernatural virtue and grace; and the visible Church, manifested as she is in the hierachy

and in the sacramental activity, is both a representation and a channel of those heavenly realities, that 'fill eternity.'" (p. 229) When one ponders over these thoughts of the great scholar it is difficult to imagine how any of his writings could ever have been conceived as "dangerous."

In the second chapter the unity of the Bible and the harmony between the Old and New Testaments are treated. As far as the first is concerned, Newman had no doubt because of the divine origin of the book. It is a work of God and "all God's works are founded on unity, for 'they are founded on Himself, who is the most awfully simple and transcendent of possible unities.'" As for the harmony existing between the Old and New Testaments, Newman could well be an inspiration and guide to modern scholars who are more and more concerned with this subject. Briefly, he posits four main connecting links, typological, ceremonial, historico-prophetical, and literary. But the unifying principle par excellence is Christ, "whether it be the historical Christ with regard to both Old and New Testaments, or the eschatalogical Christ in these the last times. It is one and the same Christ; typified in the Old, God Incarnate in the New, He will be our heavenly reward after His second coming." (p. 305)

In the third chapter the different senses of Sacred Scripture as used by Newman are treated. And it seems that here we may find a clue to his difficulty with regard to the problem of inspiration. First of all, he did admit the existence of both the literal and the mystical or typical sense. But for him each passage had *either* a literal sense *or* a typical sense. And if the literal sense of the passage had no religious bearing, then a deeper mystical sense was to be sought. Thus we can see how he could be led to state that the literal sense without religious significance would not fall under inspiration, while the same passage *would* be inspired because of its mystical meaning. Assuredly, if Newman had known of the theory of literary forms, today generally accepted, he would have avoided many of these difficulties. At any rate throughout his writings he did prefer the mystical sense, influenced as he greatly was by the Alexandrian Fathers. But he could not be considered guilty of the exaggerations of that School in this regard.

Seynaeve is convinced that Newman admitted the existence of a *sensus plenior* "as a definite kind of mystical meaning not to be identified with the typological sense." Once again we can note the confused terminology, for in other places he equates the mystical and typical senses. However, he does speak of a "deeper" sense based on the "bare letter" of the Bible. And so it is not too difficult to imagine that he did conceive of a sense of Scripture that today's scholars would point out as the *sensus plenior*.

In the fourth chapter of the section Newman's ideal of the Christian exegete is presented. We might sum up this chapter by saying that, in Newman's mind, the external requirements are attention to Church au-

thority and to Tradition, while the internal requirements are intellectual ability, moral dispositions, and supernatural faith and grace.

In a concluding chapter Seynaeve proposes the answer to three questions. What are the sources of Newman's biblical thought? In what manner and to what extent has his biblical doctrine influenced subsequent thought? What is its value in the light of modern investigation? As for the first question, his principal sources were the Bible itself, the Alexandrian Fathers, the Caroline divines of the seventeenth century, and contemporary writers. After his conversion he did become acquainted with some of the Catholic biblicists, but it is to be regretted that he never became familiar with the great Scholastics. The influence of Newman's biblical thought has never been too profound or extensive. But with regard to its value in the light of modern investigation the reviewer agrees heartily with the author when he says that " the partisans of what is commonly called a more theological exegesis may find in Newman's biblical doctrine many a valuable and enriching indication." (p. 408)

In concluding this review it can be said that, though not written in the mother tongue of the author, the book reads easily and smoothly. There are a few errata and, infrequently, an ambiguous term. But these provide no hindrance to the reader. A select bibliography is prefaced to the work and indexes of proper names and of authors mentioned in Newman's manuscripts are added. Briefly, the book is a scholarly and well documented work worthy of being classed with the other magisterial theses that have issued from Louvain.

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A History of Modern European Philosophy. By JAMES COLLINS. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954. Pp. 864 with index. $9.75.

This, the author's most ambitious work to date, is a textbook " designed primarily for students who have some acquaintance with Scholastic philosophy and who seek an introduction to the vast field of modern thought." (p. iii) It covers, roughly, the period 1500-1900, beginning with Renaissance thinkers like Machiavelli and concluding with Bergson. Each of the nineteen chapters is concluded by a summary and a lengthy bibliography of editions, translations and studies not only in English but in the various European languages. There are, in addition, approximately fifteen hundred footnote references to specific statements of, or articles about, special problems mentioned in the text. The restrained use of tables and diagrams enormously unifies lengthy exposition.

This monumental work was undertaken to help establish " fruitful intel-

lectual communication between Scholastic teaching and the representative modern system" (p. iii), an enterprise in which both Scholasticism and modern philosophy have been conspicuously loath to engage, to their mutual loss. The author's method of presentation is to explain the individual systems in chronological order. He is, of course, aware of alternate methods, like the problem method, the history of ideas approach; indeed he recognizes the merits of each. But he is soundly convinced that "it is indispensable to be grounded primarily in a study of the doctrinal systems of the individual thinkers." (p. iv) What Collins has omitted from this study is quite as much a tribute to his sound judgment as what he has included. Since the textbook is not "an encyclopedic work of reference," it gives a robust account of each major philosopher, but of major philosophers only; the minor figures, such as Malebranche, Vico, Rousseau, are excluded from the exposition, though not necessarily from the notes. The result is a structural simplicity which makes this lengthy exposition feasible for the undergraduate as well as the graduate mind.

There is a basic similarity in the construction of the various chapters. There is first a brief biography; then an explanation of the method and guiding principles of the philosopher's system; finally an account of his doctrine on various philosophical problems. These problems are basically the same in all the chapters, but where necessary, individual problems are discussed. A full, accurate account of the thought of each philosopher makes possible a restrained effort at evaluation. "An attempt is made to test the main assumptions and method operative in each system. A critical appraisal is also made, from the Thomistic standpoint, of some of the particular arguments advanced by the philosopher in question." (p. iv) Naturally this work of evaluation is incomplete, leaving the instructor and the student free to work out their own lines of criticism. The technique of evaluation—Thomism comprehending modern thought in the latter's own terms, and then evaluating it according to modern thought's "own manner and temper"—is one of the two most significant achievements of this book. The other great achievement, is, of course, the purity with which modern thought has been uttered by Collins.

The initial chapter is devoted to a discussion of the nature and the function of the history of philosophy, and to this Dr. Collins makes his typically balanced contribution. The first task of the history of philosophy is to master the sources, to have comprehended each system of philosophy as it is in itself, and to describe precisely each of those systems. Comprehension achieved, responsible evaluation may not be avoided; and hence, this task of evaluation, of judgment, is the principal aim of the history of philosophy, and is the point at which "the historical study of philosophy integrates itself with philosophy proper and serves the ends of the search for wisdom." (p. 4)

The Thomist necessarily finds himself faced with a dilemma by the plurality of philosophical systems. That dilemma is "either of ignoring these other philosophies and thus committing oneself to a sterile isolationism, or of accepting their premises and thus entailing the conclusions that necessarily flow from them." (p. 5) This is indeed a real cruel dilemma, as any responsible teacher of philosophy knows. To accept the first alternative is the safer course, which has largely been followed in the Catholic colleges of the United States; but it has generated an hostility to, and suspicion of, Thomism in the minds of many graduates of those very colleges. The sentiment is general that, if Thomism be as sound as its proponents allege, then there should be no fear of having it face modern and contemporary thought. To accept, on the other hand, the second alternative is to produce a generation of intellectually flabby, glib relativists who know the teachings of everyone and the truth of nothing. History, Professor Collins points out, comes to our assistance here. Given first a solid grounding in Thomism, then one can study each philosophical system as a laboratory specimen, without committing oneself to either the premises or the conclusion. One can afterwards evaluate, and assimilate to one's own philosophical position, whatever of truth he has seen in the various systems approached with the detachment of history.

The norms which the author employs for the historical study of philosophy are four, adapted from Aquinas. a) "The study of philosophy is directed not to a knowledge of *what men think* but to how the *truth of things* stands." (p. 6) b) Philosophy is served not by negativity, by wholesale rejection and criticism, but by *discrimination*, by simple openness to truth wherever found. Intellectual justice must cooperate with intellectual effort. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that Collins is even-handed in his criticism of Scholastic and non-Scholastic philosophers. It is no secret that Scholastic criticism of modern thought has been at times wrongly placed. Kant and Hegel, for example, have been criticized for positions they did not hold, while genuine weaknesses in them have gone unnoted. In correcting Scholastic criticisms Collins is as detached, as scrupulous, as generous and as just, to the Scholastics as to the moderns. c) "The story of philosophical development is not a black and white record . . ." (p. 7), one seeks to gain truth, and avoid error, from the efforts of every philosopher. There is no question here of eclecticism, but there is question *of development*. The firmer one's grounding in the principles of Thomism, the freer one's use of all philosophers' insights to enrich that Thomism. d) The discovery of truth is a cooperative task of the human race. The small contribution of any one man can be integrated with the findings of others. "Thus a balance is to be sought between permanent principles, healthy criticism of accepted views, and increment of fresh insights." (p. 7) And so, the approach to any philosopher must be

a balance of three angles of vision, namely, the biographical, the systematic and the relation of his system to other systems. No one of these can completely explain the others, or completely prescind from the others. A philosophical analysis of a philosophy includes the interplay of these three factors.

In lucidity of exposition, in depth and comprehensiveness of interpretation, in scholarly apparatus supplied to the student for independent research, in modesty, balance and justice of evaluation, in creative interpenetration of modern and Thomistic thought this vast study marks a new type of book in America. I should be inclined to label this a work of *organic* Thomism: the work, that is, of a mind whose second nature is Thomism, entering vigorously into the main stream of modern philosophy in order to fortify the valid insights of modern thought with the metaphysical structuring of Thomism, and to nourish Thomism on those same valid insights. The situation is simple, and it is this: in the mind of Collins, Thomism and modern thought have met, and the name of the meeting is *philosophy*. It is now about fifteen years since Maritain, in his *Preface to Metaphysics* pointed out the enormous role that modern thought had to play by way of assimilation, in the progress or development of Thomism. The only obstacle, he pointed out then, would be the laziness of Thomists. (He might have added that laziness wears many disguises). The beginning, the very model, of what Maritain would describe as the Thomistic actualization of the potential philosophy of the moderns, is here in Collins' *A History of Modern European Philosophy,* as it was also in his two earlier books and in his numerous articles in the various philosophical journals.

The influence of Collins' work will naturally be directly proportioned to the readership of this volume. It may be safely assumed that as soon as instructors in Catholic colleges, universities and seminaries have familiarized themselves with this book, that it will become the standard work in the field in these institutions. But widespread use in secular colleges and universities is also to be expected, for the simple reason that no study of modern philosophy exists in English that is comparable in scholarship with this one. Any instructor of realist and theist convictions will probably be as moved by this volume as was Reinhold Niebuhr in his *New York Times* review of Mr. Collins' *The Mind of Kierkegaard.* For *A History of Modern European Philosophy* continues the two-way task its author seems to have set himself: to reveal the relevance of the modern mind to the Thomist, and to reveal the relevance of the Thomist mind to the modern. In making each aware of the other, he also makes each more fully aware of its own riches, and aware, too, of the community which embraces them both, the community which is philosophy.

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Realms of Value. By Ralph Barton Perry. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. 509 with index. $7.50.

The first volume of this work entitled *General Theory of Value* was first published in 1926, and reprinted in 1950. It received more attention than any other work in English on the subject of "value," and was widely used as a basis for class discussion. A favorite topic for discussion with the reviewer and others was how Professor Perry, now Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University, could be a realist in the theory of knowledge and still take a non-realistic turn in his theory of value. The subtitle of that famous volume was, "Construed in Terms of Interest." What the author meant by "interest" was naturally to be considered.

It is easy to suggest the reason for the discussion the book enjoyed. It was an elaborate study, done on an high level, and written in an English style that seems to us to have been maintained by almost all the great English philosophers from Hobbes to Russell. Perhaps the study was too elaborate in the care with which it attempted to prepare the way for its own definition of value. In this regard it might be thought to be labored. But this feature, if possibly overdone in relation to definition, made a substantial contribution in another regard since in chapter after chapter Mr. Perry sought to show how the value phenomena are given and imposed on us in various fields, such as general biology, psychology, economics, politics, religion, and ethics.

Perhaps for some split second a man can exist without valuing. We believe that he cannot. Whatever else it is, *to be* is, for man, to operate, to act, and this in his case is to seek. Professor Perry has always made much of this circumstance both in the old work and in this new volume which comprises the Gifford Lectures given at the University of Glasgow in 1946-47, 1947-48. We think that he might have made even more of the circumstance. Man is a seeking, striving animal—and surely Mr. Perry says so with a good deal of emphasis, since he tends to base all human value on moral value, and to hold that moral value is achieved in the resolution of a conflict or struggle. We think that here he might have gone much further, without any straining of the evidence. He might have asked whether struggle, seeking, conflict belong only to man, or belong to life, or whether they are as possibly as wide as our given universe. It is true, as he said long ago in an article, that it is up to the individual philosopher to decide whether he will cut the value cake thick or thin; that is, whether in defining value he will aim to cover value for all life, or only for human life.

Our own view is that it is not altogether up to the individual to make this decision. The "value philosopher" begins, as Professor Perry has said, with valuing phenomena or data. The question then is, where are

these experienced or observed? Is it only in the individual himself? Mr. Perry is no solipsist. Then the human family is not so diverse from the animal family, the living family, the being family, that we are not free to raise the question of valuing, seeking, as a possible characteristic of the given universe. Possibly all nature is struggling and groaning, each type of thing in its own way. Here, it seems to us, Tolstoi was challenging in his work *What of Life?* But Tolstoi might have gone further and said, precisely in regard this struggle, What of being?

As a matter of fact, emphasis on effort and struggle is constant in Western philosophy, and it seems to have this same constancy in Oriental thought. The Greek thinkers repeatedly mentioned *orexis* and *horme* as if these were to be taken for granted in the universe. Mediaeval theologians and philosophers, perhaps Jewish as well as Christian, thought that not merely man but the whole of creation is in some kind of inevitable contest, a lethal struggle—say, with the devil or with "lower" nature—until it makes terms with God, a being Who simply is, and thus outside struggle and conflict. Modern philosophy and science does not release us from this notion of struggle, but in some ways confirms us in it. Think of Spinoza and Kant, each with a sort of divine restlessness. Think of Marx and the Marxists who stand for social conflict and war as the road to the kingdom. Think of Darwinism and the struggle for existence, the latter a narrow statement of the Thomistic notion that everything strives to be its type of being, *suo modo*. It strives as vigorously, said Aquinas, as it can and for all its worth, *totis viribus*. Think of this conative element in psychology, see it everywhere in the great new philosophers, in Maritain and Przywara, the latter finding God in the resolution of conflict.

The fundamental questions, raised by the phenomenon of valuing, are not answered by the suggestion that they exist. Our wonder, in regard to Professor Perry's remarkable volumes, is that he did not raise them, since they seem to be wished on him. This omission is the more noticeable in such an exact student, one who in 1909 in his *The Moral Economy* stated that men had long "shunned the deeper problems of ends and purposes."

Any little fact of valuing seems, if pursued, to raise this whole chain reaction of problems. First, does valuing at least imply a struggle and effort, the natural *conatus* of Aquinas and Spinoza? Does struggle and effort imply unfulfillment—the propensity and expectation featured by Mr. Perry? Can this character of seeking, this more or less fulfillment, this being and not being, be a mark or even *the* character of the universe, and of what most truly is? If we shut up the human race in its seeking as if this seeking entity, "man," were a self-enclosed finality, do we in fact shun the deeper problems of ends and purposes?

Professor Perry means to be, and he certainly is, comprehensive. We

wonder whether he is comprehensive enough. How far does this valuing and seeking process go? If, conceivably, it is a mark of all reality, would a fuller inquiry have to admit analogical types of valuing?

Simple questions such as these have always seemed to us relevant to a complete philosophy of value, and they have more than once recurred while we were reading and re-reading Mr. Perry's two volumes. They appear to be appropriate addenda to his metaphysics and natural theology, even more than to his ethics and philosophy of religion. It is true that Mr. Perry is more at home in these latter disciplines, yet he himself enters all fields of philosophy. This, we think, he is obliged to do if he is to do justice to the philosophy of value, because in " value theory " a man is compelled to ask basic questions as, for example, concerning the nature of good or value in relation to being, and questions concerning applications. The author's definition of value in terms of " interest " is perhaps much less important to his whole philosophy than what he thinks of man, of knowledge, of nature, and of destiny. If, with Mr. Perry, we define interest to be a sort of drive toward or away from, an attitude of favor or disfavor—and he consistently carries this designation through the two volumes—and if we proceed to define value as any object of interest, we have only worked out something of a conceptual framework, and we still are on a more or less superficial, nominal level. The status of valuing in the universe is yet a larger and more proper " value " question. What is it to be a man valuing, or a cat, or a stone in its way of valuing? That question, we submit, would suit an Emerson. The discovery of man valuing raises questions that, if pursued as Mr. Perry pursues his " interest " and " value " and their levels, might well produce considerable fruit.

Remaining for years with a set of interrelated questions is Professor Perry's chief merit, but seeing them as related is another matter. We believe that he does not go far enough in the questions and their interrelations. As a final instance, we can note that in his zeal for the use of psychological studies, the author must concern himself with the question of the " individual " and the " person "; but yet, he seems not to know that both these concepts have received much consideration in recent decades, and the latter long has had a classic consideration.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Truth. By Saint Thomas Aquinas. Chicago: Regnery. $20.00 the set. Vol. I. QQ. I-IX. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. 1952. Pp. 498. $7.00. Vol. II. QQ. X-XX. Translated by James V. McGlynn, S. J. 1953. Pp. 474. $7.00. Vol. III. QQ. XXI-XXIX. Translated by Robert W. Schmidt, S. J. 1954. Pp. 543, with index. $7.50.

To review the complete translation of St. Thomas' *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* is a task of tremendous extensive and intensive dimensions, not to mention virtual complexities. The reasons are quite obvious. In this monumental work we find the accumulated wisdom and scholarship of St. Thomas adequately expanded to cover practically every aspect of "truth." Here is a virtual synthesis of Aristotle, St. Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius in a thirteenth century Christian philosophico-theological treatise with the additional corroboration of Arabian and Jewish insights. The treatise involves a panoramic view of the history of the topics treated as well as their systematic discussion in a typical disputation setting. In substance it is the same as he presented to his students at the University of Paris during the academic years of 1256-1259, which is early enough in the Master's career to give us a glimpse of his extarordinary ability to understand problems and of his basic genius for synthesis. Indeed, it goes without saying the *Truth* is an excellent work to use as an introduction to the thought of the Angelic Doctor.

In format these three volumes are agreeably adapted to the scholarly achievements of St. Thomas' pupils in the twentieth century. In order to be sure that we are adequately prepared for this intellectual quest of the truth in all its academic implications, a scholarly introduction explains the function of the disputed question in the pedagogical program of the thirteenth century, discusses the historical setting for the work and gives a doctrinal analysis of the contents of the three volumes in a topical framework. Dr. Vernon Bourke has written the introduction with his usual scholarly exactness. The multitude of textual references have been tracked down with even greater exactness than we find in the original Latin editions; parallel treatments of the same problems are noted and contemporary discussions of the same basic ideas and topics are called to our attention for handy investigation and comparison.

The three volumes constitute a contribution of wise and deep scholarship in respect to Truth in its metaphysical nature, God's Knowledge, Divine Ideas, The Divine Word, Providence, Predestination, The Book of Life, Knowledge of the Angels and the Communication of Angelic Knowledge (Vol. I); The Human Mind, The Teacher, Prophecy, Rapture, Faith,

Higher and Lower Reason, Synderesis, Conscience, Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence, Knowledge of the Soul after Death, The Knowledge of Christ (Vol. II); Good, The Tendency to Good and the Will, God's Will, Free Choice, Sensuality, The Passions of the Soul, Grace, The Justification of Sinners, The Grace of Christ (Vol. III). Appendices include aids to parallel readings and references, detailed references to each article and a glossary of terms in each volume in addition to an index of sources and an index of subjects in the third volume; quite a thoroughly complete presentation of the apparatus and addenda so helpful for the intelligent student.

The philosophico-theological contents are welcome and appropriate to our times. The basic interest in the writings of St. Thomas possessed by those lacking the linguistic achievement required for a critical perusal of the original receives added stimuli and development by this work. The Angelic Doctor's fundamental point of view, objective rather than subjective, ontological rather than epistemological, will be a fresh outlook to some contemporary discussions of the questions concerning " truth." Moreover, a vital English presentation of the basic principles and discussions found in this work may be of great service for the clarification of anglicized-Latin formulae found in other " translations " of other works of St. Thomas.

We are, indeed, grateful to the editors of the Library of Living Catholic Thought for the selection of this work as a capable vehicle to achieve their basic purpose in the series. The three translators should be congratulated for a generally smooth and easy-flowing English rendition of ideas which, at times, can be so succinct, obscure and profound in the original Latin as to escape facile rendering into another language. " The aim of this translation . . . has been to express accurately in correct English the meaning of the original, and as far as possible in idiomatic English." In general, they have achieved their purpose well. One can almost be quite sure that where there are rough spots and unEnglish passages, there may be some technical Latin phrases, quite frequently a source of embarrassment for the translator. I say " can almost be quite sure " because the objective means of evaluating the translation are unavailable. Since the translation is made from an as yet unpublished text, the definitive Leonine text, we cannot actually criticize the translation with any firm conviction of complete objective validity. Their English rendition presents the basic thoughts of St. Thomas in an attractive modern garb which avoids slavish transliterations and academic clichés hallowed by many manual treatments of the same topics. In the course of the reading one can become so absorbed in the intellectual development of the discussion that he can become oblivious of the fact that he is reading a translation. This is quite an achievement as translations of St. Thomas go and it will make a much needed positive contribution to the contemporary understanding of St. Thomas' philosophico-theological treatment of the problems involved.

On the other hand, there are objective reasons for disagreement with the modification of certain formal aspects of the treatise, which may interfere seriously with the pedagogical force of the presentation. In particular I refer to the omission of *Utrum* at the beginning of all the articles, whereas the goal of a disputed question seems to postulate its presence and St. Thomas has used it in all but ten of the 253 articles. These articles, as presented by St. Thomas, are argumentative in format for a pedagogical reason, to stimulate thought and discussion on both sides of a *Question* so that it would be genuinely *Disputed.* When the introductory *Whether* is omitted and a simple question is asked, to which a categorical yes or no could be or may seem appropriate, the whole pedagogical function of the disputed question format is obscured, to say the least. This is especially unfortunate when viewed in its close proximity to the introductory discussion of the importance of such a dialectical approach to the understanding of the truth. The disputed question format and function may be lost sight of also when the arguments for one side of the disputation are introduced by the term " Difficulties." This term may have the implication that the arguments presented are impediments to the correct understanding of the problem. On the contrary, they are really presented as dialectical means to reach the truth of the question disputed. In addition, the use of the word, " Reply," for the *Respondeo dicendum quod* has little of the argumentative force of the Master's determination of the disputed question, that is, his way of bringing the discussion to a terminal solution. In spite of these criticisms we think that the translators have done a splendid work; we hope that these volumes will receive the extensive popularity they so greatly deserve.

Agape. By Viktor Warnach. Düsseldorf. Patmos-Verlag, 1951. Pp. 751, with index. 26.50 DM.

One of the most extensive of the numerous recent studies on the love of God is the present work by Dom Viktor Warnach, a monk of Maria Laach. The immediate occasion of this volume was the monumental study on Agape and Eros, published by the distinguished Swedish theologian, Anders Nygren, to which Dom Warnach's work seeks to make a full reply from the point of view of Catholic theology and faith. It may be said that of all the various Catholic books and articles, dealing in some way with Nygren's ideas, none has provided so complete a scriptural study of the problem. The volume is supplied with complete bibliographical references, lists of all biblical texts dealing with love, and a lengthy section on the doctrine of love in Scripture. This section follows an introduction which distinguished three conceptions of love: sex, eros, and agape. The one

difficulty with the exegetical study of the New Testament is that no real theological synthesis is given that is based strictly on the texts.

This defect is due in part to Dom Warnach's great interest in and sympathy for the " mysterion " theories of his late confrère, Dom Odo Casel. This theory, which has caused so much theological discussion, is at the basis of the detailed " speculative " study which forms the main part of this volume. This preoccupation on the part of the author does not lessen the value of some of the quite remarkable phenomenological and personal insights into love and its nature. In such passages, Dom Warnach does show that this method does have definite advantages, which a more strictly speculative, " scholastic " treatment cannot provide, and, perhaps, is not intended to provide. These advantages are principally to present a warmer, more human, and more concrete description of love, and to show that a merely rational discussion does not deal fully with such an important element of man's life, both natural and supernatural, as love.

Theologically, however, the theories centering upon the participation of the human spirit with God in the mystery of Christ brings back many of the problems which Casel's theory presents. This application of the " mysterion " theory to charity leads to such conclusions as not considering charity as a virtue, a habit of the will, but as an act of the whole existential man, a conclusion which does not easily lend itself to strictly scientific conclusions of theology. Furthermore, the author accepts Nygren's theologically and philosophically questionable position that the act of Agape is not specifically or in any way affected by its object. Man is said to love God by the very same (formally?—Warnach would perhaps consider such terminology irrelevant) love as that by which God loves man, and thus, in a sense, he even goes beyond Nygren, who concluded that man's only response to God's agape was faith, understood in the orthodox Lutheran sense. Such a conclusion seems to be a direct outcome of an application of the " mysterion " theory. The author also goes beyond the scriptural data, and common theological teaching in reaching this conclusion. It may be more exact to say that the confusions of Casel's theory are manifest in this opinion on the nature of charity, or its act, as elicited by man.

In spite of these difficulties this study may be recommended to the moral theologian, who is being presented these days with so much literature on the subject of charity. It is certainly a need of Catholic theology to give proper attention to the " form of the virtues," and one may hope, too, that others with the proper background, both scriptural and theological, will turn their full attention to a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to the great work of Nygren. This volume does make a real contribution in this direction.

The Philosophy of Being. By Louis de Raeymaeker. Translated by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1954. Pp. 372, with index. $4.95.

It would have been misleading to have given this book any other than its present title, for throughout De Raeymaeker investigates philosophically the manifestation, scope and complexity of being. This is metaphysics at its best. It is a well ordered book, examining first the experience of being and the difficulty of giving an intelligible and consistent explanation of that experience; it then probes into the internal structure of being, viewed both statically and dynamically, adding an excellent analysis of particular being in its participated existence; and it concludes with a careful explanation of the cause of being, showing the complete dependence of finite being upon the unlimited Absolute. Not only is there ascending structure dominated by the Absolute but throughout there are circular patterns of key notions constantly repeated, such as participation, the value and mode of being, order, transcendental relation, and the complexus of particular being.

Certain aspects of De Raeymaeker's presentation make this an unusual and refreshing study. There is the psychological-epistemological point of departure which has become a trademark of Louvain studies, the initial analysis of conscious life in its experience of being. Traditional metaphysicians might object that such analysis slows up the presentation, but the objection pales before the benefits accrued: a sense of immediacy, realism and non-gratuity, in addition to an avoidance of shopworn essentialist terminology. Then there is De Raeymaeker's preoccupation with integrating and unifying the study. Too frequently metaphysicians have given a fragmented picture of being according to the set categories of act and potency, substance and accident, the four causes, transcendentals and predicaments. The present author avoids this by the unified structure referred to above. by strategically scattered summarizings which are never labeled summaries, by his brilliantly written defense of the Absolute as the supreme foundation of being, and by a neat concluding chapter in which the problem of being and its solution are restated.

A third aspect, less important yet attractive, is the historical notes appended to those interpretations of being about which there has been considerable controversy over the years. These cover such subjects as: the real distinction between essence and existence, the principle of individuation, substance and accident, the nature of the good, and causality. With the exception of the treatment of Scotus' position on individuation which, though understandably short, might still have received a fuller treatment, the historical surveys are adequate and well-documented. They give depth and perspective to the author's picture.

Not all of De Raeymaeker's interpretations will be acceptable to all Thomists. When he says that "nowhere in the vegetative and animal world do we encounter the fundamental unity of a subsistent being," and in another section (p. 243) depreciates the unity of substance of things less than man, he seriously challenges the traditional Thomistic philosopher of nature who leans heavily upon the theory of hylemorphism in the essential constitution of a substantial unity in organic and inorganic bodies. Not less controversial is De Raeymaeker's view that the principle of existence is the formal constitutive principle of personality, since personality "does not involve the question *quid est?*, what is this reality?, but rather the question *an est?*, does it exist?" For him, since personality is the "last" perfection in the structure of a conscious being, its constitutive root principle ought to be existence since the structure of a subsistent reality terminates in existence. He closely associates personality and subsistence, both of which have existence as their ontological principle. Here again we see his tendency to limit subsistence to conscious beings, those capable of personality.

Causality is particularly well-developed by the author, and he carefully shows that the principle of causality cannot be deduced legitimately from an abstract consideration of the principles of identity, contradiction, or sufficient reason (as is so commonly done), but solely from a consideration of particular concrete being, the knowledge of which "formally attains to the relativity of this being, to its belonging necessarily to an order of beings, and therefore also to its reference to the cause on which it depends."

The translator's preface indicates that the study was not written as a textbook but might readily be used as one. It seems to this reviewer that background requirements for grasping some of the material, plus a certain prolixity of style, militates against such a use. Unquestionably the teacher of metaphysics ought to have it at his fingertips.

In Defense of Plato. By Ronald B. Levinson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. 674, with index. $10.00.

Since book-reviewing fits within the scope of criticism, the reviewer must use principles or conclusions at which he has arrived himself or which he accepts from some trustworthy authority. If these principles or conclusions are not sufficiently evident to the prospective readers of the review, then he must clarify the principles which he is employing. This clarification is prerequisite to any modern consideration of Plato and his teaching, as also is the acceptance of the said principles and conclusions. The number and quality of disputes among those fully acquainted with the Platonic texts, and this in every age since Plato, lead one prudently to seek the

guidance of a teacher whose conclusions in this matter have never been seriously challenged. We could find no better guide in this regard than St. Thomas Aquinas, who weighed the problem throughout his scholarly life and arrived at the following conclusions: (1) That Plato was defective in the art of teaching is evident from the fact that, in his statement of philosophy, he almost exclusively used poetic dialectics, which leaves the minds of the students in irresoluble doubt; and for this reason St. Thomas does not try to determine what Plato meant, but he explains what follows according to the "sound," or univocal sense of Plato's words, since this univocal sense has misled many students of Plato (cf. *I de Anima*, lect. 8; *I de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 22, n. 8); (2) However, Plato's clear statement of moral precepts enables us to call him "the Preceptor" (cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, *passim*); (3) Since Plato was an outstandingly chaste man, it can be supposed that he had the other moral virtues at least in some degree (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 3); (4) Yet, although Plato was acquainted with the book of Genesis and explained part of it (*I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1; *de Pot.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 66, a. 1, ad 5; q. 74, a. 3, ad 4), he followed the false pagan opinion concerning sacrifice to the pagan gods (*Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 3).

We shall see shortly that all these conclusions have a bearing upon the attacks and defense regarding Plato. However, the first conclusion is most fundamental for understanding the history of Platonic thought after Plato. Since his writings are dialectical, the resolution thereof will be into one of the two possible contradictories implied in all dialectics. In general, the pagan disciples of Plato resolved the poetic dialectics by taking the figures and symbols to be *univocal* expressions of Plato's thought. Many of the early Fathers and Doctors of the Church rightly understood the *Dialogues* to be poetic and resolved the dialectics according to the demands of divinely revealed truth. St. Augustine records the two possible resolutions of Plato's dialectics in his own writings and shows how the conclusions drawn according to one resolution contradict those following according to the contrary resolution.

It is to be noted that St. Thomas concludes to Plato's lack of fitness for teaching, not on moral or psychological grounds, but on the basis of a logical analysis of the *Dialogues*, especially as regards the supposition of terms therein. Some modern attackers of Plato, basing their objections on the supposedly univocal expression in the *Dialogues*, claim his teachings to be definitely erroneous; they would do well to read St. Thomas' remarks in the referred commentaries on the *de Anima* and the *de Caelo et Mundo*. Others rashly attack Plato's morals. Those against whom Mr. Levinson writes judge according to Freudian principles and the pseudo-moral science drawn from these principles, and conclude that Plato was unfit to be a teacher because he was a Freudian misfit.

Unfortunately, the 674 pages of Mr. Levinson's proposed defense of Plato contain little more than a rambling dialectic, based, in turn, upon a dialectical analysis of Freud's teachings and upon history (which, in relation to science, is really only preparatory dialectics). In other words, Mr. Levinson tries to defend Plato's dialectic (which he does not recognize to be dialectic) by another intrinsic dialectics. Not relying upon the tradition of those who have resolved Plato's dialectic into true science, he does not indicate a true path for resolving the difficulties in the Preceptor's writings. And since defense must be based upon scientific grounds if it is to be a sure defense, we may conclude that Mr. Levinson does not really defend Plato.

Handbook of Logic. By Roland Houde and Jerome J. Fischer. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1954. Pp. 174, with index. $2.65.

Workbook of Logic. By Roland Houde and Jerome J. Fischer. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1954. Pp. 138. $1.75.

Roland Houde of the Department of Philosophy and Jerome J. Fischer of the Department of English, both of Villanova University, have successfully combined their talents to produce a new textbook on logic and a workbook companion. Throughout the work, the style is crisp and clear. The *Handbook* is intended for an introductory course in the subject and, as such, is adequate. The *Workbook,* undoubtedly, will receive a mixed response depending upon one's own prejudice for or against such a device. The *Handbook* comprises an interesting introduction followed by four main divisions, the first three devoted to the acts of the mind, while the final section deals with contemporary problems in logic.

It is encouraging to note that the authors continue the contemporary trend away from the old material and formal division of the subject, and as a result they achieve a solid presentation of the whole field of logic. Even though there is nothing startlingly new or original in the composition of the book, new examples, fresh and even witty, replace the hoary ones that have filled logic texts since Aristotle composed them. The list of suggested readings at the end of each chapter is superb in itself, but perhaps too ambitious for the average first year student of philosophy.

Exception must be taken to the failure to include any treatment of the Predicables. Such an omission, we believe, leaves the explanation of definition incomplete. Although the authors merely suggest or hint at the major problems in logic, their observations, often contained in the notes at the ends of the chapters, will be of interest to advanced logicians.

In general, however, these two books should be well received inasmuch as they achieve their purpose, the pleasing presentation of logic to neophytes.

Natural Right and History. By Leo Strauss. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. 323, with index. $5.00.

This expanded version of the author's Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures is devoted to a consideration of the reasons for the present day rejection of natural right by modern social science and an able examination of the development of the classical natural right doctrine of the Greek and Roman philosophers and a criticism of the fallacies in the natural right doctrines of certain "enlightened" philosophers of the eighteenth century. "The majority among the learned who still adhere to the principles of the Declaration of Independence interpret these principles not as expressive of natural right but as an ideal, if not as an ideology or as a myth. Present-day American social science, as far as it is not Roman Catholic social science, is dedicated to the proposition that all men are endowed by the evolutionary process or by a mysterious fate with many kinds of urges and aspirations, but certainly with no natural right." (p. 2)

Professor Strauss notes two reasons for the rejection of natural right by modern social science: *historicism*, the view that, as all human thought is historical, we are unable to grasp anything eternal, and the distinction between facts and values which arises from the view that we can know facts and their causes but are unable to answer questions of value because there cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought. The author seeks to overcome both of these reasons for rejecting natural right by going back to the pre-scientific and pre-philosophic "natural world" where the good was identified with the ancestral, and tracing the early development of the idea of natural right by the Greek and Roman philosophers. This is followed by critical analysis of the defective concepts of natural right propagated by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Edmund Burke.

Professor Strauss notes that the modern rejection of the principles of natural right, particularly as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, is due at least in part to the peculiar interpretation of natural right by eighteenth century philosophers who were unable to determine the ultimate goal of wise actions. This speaks well of the value of the Christian heritage and independent, critical attitude of the colonial leaders who though thoroughly familiar with the writings of those philosophers did not permit the disintegrating, corrosive effect of their ideas to undermine our Federal Constitution or to dominate the early decisions of our state and federal courts.

The scholarship evident in this work is impressive but the results are unsatisfying. By limiting himself to natural right, the author has been able to examine more exhaustively his subject matter, but only at the expense of doing so without either the assistance of the indispensible criteria of evaluation of the various natural right doctrines treated in his study or a complete appreciation of the causes of modern fallacies.

Natural right, as it implies a duty in others to recognize the right, depends upon justice for its enjoyment. The highest and basic norm of natural law in the narrow sense is that justice is to be done. Natural right is not justice and it is not natural law, yet it is only meaningful in the context of justice and natural law. Thus it is not surprising that this author without clearly distinguishing between natural right and natural law, brushes off the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas in a single paragraph in which he casts doubt on " whether the natural law as Thomas Aquinas understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i. e., a law knowable to the unassisted mind which is not illumined by divine revelation." (p. 163)

If Professor Strauss intends to indicate by this book what ought to be the natural right teaching, and not to make a careful comparison of doctrines, then he appears to either make antiquity the criterion for the true and the good or, like Thomas Jefferson, to choose those sections of the writings of philosophers which appeal to his natural predilections, omitting or contradicting those which do not.

St. Thomas on the Object of Geometry. By VINCENT E. SMITH. *The Aquinas Lecture, 1953.* Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954. Pp. 99. $2.00.

St. Thomas' contribution to the foundations of mathematics is not found neatly assembled in one classical *locus*, but rather is diffused through his innumerable works. The resulting complication to the task of the researcher would seem to have been a major factor in the eclipse of Thomistic thought in mathematics during the past few centuries. Vincent Smith, Aquinas Lecturer for 1953, here attempts to remedy the situation by singling out one of the key problems in the foundations of geometry and thoroughly exposing St. Thomas' solution to the difficulties it presents. Thus he makes a modest but worthwhile contribution that should bring modern minds to a better understanding of the universal genius of the Angelic Doctor.

The lecture may be divided into three parts, the first dealing with the nature of mathematical abstraction, the second with an analysis of quantified being, and the third with the problem of the continuum. Each of these represents a well-documented study of Thomistic texts on the respective subjects, with little original development other than the ordering and lucid exposition of the doctrine. The lecture concludes with a brief application of the matter presented to the problem of the relative validity of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Dr. Smith rightly defends Euclidean geometry as the only real science of continuous quantity, fortifying his position with metaphysical and dialectical arguments.

Of particular value in the study is the author's clarification of the senses in which form is used in mathematics, and his solution of some antinomies

proposed against the position that parts do not exist actually in the continuum. He also explains well the role of the imagination in mathematics. Without wishing to detract from the general excellence of the work, this reviewer would have appreciated more attention to the function of construction in geometrical demonstration, and to the criteria for distinguishing real and rational being in the science of geometry.

Relativity and Reality. By E. G. Barter. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 142. $4.75.

Ever since Einstein proposed his theory of special relativity in 1905, and each time that he has furnished successive emendations, there has been a flood of literature interpreting the relativity theory for the common man. By and large these interpretations have discredited the common sense position, insisting that man's primitive notions of space and time will have to be radically revised, and even arguing to the complete overthrow of the absolute in favor of an all-pervading relativism. The concern of some philosophers over the patent contradictions between the mathematical theories of relativity and the facts of everyday experience has made little impact on modern thought, largely because the facile explanations of logical positivism have universally shaken faith in the testimony of the senses. Thus it is refreshing to see a book that reopens the entire question of the relation between relativity and reality, and reinterprets the popular anomalies in such a way as to bring them back into accord with the facts of common sense. Mr. Barter does this in convincing style in his *Relativity and Reality,* presenting the case against mathematicism and positivism in a way that will delight the heart of any realist.

Unlike most books on relativity that are not specifically addressed to theoretical physicists, this is far from being a popular presentation. Rather it is a philosophical work, written by a person who comprehends the technical details of the relativity theories, yet selects only those points for discussion that have philosophical relevance. The author further defers graciously to savants in the positivist tradition, devoting two chapters to citations under the title of "Expert Opinion" before calmly exposing the absurdity of each position with a ruthless dialectic. The burden of his argument is that special relativity implies the very space at rest which it denies, while general relativity implies the straighteness of space from which its curvature departs.

This book will be heavy reading for one who does not have some technical competence in modern physics and mathematics. Yet it is a thorough piece of work, and will richly reward the investigator who is interested in a defense of realism against attacks from relativity enthusiasts who confuse their theories with the physical reality to which they apply.

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